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CHAPTER	1	-	INTRODUCTION	
Not	long	ago,	the	seemingly	mundane	process	of	infrastructural	budgeting	in	Brazilian	local	governments	garnered	international	attention	from	academics	and	the	development	community.	In	a	few	municipalities,	citizens	were	allowed	direct	input	into	the	budgeting	process	for	the	first	time,	and	out	of	these	initial	experiences	came	an	innovation	called	Participatory	Budgeting	(PB).	Originally	linked	to	one	political	party	in	a	handful	of	Brazilian	cities,	PB	is	now	practiced	by	hundreds	of	Brazilian	municipalities,	and	many	more	local	governments	across	both	the	developing	and	developed	world.	Though	PB	has	become	a	part	of	the	mainstream	toolkit	for	local	development,	evidence	of	its	transformative	effects	that	seemed	so	clear	in	the	early	years	of	the	program	is	far	less	clear	for	this	much	more	diverse	set	of	PB	approaches	that	have	emerged	in	the	past	two	decades.	
Participatory	budgeting	was	first	implemented	in	Porto	Alegre	in	1989	as	an	institution	that	combined	a	venue	for	participation	with	administrative	reforms	drafted	with	the	goal	of	turning	rhetoric	about	public	participation	into	practice.	It	spread	quickly	from	a	handful	of	larger	cities	to	every	corner	of	the	country,	then	across	the	developing	world	as	it	was	promoted	as	a	centerpiece	of	poverty	reduction	efforts	by	major	international	organizations	such	as	the	World	Bank.	In	most	of	the	early	experiences,	spaces	were	opened	for	citizen	input	both	directly	in	large	assemblies	and	indirectly	through	representatives	who	met	in	smaller	settings	more	suitable	for	deliberation.	Administrative	reforms	centralized	budgetary	control	under	the	mayor’s	office,	and	participatory	budgeting	had	an	institutionalized	role	in	the	annual	budgetary	planning	
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process	(Fedozzi	2001).	Finally,	cities	took	it	upon	themselves	to	mobilize	traditionally	underrepresented	residents	through	direct	community	mobilization	and	a	focus	on	small	infrastructure	projects	that	could	quickly	demonstrate	that	participation	translated	into	concrete	benefits	for	one’s	community	(Abers	2000).	As	the	institution	has	spread	over	nearly	30	years,	there	has	been	a	tendency	for	cities	to	focus	only	on	seeking	public	input	regarding	the	budget	rather	than	the	more	extensive	participatory	opportunities	found	in	earlier	versions	of	the	approach	(Baiocchi	&	Ganuza	2014).	Despite	this	significant	change	in	program	design,	much	of	the	existing	empirical	research	on	PB’s	effects	has	been	conducted	under	the	assumption	that	these	simplified	programs	will	produce	the	same	outcomes	as	those	found	in	the	original	versions	of	the	program.	
This	dissertation	explores	the	budgetary	and	development	impact	of	the	various	forms	of	participatory	budgeting	that	have	emerged	in	recent	years,	focusing	on	the	role	
that	differences	in	institutional	design	play	in	program	outcomes.	I	find	that	the	mere	opening	of	public	space	for	discussion	is	insufficient	to	ensure	that	government	acts	on	the	input	it	receives	from	citizens.	The	rules	that	structure	how	participation	takes	place	must	adequately	facilitate	and	incentivize	the	participation	of	individuals	and	communities	with	little	previous	history	in	civic	activism	so	that	they	can	engage	as	equals	alongside	the	groups	that	typically	dominate	policy	debate	in	public	fora.		Participants	must	be	provided	with	the	support	necessary	to	make	informed	decisions	as	to	what	demands	of	theirs	may	be	fiscally	or	technically	viable	and	within	the	scope	of	that	year’s	budget.	To	ensure	that	these	decisions	make	it	into	the	final	budget,	the	implementing	government	must	carry	out	administrative	reforms	that	limit	the	ability	of	legislators	and	bureaucrats	to	impede	their	full	and	faithful	execution.	These	additional	aspects	of	the	program	are	not	necessarily	
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adopted	in	conjunction	with	the	basic	structure	of	neighborhood	meetings,	leading	to	an	increasing	gap	between	what	is	considered	minimally	sufficient	for	a	program	to	be	called	PB	and	what	first	grabbed	the	attention	of	the	international	community.	
The	trajectory	of	participatory	budgeting	within	Brazil	across	almost	30	years	proves	to	be	particularly	fertile	terrain	for	a	mixed-methods	approach	that	looks	at	institutional	design	as	a	possible	window	towards	explaining	how	participatory	institutions	work.	Given	the	substantial	interest	of	international	organizations	and	scholars	from	different	academic	disciplines	across	the	globe,	there	is	a	strong	body	of	qualitative	multidisciplinary	literature	that	focuses	on	PB	which	proved	to	be	indispensable	in	the	theory-building	phase	of	this	project.	My	own	research	then	uses	differences	in	what	is	practiced	under	the	“participatory	budgeting”	label	within	the	country	provide	an	opportunity	to	test	this	theory	by	comparing	between	programs	and	isolating	specific	features	that	I	argue	are	crucial	for	popular	participation	to	effectively	lead	to	changes	in	government	behavior.	
This	dissertation	explores	a	series	of	propositions	derived	from	early	studies	of	exceptional	cases	of	participatory	budgeting	on	a	Brazilian	nationwide	data	set	that	aim	to	identify	the	institutional	aspects	of	PB	responsible	for	the	program’s	early	success	by	evaluating	the	specific	causal	mechanisms	through	which	such	promise	should	emerge.	I	put	forth	propositions	derived	from	findings	of	early	case	studies	and	test	them	using	a	data	set	that	covers	the	period	from	1989	to	2014.	In	the	process,	I	attempt	to	bridge	the	gap	between	the	optimism	surrounding	early	work	on	participatory	budgeting	and	later	
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research	that	produced	far	more	mixed	findings	regarding	PB’s	impact	with	respect	to	policy	outcomes	and	citizen	participation	in	local	politics.		
To	measure	participatory	budgeting’s	spread	in	Brazil,	I	combine	original	research	with	an	existing	data	set	to	categorize	PB	cases	according	to	the	scope	of	program	implementation	based	on	a	series	of	objective	criteria.	In	the	process,	I	make	a	key	distinction	between	the	programs	in	which	participation	is	effectively	linked	to	institutional	mechanisms	that	provide	a	path	towards	citizen	empowerment	and	those	in	which	public	debates	merely	serve	to	communicate	public	preferences.	This	programmatic	distinction	proves	to	be	critical	in	understanding	differences	in	PB	outcomes.	To	our	wider	understanding	of	participatory	policy,	this	points	to	the	need	to	pay	attention	to	the	details	of	such	policies	rather	than	focus	only	on	their	presence	or	absence.	
Participatory	Budgeting	in	Brazil	–	Context	and	Institutions	
In	its	most	basic	format,	Participatory	Budgeting,	or	PB,	is	a	mechanism	that	creates	institutional	spaces	for	community	participation	in	determining	the	use	of	public	resources.	Most	commonly,	PB	involves	the	portion	of	the	budget	dedicated	to	infrastructure	capital	expenditures.	Decisions	on	how	and	where	to	allocate	these	funds	are	opened	to	debate	in	neighborhood	and	regional	fora.	Different	institutional	structures	with	PB-like	elements	have	been	tried	around	the	world	since	at	least	the	early	1980s	(Costa	2010),	but	PB’s	“birth”	is	most	often	credited	to	the	southern	Brazilian	city	of	Porto	Alegre,	where	PB	was	launched	in	1989	after	the	election	of	Olivio	Dutra	of	the	Workers’	Party	(Partido	dos	Trabalhadores,	or	PT).		
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Although	details	vary,	there	is	a	basic	model	that	guides	the	implementation	of	PB	both	in	Brazil	and	worldwide.	First,	the	municipality	is	divided	into	regions	and	districts	whose	infrastructure	needs	are	subsequently	measured	and	indexed.	The	administration	then	sends	a	budget	proposal	to	a	regional	plenary,	where	specific	proposals	are	voted	on	in	neighborhood	meetings.	At	the	second	regional	plenary,	priorities	of	different	needs	for	that	year	are	ranked	and	councilors	are	elected	who	then	sit	on	a	citywide	Participatory	Budget	Council.	This	Council	then	participates	in	final	negotiations	among	themselves	and	with	the	administration	to	create	a	budget	that	is	sent	to	the	municipal	legislature	for	approval.	In	the	last	25	years,	this	approach	to	municipal	budgeting	has	spread	first	throughout	Brazil	and	then	to	other	countries	across	the	world,	gaining	the	approval	of	international	development	organizations	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	the	United	Nations	Development	Program	(Ganuza	&	Baiocchi	2012).	
The	basic	original	model	for	PB1	works	on	an	annual	cycle	beginning	with	meetings	that	all	citizens	are	welcome	to	attend.	Although	attendance	is	open,	voting	rights	are	exclusive	to	residents	of	the	area	in	which	these	meetings	are	taking	place.	Neighborhoods	are	clustered	together	into	districts	or	regions	based	on	both	geographical	and	socio-economic	proximity,	and	are	roughly	equal	in	population	across	a	city.	Representatives	elected	the	preceding	year	explain	the	conclusion	of	the	past	year’s	budget	process,	with	government	officials	on	hand	to	provide	any	necessary	clarification.	The	floor	is	open	to	discussion	and	questions	regarding	the	final	budget	as	well	as	about	the	status	of	investment	projects	voted	on	in	the	prior	year’s	assemblies.																																																									
1 See Abers 2000, 2003, Baiocchi 2005 and Fedozzi 1998, 2000 for a full description of the first 
PB program in Porto Alegre and Avritzer (2009) and Wampler (2007) for comparative treatments 
of a selection of early, notable cases. 
		6	
After	these	regional	meetings,	there	are	smaller	meetings	held	at	the	neighborhood	level	that	are	open	to	all	residents,	where	the	status	of	proposals	from	last	year	is	further	disseminated.	Following	this	phase,	those	same	neighborhood	assemblies	vote	to	prioritize	investment	projects	for	the	community,	as	well	as	to	select	delegates	to	attend	to	the	regional	assemblies	on	behalf	of	the	neighborhood.	An	important	aspect	of	these	neighborhood-level	meetings	is	that	numerical	representation	at	the	regional-level	is	based	not	on	neighborhood	population	but	on	the	number	of	participants	in	the	neighborhood	
meetings.	The	ability	of	a	neighborhood	organization	to	mobilize	residents	to	attend	these	meetings	then	has	an	important	effect	on	the	ability	of	the	neighborhood	to	secure	the	resources	it	desires	(Abers	2000).		
Participatory	budgeting	has	appealed	to	planners,	politicians	and	scholars	as	a	pragmatic	way	to	lessen	corruption,	increase	government	efficiency,	heighten	citizen	involvement	in	local	affairs,	and	better	target	government	spending	on	the	poorest	and	most	marginalized	areas	of	a	city	(Avritzer	2010).	Advocates	say	that	PB	has	the	possibility	to	transform	politics,	empowering	traditionally	marginalized	sectors	of	the	population	and	weakening	previous	clientelist	relationships	(Nylen	2002).	Economists	such	as	Joseph	Stiglitz	(2002)	point	to	the	positive	benefit	of	participatory	processes	on	long-term	development	by	creating	community	ownership	of	developmental	projects.	According	to	this	logic,	the	changes	in	policy	necessary	for	economic	development	become	more	palatable	to	the	community,	in	part	because	citizens	do	not	feel	left	out	of	the	process	of	policy	formation	but	rather	become	stakeholders	with	a	vested	interest	in	the	success	of	the	policy.	
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Participatory	democracy	theorists	argue	that	participation	creates	more	politically	astute	citizens,	expands	the	democratic	sphere	to	new	sectors	of	society	and	leads	to	more	equitable	policies	and	politics	(Hilmer	2010).	In	participatory	co-governance	systems,	the	relationship	between	state	and	society	becomes	more	horizontal,	and	accountability	relationships	are	strengthened	(Ackerman	2004).	Evidence	for	these	theoretical	benefits	of	participatory	budgeting	programs,	however,	is	decidedly	mixed,	with	early	research	indicating	that	such	benefits	do	emerge	while	later	research	offers	far	more	mixed	support	for	such	benefits.		
A	key	element	missing	in	most	of	this	research,	though,	is	systematic	attention	to	variations	in	the	design	of	PB	that,	I	argue,	produce	decidedly	different	participatory	and	development	policy	outcomes.	Before	delving	into	these	differences	in	more	detail,	I	first	offer	an	overview	of	the	PB	approach	from	its	origins	in	southern	Brazil	to	its	position	now	as	a	common	approach	to	local	budgeting	across	the	developing	world.		
A	Brief	History	
The	context	of	decentralization	and	democratization	under	which	PB	first	came	about	is	an	important	backdrop	for	locating	the	strategy	as	a	central	component	of	the	many	sweeping	administrative	reforms	carried	out	not	only	in	Brazil,	but	across	much	of	the	developing	world.	PB	was	designed	to	partially	address	the	institutional	crises	common	to	many	local	governments	that	revolved	around	an	increase	in	political	decentralization	without	a	parallel	increase	in	local	fiscal	or	administrative	power.	The	initial	success	of	PB	in	stabilizing	government	finances	and	shoring	up	popular	support	appealed	to	reformist	politicians	across	the	country	and	even	across	the	ideological	spectrum.			
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In	the	late	1980s	to	early	1990s,	PB	began	as	a	project	of	the	Workers’	Party	(PT)	in	places	that	had	experienced	a	boom	in	associational	life	at	the	end	of	the	country’s	dictatorship,	combining	a	party	with	origins	in	the	labor	movement	and	a	rapid	increase	in	neighborhood	organizations	and	local	civic	engagement	(Baiocchi	2003a).	Neighborhood	associations	and	the	PT	were	able	to	establish	a	close	relationship	in	part	because	both	involved	fairly	new	actors	and	activists	that	were	less	embedded	in	the	traditional	local	political	framework	(Earle	2013).	Porto	Alegre	stood	out	due	to	the	central	role	that	a	coalition	of	neighborhood	organizations	played	in	securing	victory	for	Olivo	Dutra,	the	local	PT’s	mayoral	candidate	(Avritzer	2009).	
In	Dutra’s	two	terms	as	Mayor	of	Porto	Alegre	(1989-1992,	1993-1996),	PB	attracted	a	great	deal	of	attention	for	its	performance	on	a	number	of	dimensions.	Electorally,	popular	support	for	PB	helped	overshadow	the	mediocre	fiscal	performance	of	his	administration	during	the	reelection	campaign	(Novy	&	Leubolt	2005).	This	level	of	support	gave	Dutra	and	the	PT	the	political	capital	necessary	to	pass	progressive	taxation	reforms	through	a	city	council	in	which	their	coalition	held	only	10	of	33	seats	(Wampler	2004),	freeing	up	the	resources	to	increase	infrastructure	spending	from	only	two	percent	of	the	budget	in	1989	to	almost	20	percent	by	1994	(Baiocchi	2003a).	While	initial	numbers	of	PB	participants	stagnated	for	most	of	Dutra’s	first	term,	by	1993	6,000	people	were	participating	in	the	second-round	regional	meetings.	By	1995,	there	were	15,000	people	participating	across	different	assemblies,	1,000	people	working	as	councilors	or	delegates,	and	around	US$65	million	in	capital	expenditures	were	being	debated	(Rennó	&	Souza	2012).	Whereas	civil	society	contributed	individuals	who	filled	a	majority	of	
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leadership	positions	at	the	beginning,	within	a	decade	the	associational	density	of	the	city	more	than	doubled,	expanding	far	beyond	the	leadership	positions	(Avritzer	2009).	
The	development	benefits	of	Porto	Alegre’s	PB	program	quickly	emerged	as	well.	The	proportion	of	houses	in	the	city	with	a	connection	to	the	sewage	network	went	from	46	percent	in	1989	to	85	percent	in	1996.	Similarly,	the	percentage	of	households	with	running	water	went	from	85	to	98	percent	across	the	same	time	period	(Novy	&	Leubolt	2005).	Seemingly	mundane	projects	such	as	paving	a	dirt	street	or	creating	a	new	bus	stop	had	a	demonstration	effect	where	these	small	investments	would	increase	subsequent	levels	of	participation	by	lending	credibility	to	PB	(Abers	2000).	The	immediate	need	in	poor	communities	for	the	very	basic	infrastructure	elements	that	PB	was	designed	to	address	gave	members	of	these	communities	a	more	urgent	incentive	to	participate	than	neighborhoods	with	better	existing	infrastructure.	Driven	partially	by	this	need,	the	median	income	and	education	level	of	PB	participants	in	the	regional	assemblies	was,	and	largely	has	remained,	lower	than	the	overall	median	in	a	municipality	across	a	number	of	cases	(Wampler	2007).	While	the	regional	assemblies	targeted	the	immediate	needs	of	traditionally	marginalized	areas	of	the	city,	thematic	assemblies	were	introduced	in	Dutra’s	second	term	to	elicit	the	participation	of	middle-class	professionals	(Wampler	&	Avritzer	2004).	This	program	reform	appears	to	have	paid	off	in	terms	of	increased	trust	in	government	among	the	middle-class	,	as	well	as	decreasing	levels	of	tax	avoidance	despite	higher	tax	rates	(Schneider	&	Baquero	2006).		
	 By	1996,	PB	was	active	in	36	Brazilian	municipalities,	increasing	to	103	by	2000,	and	to	170	by	2004	(Avritzer	2009).	The	PT	included	promises	of	PB	in	the	“modo	petista	
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de	governar”	(PT	model	of	governing)	brand	they	used	to	expand	their	national	presence	in	the	late	1990s,	and	all	municipalities	with	over	100,000	inhabitants	that	were	governed	by	the	PT	at	some	point	between	1989-2004	adopted	PB	(Baiocchi	2003a).	Nonetheless,	PB	ceased	to	be	a	public	policy	unique	only	to	PT	administrations,	with	66	of	the	103	PB	programs	in	2000	carried	out	under	non-PT	local	governments	(Spada	2009).	A	combination	of	declining	adoption	by	PT	mayors	and	the	program’s	increasing	popularity	has	meant	that,	since	2000,	a	majority	of	ongoing	PB	cases	are	under	mayors	from	other	political	parties	(ibid.).	Data	that	runs	through	2014	show	that	this	has	remained	the	case.	
	 International	development	organizations	have	been,	in	many	cases,	actively	in	favor	of	spreading	the	PB	model	to	other	countries.	After	giving	Porto	Alegre	its	“best	practices”	award	in	1996,	UN-Habitat	created	a	whole	set	of	resources	accessible	for	local	activists	or	government	officials.	These	detail	what	PB	is	and	how	to	implement	it,	accompanied	by	dozens	of	case	studies	(Fernande,	2011).	Grants	to	foster	PB	have	come	from	USAID	and	the	United	National	Development	Program	(Ganuza	&	Baiocchi	2012).	Perhaps	the	most	notable	proponent	has	been	the	World	Bank.	Between	2002	an	2011,	the	World	Bank	has	issued	at	least	$280	million	of	grants	or	loans	supporting	PB	or	PB-related	projects	in	over	a	dozen	countries,	ranging	from	Mozambique	to	Kyrgyzstan	(Goldfrank	2012).	The	standard	relief	package	now	given	by	the	World	Bank	and	IMF	towards	Highly	Indebted	Poor	Countries	includes	the	need	for	locally	generated	economic	policy	studies	and	subsequent	programs	involving	partnerships	between	the	government	and	local	civil	society.	Partly	as	a	result	of	this,	the	country	with	the	most	PB	institutions	in	the	world	is	
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not	Brazil	but	Peru,	as	a	constitutional	reform	in	2003	made	PB	mandatory	for	all	sub-national	units	(McNulty	2012).2	
	 Participatory	budgeting,	at	least	within	Brazil,	has	not	been	just	a	way	to	determine	the	allocation	of	infrastructure	spending.	When	still	just	a	pet	project	of	the	then-unknown	Workers’	Party	at	the	beginning	of	democratization,	the	architects	of	PB	meant	it	to	be	part	of	a	wider,	large-scale	transformation	of	state-society	relationships	by	giving	citizens	effective	decision-making	power	and	reducing	inequalities	in	the	ability	of	communities	to	mobilize	for	change.	Once	spread	around	the	world,	however,	it	became	more	driven	by	such	concerns	as	reducing	corruption	and	streamlining	government	and	less	focused	on	the	particular	social	justice	concerns	which	had	initially	made	PB	a	noteworthy	policy	innovation.	However,	even	if	the	decision	to	implement	PB	and	its	design	features	in	recent	years	have	been	driven	by	a	simplification	of	the	program’s	original	intent,	the	approach	may	still	have	the	potential	to	have	a	wide-reaching	impact.	This	project	seeks	to	assess	the	extent	to	which	PB	can	achieve	these	more	transformative	goals,	such	as	passing	effective	control	of	budgetary	resources	to	average	citizens	and	helping	shift	spending	priorities	towards	poorer	communities,	in	the	absence	of	many	of	the	reforms	that	were	originally	intended	to	accompany	public	debate.	
																																																								
2 This refers specifically to units of local government with PB in place. While Peru’s population 
size is far less than Brazil, it has nearly 1,900 distritos, whereas the number of Brazilian 
municipalities that have adopted the program is estimated to be around 300 (Sintomer et al. 
2013). 
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Research	on	Participatory	Budgeting	and	its	Consequences	
Over	the	past	two	decades	the	study	of	participatory	budgeting,	and	other	mechanisms	and	institutions	placed	under	the	banner	of	“participatory”,	has	moved	from	theory-driven	case	studies	to	large-scale	quantitative	comparative	analysis.	There	is	a	reasonable	consensus	around	certain	factors	crucial	for	the	launching	and	effective	implementation	of	PB	and	similar	programs,	but	very	little	empirical	research	has	been	done	on	the	consequences	of	variations	in	the	institutional	design	of	programs	that	all	fall	under	the	generic	“participatory	budgeting”	label	(Speer	2012).	Scholars	have	mainly	focused	on	pre-existing	factors	of	both	the	government	and	of	civil	society	that	lead	to	participatory	institutions	with	varying	levels	of	autonomy,	influence,	inclusiveness	and	other	performance	metrics.	
	 As	participatory	budgeting	spread	across	the	globe	and	gained	popularity	within	the	development	community	during	the	1990s	and	early	2000s,	the	academic	enthusiasm	that	accompanied	its	initial	rise	turned	towards	qualified	skepticism	or,	more	commonly,	general	indifference	(Speer	2012).	The	cadre	of	political	scientists,	and	social	scientists	more	generally,	that	study	PB	has	shrunk	even	as	the	number	of	cases	of	PB	has	greatly	increased	(Cornwall,	Romano,	&	Shankland	2008),	leaving	much	that	has	happened	since	the	beginning	of	the	21st	century	uninvestigated	and	unexplained.	
One	primary	reason	for	this	fading	interest	in	PB	and	its	political	and	development	outcomes	is	the	rise	of	other	innovative	programs	by	the	leader	of	the	Worker’s	Party	and	president	of	Brazil	from	2003-2011,Lula	da	Silva.	Most	notably,	Lula’s	conditional	cash	transfer	program	known	as	Bolsa	Família	captured	the	attention	of	academics,	
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policymakers,	and	the	development	community	in	ways	that	have	led	to	the	virtual	disappearance	of	PB	research	efforts,	despite	the	fact	that	PB	has	remained	a	budgeting	approach	found	across	Brazil	to	the	present	day.	The	shine	of	PB	has	faded	so	much	that	the	PT,	the	very	party	that	introduced	it	and	embraced	becoming	its	standard-bearer,	dropped	any	mention	of	the	approach	in	its	national	policy	platform	after	Lula	became	president	(Albert	2010).	Among	468	of	the	largest	Brazilian	municipalities,	the	total	number	implementing	PB	has	moved	from	129	in	2004	to	99	in	2012,	putting	a	stop	to	what	had	until	then	been	a	continuous	upward	trajectory.	This	reversal	has	been	sharpest	where	one	would	least	expect,	with	the	share	of	PT-led	cities	with	participatory	budgeting	in	place	dropping	from	89%	to	58%	during	the	same	period	in	time	(Spada	2014:	16).	
	 Alongside	the	change	in	attitude	among	Brazilian	politicians	and	policymakers,	the	initial	enthusiasm	within	academic	circles	towards	PB	has	also	dampened.	The	literature	on	participatory	budgeting	can	be	divided	into	two	distinct	phases	with	different	methodologies	and	theoretical	perspectives.	The	first	phase	focused	on	in-depth	case	studies	of	notable	PB	programs,	in	many	cases	with	the	hope	that	PB	could	be	the	answer	to	a	series	of	issues	democracy	faced	on	the	local	level	both	in	Brazil	and	in	the	developing	world	more	generally.	Perhaps	the	best	known	among	these	works	is	that	of	Abers	(2000),	a	comprehensive	assessment	of	PB	as	practiced	in	Porto	Alegre.	Scholars	looked	at	these	cases	and	saw	possibilities	for	inequalities	to	be	reduced	via	public	deliberation	(Baiocchi	2003b),	for	the	marginalized	to	become	empowered	(Nylen	2002)	and	for	the	orientation	of	the	government	to	become	more	targeted	at	the	poorest	communities	of	a	city	(Novy	&	Leubolt	2005).		
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In	this	first	phase	of	research	on	PB,	only	a	very	small	set	of	municipalities	were	studied,	with	Porto	Alegre	most	commonly	being	the	central	focus	(Speer	2012).	In	the	first	decade	of	Latin	America’s	recent	period	of	democratization,	there	was	hope	that	popular	participation	through	channels	such	as	PB	could	ameliorate	the	yawning	economic	and	political	inequalities	that	characterized	many	of	the	region’s	countries.	
In	contrast	to	these	early,	positive	returns	from	research	on	the	political	and	development	impact	of	PB,	more	recent	work,	based	on	analyses	of	a	larger,	more	diverse	set	of	local	experiences,	has	produced	far	more	mixed	assessments	of	the	PB	approach	(Goldfrank	2012).	This	second	phase,	beginning	in	the	early-2000s,	has	involved	larger	sample	sizes	and	a	more	extensive	use	of	quantitative	comparative	research	methods	with	an	emphasis	on	discovering	the	reasons	behind	the	wide	variance	in	outcomes	across	the	many	cases	local	governments	implementing	some	form	of	PB	(World	Bank	2008;	Boulder	&	Wampler,	2010;	Gonçalves,	2014).	The	comparatively	muted	results	from	these	works	has	done	little	to	encourage	renewed	attention	in	the	program,	and	even	in	its	birthplace	of	Porto	Alegre	PB	has	become	a	shadow	of	what	it	once	was	(Melgar	2014;	Rennó	&	Souza	2012).		The	failure	of	PB	to	radically	transform	local	government	and	bring	about	full	participatory	democracy	seems	to	have	overshadowed	for	some	in	these	communities	the	possibility	that	PB	may	have	had	more	modest	yet	still	significant	long-term	political	and	development	benefits	(Nylen	2011).	A	main	objective	motivating	this	project	is	to	re-assess	the	PB	legacy	as	the	approach	nears	its	third	decade	of	existence	in	Brazil.	
	 As	PB	has	spread	internationally,	cross-national	research	has	been	made	possible	and	encouraged	by	organizations	such	as	USAID,	the	World	Bank,	and	UN-Habitat.	While	
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this	has	led	to	findings	that	appear	more	generalizable	than	those	focused	only	on	Brazil,	variations	in	the	context	in	which	PB	was	introduced	have	been	substantial.	The	effort	of	administrative	reforms	that	accompany	PB	has	been	more	shallow,	even	more	so	when	introduced	from	national	governments	and	international	agencies	rather	than	by	the	municipality	itself	(Ganuza	&	Baiocchi	2012)	.	In	cases	like	Uganda	and	Peru,	PB	mechanisms	had	to	be	put	into	place	in	all	subnational	units	as	a	result	of	aid	packages	within	a	short	time	frame.		
In	other	situations,	scholars	have	aggregated	different	mechanisms	of	popular	participation	under	different	umbrella	terms	such	as	“empowered	local	governance”	(Fung	&	Wright	2003)	and	“transparency	and	accountability	initiatives”	(Gaventa	&	McGee	2011)	that	center	on	the	basic	element	of	citizen	participation	in	some	aspect	of	decision-making,	controlling	typically	for	the	national	context	of	these	initiatives	without	taking	into	account	features	of	the	mechanisms	of	participation	themselves.	A	recent	large	sample	quantitative	study	of	the	effects	of	participatory	institutions	looks	at	community-run	schools	in	rural	Guatemala	as	the	unit	from	which	broader	conclusions	are	made	(Altschuler	&	Corrales	2012).	The	extent	to	which	the	authors’	positive,	albeit	heavily	qualified,	conclusions	about	these	USAID	funded	schools	in	a	centralized	political	system	can	be	applied	to	a	PB	program	implemented	in	an	urban	environment	within	federalist	Brazil	is	questionable.	Similarly,	the	limited,	but	growing,	research	on	PB	reforms	in	Peru,	where	the	approach	to	local	budgeting	is	now	common,	has	found	that	severe	limitations	on	the	spending	capacity	of	local	governments	throughout	the	country	has	undermined	PB	in	ways	not	found	in	Brazil	(Loayza,	Rigolini,	&	Calvo-González	2011).	
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In	sum,	this	second	phase	of	PB	research	has	led	to	the	general	view	that	the	previous	high	hopes	of	PB	have	not	come	to	fruition	as	the	institution	has	spread	to	a	greater	number	of	municipalities	and	national	settings.	On	one	end	of	the	equation,	the	findings	of	both	newer	case	studies	and	larger	comparative	research	indicate	a	series	of	prerequisites	for	PB	to	flourish	that	have	not	been	met	in	most	contemporary	cases.	First,	the	effects	of	PB	may	not	be	strong	enough	to	offset	previous	political	legacies	of	clientelism	and	patrimonialism	(Reiter	2008).	Second,	the	success	of	the	PB	approach	may	be	contingent	on	the	continued	occupation	of	the	mayor’s	office	by	the	PT	(Baiocchi,	Heller,	&	Silva	2011;	Pereira	&	Rennó	2003).	Finally,	the	motivations	of	later	adopters	of	PB	may	be	less	altruistic	and	more	opportunistic,	leading	to	the	distortion	of	PB	and	its	intended	political	and	development	benefits	(Wampler	2009).		
Purpose	and	Outline	of	the	Dissertation	
This	dissertation	is	motivated	by	a	need	to	bridge	the	gap	between	early	hopes	that	participatory	budgeting	once	held	as	a	democratic	innovation	and	its	current	status	as	a	relatively	benign	part	of	internationally	recognized	best	practices.	To	what	extent	did	the	transformative	effect	attributed	to	PB	when	it	was	first	implemented	reflect	the	hopes	and	ambition	of	a	political	party	during	Brazil’s	democratic	transition	rather	than	an	answer	to	important	issues	in	contemporary	representative	politics	across	the	globe?	How	does	PB	as	practiced	today	systematically	differ	from	these	first	experiences?	To	what	degree	do	we	need	to	adapt	the	methods	we	use	to	study	PB	in	order	to	deal	with	the	continuously	growing	set	of	participatory	programs	carried	out	using	the	PB	label?		
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I	question	the	prevailing	decision	to	rely	on	minimalist	definitions	centered	on	the	public	assembly	aspect	of	PB	for	two	main	reasons.	First,	a	characterization	of	PB	as	merely	an	annual	neighborhood	assembly	to	discuss	the	budget	ignores	a	host	of	other	institutional	features	common	to	earlier	programs.	These	included	internal	administrative	reforms	and	the	adoption	of	particular	rules	and	incentives,	which	are	essential	parts	of	participatory	budgeting	as	it	was	originally	conceived.	Secondly,	the	increasing	proliferation	of	local	experiences	that	borrow	only	selectively	from	the	original	model	makes	it	increasingly	untenable	to	assume	that	all	PB	programs	are	the	same,	and	it	is	the	variation	within	that	PB	label	that	I	explore	in	this	project.	
	 This	dissertation	is	organized	by	chapter	with	each	focused	on	a	distinct	analysis	of	PB’s	impact	on	the	decision-making	and	development	impacts	of	PB	across	Brazilian	municipalities	from	its	beginning	in	1989	through	2014.	Chapter	2	begins	by	putting	forth	a	new	working	conceptualization	of	participatory	budgeting	that	allows	for	a	distinction	between	institutional	formats.	Reviewing	the	definition	that	has	most	frequently	been	used	to	define	PB	for	the	purpose	of	comparative	analysis,	I	highlight	its	limitation	in	distinguishing	between	the	distinct	forms	of	PB	adopted	across	Brazil	over	the	past	three	decades.	These	distinctions,	I	then	argue,	are	critical	in	identifying	and	understanding	better	the	different	budgeting	and	development	outcomes	that	I	find	in	subsequent	chapters.		I	conclude	Chapter	2	with	the	introduction	of	five	additional	criteria	for	identifying	PB	programs	that	will	capture	the	elements	of	the	approach	that	should	be	most	likely	to	produce	a	cycle	of	positive	reinforcement	with	regard	to	the	role	of	common	citizens	in	public	affairs.	I	then	apply	these	criteria	to	all	Brazilian	municipalities	with	over	50,000	inhabitants.	
		18	
	 Chapter	3	begins	my	quantitative	evaluation	of	PB	in	Brazil	over	the	past	three	decades.	The	hypotheses	tested	in	this	chapter	relate	to	the	expected	impact	that	participatory	budgeting	should	have	on	municipal	government	spending	patterns.	Theoretically,	we	should	find	key	differences	in	the	budget	allocation	decisions	between	those	municipalities	with	the	most	advanced	form	of	PB	in	place	and	their	counterparts	with	no	PB	institution	in	place	or	those	with	incomplete	PB.	In	those	governments	with	full	PB	we	should	find	budgets	that	more	fully	reflect	the	types	of	preferences	most	commonly	raised	in	the	form	of	popular	demands	(e.g.	potable	water	projects	in	underserved	neighborhoods).	With	a	data	set	that	includes	annual	budgetary	data	covering	16	years	across	hundreds	of	Brazilian	municipalities,	I	can	empirically	take	into	account	and	address	any	systematic	differences	that	may	exist	between	adopting	and	non-adopting	municipalities	that	may	also	influence	spending	decisions	and	development	outcomes.	
	 Chapter	4	moves	from	an	analysis	of	local	government	budgets	to	an	evaluation	of	municipal	public	good	provision,	with	a	comparison	of	household	access	to	basic	services	over	the	past	two	decades.	PB	provides	incentives	for	participants	to	mobilize	around	issues	within	their	neighborhood	and	targets	communities	with	the	greatest	level	of	need,	which	means	that	the	clearest	policy	output	should	take	the	form	of	substantive	improvements	in	access	to	basic	necessities	such	as	potable	water,	sewerage	and	trash	collection.	Access	to	each	of	these	is	then	broken	down	by	income	category,	to	see	if	the	benefits	do	in	fact	accumulate	primarily	to	the	poorest	residents	of	a	city.	
	 Chapter	5	concludes	the	empirical	assessment	of	PB	in	Brazil	through	a	comparative	case	study	of	six	smaller	municipalities	in	the	Southern	Brazilian	state	of	Rio	Grande	do	Sul.	
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The	state-level	Workers’	Party	has	maintained	a	nearly	universal	commitment	to	implementing	PB	wherever	they	have	been	elected	since	1988	despite	the	party’s	national	trend	of	loosening	this	obligation	since	the	party’s	presidential	victory	in	2002.	Combined	with	the	party’s	strong	presence	in	the	state,	my	data	show	that	Rio	Grande	do	Sul	has	consistently	had	one	of	the	highest	rates	of	PB	coverage	in	all	of	Brazil.	The	common	shared	template	provided	by	Porto	Alegre’s	experience	has	nonetheless	led	to	substantially	different	programs	carried	out	under	the	banner	of	participatory	budgeting,	allowing	for	a	unique	opportunity	to	understand	how	and	why	mayors	adopt	forms	of	PB	that	vary	in	the	way	in	which	they	delegate	authority	to	citizens,	and	what	the	consequences	of	these	choices	may	be	for	the	larger	goals	of	the	PB	strategy.	Chapter	6	concludes	with	a	review	of	the	findings	as	well	as	a	discussion	of	their	potential	implications.		 	
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CHAPTER	2	–	DEFINING	AND	IDENTIFYING	PARTICIPATORY	BUDGETING	
	 The	spread	of	participatory	budgeting	(PB)	over	the	past	25	years	has	taken	it	across	borders	and	boundaries	both	ideological	and	geographical	in	nature,	and	there	now	exist	countless	experiments	around	the	world	where	people	have	taken	PB	as	a	model	and	adapted	it	to	fit	local	circumstances.	This	malleability,	however,	poses	significant	challenges	for	comparative	research	into	the	extent	to	which	the	PB	design	has	realized	the	participatory	and	governance	goals	laid	out	by	its	proponents.	Scholars	and	development	practitioners	are	no	longer	able	to	simply	identify	PB	programs	by	name	alone.	Far	too	much	potentially	significant	design	variation	exists	within	the	generic	category	of	Participatory	Budgeting	for	an	adequate	evaluation	of	the	strategy	to	be	conducted	without	a	more	nuanced	approach.		
Understanding	the	degree	to	which	local	efforts	to	implement	PB	actually	result	in	programs	that	could	be	expected	to	have	transformative	capabilities	is	a	necessary	first	step	toward	distinguishing	between	these	different	types	of	programs.	Porto	Alegre	may	have	served	as	a	model	for	many	of	these	experiences,	but	the	very	nature	of	PB	as	something	that	is	designed	and	implemented	autonomously	by	substantially	different	local	governments	makes	it	difficult	to	identify	a	universal	set	of	characteristics	that	remain	faithful	to	program	as	it	was	initially	conceived.	
In	order	to	manage	this	increasing	diversity	under	the	umbrella	of	one	concept,	PB	researchers	have	tended	to	opt	for	one	of	two	strategies,	each	employing	distinct	methodological	tools.	One	approach	highlights	the	nuanced	differences	in	PB	programs	around	the	world	by	explicitly	focusing	on	those	differences	as	the	object	of	study.	Given	
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the	intensive,	case-specific	data	required	by	this	approach,	only	a	limited	number	of	these	works	employ	large-N	evaluations	of	the	consequences	of	such	program	differences.	The	other	approach	opts	for	a	large-N,	quantitative	approach	to	evaluating	PB’s	effects,	but	in	doing	so	relies	on	a	minimalist,	dichotomous	measurement	criterion	to	identify	those	municipalities	with	and	without	PB.	In	this	chapter,	I	introduce	a	categorical	approach	to	the	conceptualization	and	measurement	of	PB	that	incorporates	insights	and	findings	from	existing	case	study	research	while	also	seeking	to	develop	a	measure	of	PB	that	allows	for	a	large-N	assessment	of	PB	across	Brazilian	municipalities.	
The	value	of	the	comparative	case	study	approach	to	understanding	PB	in	Brazil	and	elsewhere	has	been	in	its	identification	of	critical	institutional	features	of	PB	that	should	theoretically	lead	to	distinct	development	and	citizen	engagement	outcomes.	By	highlighting	the	local	social	and	political	factors	that	enable	and	encourage	the	adoption	and	maintenance	of	PB	programs	with	different	institutional	formats,	this	research	provides	the	basis	for	developing	a	more	nuanced	categorization	of	different	types	of	PB.	Wampler	(2007),	for	example,	compares	eight	cities	that	implemented	PB	in	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000s.	He	breaks	down	the	different	factors	that	lead	a	PB	program	to	include	real	delegation	of	authority	to	citizens.	While	some	of	the	factors	found	to	be	relevant	are	related	to	the	socio-political	context	within	which	PB	is	implemented,	he	also	finds	that	the	rules	and	format	of	PB	are	themselves	important	in	shaping	the	behavior	of	government	officials	as	well	as	participants.	In	only	two	of	his	eight	cases	did	he	find	fully	successful	examples	of	delegated	authority,	while	he	classified	four	others	as	having	intermediate	levels	of	delegation.		It	is	precisely	this	type	of	research	that	provides	a	foundation	for	
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exploring	how	different	variations	of	PB	might	shape	the	political	and	development	effects	of	the	approach.	
Quantitative,	large-N	research	is	most	frequently	concerned	with	differences	between	PB	and	non-PB	towns	and	cities,	with	variation	among	PB	programs	accounted	for	through	the	use	of	interaction	variables.	Among	other	indicators,	studies	have	used	the	mayor’s	political	party	(Touchton	and	Wampler	2014),	socioeconomic	structure	(Gonçalves	2014)	and	GDP	per	capita	(Boulding	and	Wampler	2010)	as	proxies	for	the	relative	capability	of	a	given	program	to	have	an	effect	on	the	topic	of	interest.	The	operational	definition	used	to	code	the	data	is	not	always	made	explicit,	raising	the	possibility	that	cases	are	taken	to	be	PB	based	on	name	alone.	As	an	example,	Gonçalves	(2014)	conducted	a	study	of	Brazilian	municipalities	that	coded	municipalities	as	either	PB	or	non-PB	on	an	annual	basis	from	1986	to	2004	based	on	data	from	Workers’	Party	records	and	a	survey	conducted	by	a	group	of	social	movements	over	most	of	that	time	period.	Though	a	useful	contribution	to	our	understanding	of	PB	in	its	early	years,	the	limitations	of	this	somewhat	blunt	measure	make	conclusions	difficult	regarding	the	impact	that	variations	in	the	program’s	application	may	have	had	on	its	outcomes.	
I	propose	to	incorporate	what	is	known	about	the	diversity	of	practices	carried	out	under	the	banner	of	PB	into	a	generalizable	measure	that	I	then	employ	in	the	analytical	chapters	of	this	dissertation.	The	first	case	studies	of	Porto	Alegre	and	other	exceptional	success	stories	of	PB	implementation	are	in	many	ways	unrepresentative	of	the	universe	of	programs	that	now	carry	the	PB	label.	Though	many	local	governments	adopt	the	general	format	of	open	public	meetings	that	discuss	budgetary	matters,	most	do	not	implement	the	
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key	PB	reforms	that	institutionally	link	citizen	participation	to	actual	government	decision-making	(Baiocchi	&	Ganuza	2014).	A	suitable	definition	of	PB,	then,	must	take	into	account	both	its	basic	procedural	format	as	well	as	the	accompanying	innovations	that	formalize	links	between	citizens	and	their	local	budgetary	process.	Unfortunately,	the	prevailing	definition	used	in	quantitative	analysis	(Sintomer	et	al.	2013)	focuses	exclusively	on	the	communicative	dimension	of	PB,	leaving	out	features	that	may	be	necessary	for	the	program	to	have	an	effect	on	public	policy.		
The	conceptualization	and	measurement	of	participatory	budgeting	developed	in	this	chapter	builds	off	of	the	existing	criteria-based	approach	presented	by	Sintomer	et	al.	and	incorporates	criteria	related	to	two	additional	dimensions	of	participation,	interaction	between	participants	and	decision-making	authority	(Fung	2006).	I	include	criteria	that	specifically	relate	to	the	existence	of	institutional	design	mechanisms	that	favor	equal	participation	within	PB	itself,	incorporate	elements	of	both	direct	and	representative	democracy,	and	establish	a	common	understanding	that	the	final	decisions	reached	through	the	PB	process	are	binding.	I	argue	that	these	features	are	an	essential	part	as	to	how	participatory	budgeting	is	able	to	shift	government	behavior.		
For	the	remainder	of	this	chapter	I	have	several	objectives.	First,	I	offer	a	brief	review	of	the	existing	literature	on	participatory	budgeting	that	addresses	the	problems	with	the	various	measurement	approaches	developed	to	evaluate	PB	programs	and	their	impact.	Using	the	distinction	between	the	“communicative”	and	“empowerment”	dimensions	of	PB	made	by	Baiocchi	and	Ganuza	(2014),	I	then	offer	a	measurement	strategy	for	PB	that	relies	on	ten	criteria	to	capture	these	distinct	design	elements	that	I	argue	lie	at	the	core	of	PB.	
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The	first	set	of	these	criteria	focuses	on	the	existence	of	open	public	meetings	where	citizens	are	able	to	express	needs	and	preferences	in	a	government-led	forum.	The	second	set	of	criteria	deals	with	the	extent	to	which	these	public	spaces	involve	the	transfer	of	real	decision-making	power	to	the	average	citizen.	Using	these	criteria,	I	introduce	an	original	categorization	of	PB	cases	that	I	then	apply	to	a	data	set	that	includes	all	560	Brazilian	municipalities	with	over	50,000	inhabitants.		
In	constructing	this	data	set,	I	incorporate	a	wide	range	of	data	sources	that	allow	me	to	then	offer	a	more	nuanced	and	analytically	useful	coding	of	Brazilian	municipalities	and	the	extent	to	which	they	have	something	in	place	that	can	be	called	a	“participatory	budgeting”	program.	I	conclude	with	a	brief	presentation	of	the	results	of	this	recoding	and	discuss	the	potential	implications	for	the	hypothesis	testing	to	come	in	the	following	chapters.		
The	Problem	with	Current	Criteria	
Substantive	and	potentially	significant	differences	separate	the	most	recognized	handful	of	successful	PB	experiences	from	the	large	universe	of	local	government	public	policies	that	carry	the	same	name.	What	has	spread	under	the	PB	brand	has	not	always	been	a	faithful	replication	of	the	series	of	institutional	practices	first	implemented	in	Brazil	during	the	1990s.	Many	of	these	more	recent	manifestations	of	the	PB	approach	have	a	tendency	to	focus	only	on	some	of	the	most	visible	aspects	of	the	program	while	ignoring	the	deeper	institutional	reforms	that	facilitated	PB’s	early	successes.	Baiocchi	and	Ganuza	(2014)	characterize	initial	implementations	of	PB	as	being	composed	of	two	distinct	yet	
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equally	important	dimensions:	the	communicative	dimension	and	the	empowerment	
dimension.	
These	scholars	define	the	communicative	dimension	as	“the	open	structure	of	transparent	meetings	to	decide	on	projects	and	priorities	(…)	based	on	procedures	that	regulate	the	conditions	of	communication,	democratizing	the	nature	of	demand	making	in	civil	society”	(31).	The	empowerment	dimension	is	“the	coupling	of	the	assemblies	with	administrative	structures	(…)	through	real	democratic	reforms	of	the	state	apparatus”	(36).	To	the	authors,	it	was	the	combination	of	these	two	dimensions	that	gave	PB	its	transformative	potential,	while	the	most	common	form	of	PB	that	has	spread	throughout	Brazil	and	other	countries	in	recent	years	consists	of	primarily	the	communicative	dimension	with	only	a	limited	number	of	cases	where	the	empowerment	dimension	is	evident.		
Without	this	empowerment	dimension,	“the	danger	exists	that	Participatory	Budgeting	becomes	only	peripherally	connected	to	centers	of	power	and	instead	becomes	linked	to	small	discretionary	budgets,	bound	by	technical	criteria.	It	becomes	a	process	of	one-sided	democratization	that	brings	greater	transparency	and	social	justice	up	to	the	point	where	demands	are	delivered	to	state	officials;	what	happens	after	that	point	–	let	alone	what	portions	of	city	budgets	are	turned	over	to	the	popular	mandate	–	is	left	untouched”	(32).	Specific	reforms	include	the	centralization	of	planning	within	the	government,	the	decentralization	of	government	services	and	administration	and	the	involvement	of	representatives	of	different	departments	in	the	collection	of	popular	demands	(Ganuza	&	Baiocchi	2012).	
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In	another	approach	to	identifying	and	better	understand	the	relevance	of	the	unique	combination	of	institutional	features	found	across	the	wide	range	of	participatory	programs,	Archon	Fung	(2003;	2006)	proposed	a	“democracy	cube”	of	three	different	dimensions	along	which	participatory	mechanisms	could	vary	–	decision-making	procedure,	participant	selection	and	level	of	authority.	Each	dimension	is	composed	of	a	series	of	steps	from	least	to	most	participatory,	forming	a	three-dimensional	space	within	which	institutions	can	be	compared.	The	appropriateness	of	any	given	institutional	design	may	vary	depending	on	what	issues	public	participation	is	meant	to	address,	most	commonly	social	justice,	efficiency,	or	legitimacy.		
Fung	points	to	Porto	Alegre’s	PB	program	as	a	successful	case	of	addressing	social	justice	in	terms	of	increasing	the	government’s	spending	towards	meeting	the	needs	of	the	city’s	poorest	residents,	which	it	accomplishes	through	open	participation	with	targeted	incentives	that	wields	authority	over	decisions.	While	Fung	argues	that	the	decision-making	procedure	is	less	relevant	if	social	justice	is	a	program’s	primary	goal,	“mechanisms	that	increase	justice	in	this	way	can	only	do	so	if	they	exercise	direct	authority	over	relevant	decisions.	Because	they	typically	address	structures	of	corruption	and	exclusion	that	generate	benefits	for	the	advantaged,	the	recommendations	offered	by	merely	advisory	mechanisms	are	typically	ignored”	(2006,	72).	On	the	participant	selection	dimension,	PB	“increases	justice	in	public	governance	by	changing	the	actors	who	are	authorized	to	make	decisions	[…]	having	an	open	structure	of	participation	with	targeted	recruiting	(structural	incentives	that	target	the	poor)”	(ibid.).		
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In	a	similar	vein,	Wampler’s	(2012)	definition	of	the	core	principles	of	PB	distinguishes	between	voice	and	vote,	in	which	voice	consists	of	the	venues	and	opportunities	for	citizen	participation	and	vote	refers	to	the	effective	translation	of	that	participation	into	government	action.		While	traditional	participatory	programs	involve	consulting	the	public,	in	full	PB	programs,	“citizens	are	empowered	to	make	specific	decisions	regarding	public	resources	and	state	authority”	(4).	He	additionally	includes	two	further	essential	principles	of	PB	that	need	to	be	taken	into	consideration:	social	justice	and	citizen	oversight.	Social	justice	involves	the	mechanisms	employed	to	mobilize	the	poor	to	participate,	particularly	the	introduction	of	objective	criteria	through	which	resources	are	distributed	in	a	manner	benefitting	traditionally	marginalized	communities.	His	definition	of	oversight	goes	beyond	transparency	and	involves	a	transformation	of	local	administrative	processes	designed	to	enhance	participatory	inputs	and	public	feedback	on	how	policies	are	implemented.	
The	most	common	approach	to	measuring	participatory	budgeting	at	the	cross-national	level	views	five	minimal	criteria	as	necessary	for	a	local	participatory	program	to	be	classified	as	participatory	budgeting	(Sintomer	et	al.	2013).	In	what	I	will	refer	to	as	the	Sintomer	et	al.	criteria,	a	program	may	be	classified	as	PB	if	it	involves	the	following:	
1) Public	discussion	of	financial/budgetary	processes.	All	participatory	devices	might	concern	financial	questions	(for	example,	any	participatory	process	related	to	urban	planning	will	have	an	impact	on	costs	if	projects	become	bigger	or	smaller	than	previously	planned).	In	PB,	however,	the	participatory	process	is	centrally	based	on	the	question	of	how	a	limited	budget	should	be	used.		
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2) The	city	level	has	to	be	involved,	or	a	decentralized	district	with	an	elected	body	and	some	power	over	administration	and	resources,	matching	the	scale	of	representative	democratic	institutions.		3) It	has	to	be	a	repeated	process	over	years.	Consequently,	if	a	participatory	process	were	a	unique	event,	involving,	for	example,	a	one-time	referendum	on	financial	issues,	it	would	not	qualify	as	an	example	of	participatory	budgeting.	4) Some	sort	of	public	deliberation	must	be	included	within	the	framework	of	meetings	specifically	dedicated	to	PB.	However,	PB	deliberation	does	not	necessarily	directly	lead	to	decision-making.		5) Some	accountability	or	feedback	regarding	the	results	of	the	process	is	required,	such	as	whether	or	not	proposals	are	accepted.	(2-3).		
Drawing	from	the	above	discussion	on	the	communicative	and	empowerment	dimensions	of	PB	developed	by	Ganuza	and	Baiocchi	(2012)	it	is	clear	that	these	five	criteria	reflect	a	nearly	exclusive	concern	with	the	communicative	dimension	of	PB,	and	include	no	mention	of	any	linkages	between	the	participatory	process	and	the	local	state.	It	is	this	lack	of	explicit	attention	to	the	empowerment	dimension	of	PB	programs	in	most	large-N	evaluations	of	PB	that	leads	me	to	the	development	of	a	categorical	measurement	approach	for	PB	programs	that	will	allow	for	a	better	understanding	of	the	fiscal	and	development	consequences	of	PB.	
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Additional,	and	Necessary,	Criteria	for	Participatory	Budgeting	
I	propose	a	definition	of	participatory	budgeting	that	can	objectively	be	extended	to	a	wide	range	of	cases	while	also	including	a	series	of	relevant	institutional	features	left	out	of	the	Sintomer	et	al.	criteria.	Rather	than	treating	PB	as	a	uniform	and	standardized	policy	instrument,	my	approach	introduces	a	series	of	categories	that	take	into	account	the	substantial	heterogeneity	between	the	practices	that	are	adopted	using	the	label	of	participatory	budgeting.	I	use	Fung’s	democracy	cube	(2006)	and	the	distinction	between	the	communicative	and	empowerment	dimensions	of	PB	proposed	by	Baiocchi	and	Ganuza	(2014)	to	create	two	sets	of	five	criteria,	each	pertaining	to	one	of	these	dimensions	as	described	in	the	previous	section.	Treating	the	communicative	dimension	as	a	minimal	set	of	characteristics	for	a	given	program	to	be	accurately	considered	PB,	I	modify	Sintomer	et	al.’s	five	criteria	to	focus	exclusively	on	the	formal	basic	structure	of	participation	that	is	associated	with	PB.	I	then	present	an	additional	set	of	five	criteria	that	capture	institutional	features	that	deal	with	three	interrelated	issues:	linkages	between	participation	and	concrete	government	action,	the	amelioration	of	traditional	inequalities	in	political	participation,	and	shifting	government	investment	spending	towards	needier	communities.		
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Communicative	Dimension	Criteria	
1. PB	involves	citizens	communicating	demands	to	the	state	that	relate	to	the	public	provision	of	
goods	or	services.	
This	new	criterion	is	an	adaptation	of	the	requirement	that	PB	deals	with	budgetary	questions	and	scarce	resources.	This	removes	the	presumption	that	PB	be	integrated	into	the	process	of	elaborating	the	local	budget.	Citizens	making	claims	with	regards	to	local	government	spending	is	one	of	the	most	easily	observable	practices	common	across	PB	programs,	although	the	extent	to	which	this	helps	shape	the	final	budget	widely	varies.	
2. PB	is	implemented	by	the	municipal	government	and	involves	participation	that	takes	place	in	
decentralized,	territorially	based	units	such	as	neighborhoods,	zones	or	regions.	
The	level	at	which	citizens	engage	in	participation	is	a	critical	design	element	that	deserves	to	be	considered	as	a	necessary	component	for	any	program	to	be	considered	as	PB.	The	original	criteria	specifically	exclude	cases	of	“neighborhood	funds	in	relations	to	which	citizens	can	decide	about	a	concrete	amount	of	money,	but	without	having	any	influence	on	broader-scale	issues”	and	that	they	“consider	only	those	participatory	processes	with	a	similar	scale	to	that	of	the	elected	bodies	of	representative	democracy”	(Sintomer	et	al	2013,	11).	A	potential	interpretation	of	this	would	be	that,	for	a	program	to	count	as	PB,	it	would	have	to	involve	participation	that	takes	place	at	the	citywide	level.	While	Brazilian	PB	often	features	city-level	representative	bodies,	the	point	at	which	the	vast	majority	of	participants	engage	in	PB	is	at	the	neighborhood	or	regional	level.	Even	widely	lauded	PB	cases	such	as	Belo	Horizonte	had	only	regional	representative	bodies	for	
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over	a	decade	(Wampler	2007).	A	program	in	which	only	one	or	two	meetings	for	the	entire	city	were	held	at	a	central	location	would	make	it	more	difficult	for	residents	of	peripheral	neighborhoods	of	the	city	to	participate.	
3. PB	is	a	cyclical	process	intended	to	be	repeated	over	time.	
	 The	requirement	that	PB	must	be	a	repeated	process	over	years	is	used	by	Sintomer	et	al.	to	separate	PB	from	referenda	or	one	isolated	meeting.	While	this	distinction	is	important,	as	a	stand-alone	criterion	the	duration	with	which	a	potential	PB	case	is	in	existence	is	an	imperfect	measure	because	it	eliminates	cases	in	which	PB	was	cut	short	after	one	or	two	years	due	to	fiscal	crises	or	changes	in	the	government	in	power.	Instead	of	focusing	on	temporality,	this	new	criterion	is	concerned	with	PB	as	something	that	is	being	carried	out	as	if	it	were	to	be	a	recurrent	phenomenon.	A	case	may	qualify	as	PB	even	if	it	existed	for	only	one	or	two	years	if	throughout	the	time	it	was	in	place	it	was	meant	to	continue	further	but	was	ended	due	to	unforeseen	factors	exogenous	to	the	program’s	design.		
4. The	communication	of	public	preferences	through	direct	participation	according	to	a	
common	set	of	rules	and	procedures	in	exclusively	purposed	public	forums	that	are	both	
recognized	and	facilitated	by	the	local	government.	
The	corresponding	criterion	from	Sintomer	et	al.	is	that	public	deliberation	takes	place	within	specific	meetings	or	forums	dedicated	to	PB	rather	than	in	existing	institutional	spaces.	This	has	two	components	that,	when	combined,	provide	an	important	aspect	of	what	makes	PB	unique	–	the	use	of	participatory	institutional	design	to	inspire	
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public	deliberation.	Analytically,	the	institutional	aspect	alone	is	important.	Additionally,	objectively	determining	the	quality	of	the	communication	that	takes	place	in	the	public	forum	and	whether	it	qualifies	as	public	deliberation	is	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	when	dealing	with	a	large	number	of	cases.	It	is	realistic	to	establish	that	there	are	institutionalized	spaces	where	public	preferences	can	be	communicated,	and	have	some	set	of	rules	guiding	them	that	sets	them	apart	from	a	simple	collection	of	grievances	or	sporadic	meetings	in	communities	that	do	not	follow	a	calendar.	The	important	element	here	is	that	the	fact	that	the	government	is	supporting	this	participation	in	a	new	institutional	format	that	implies	at	least	a	partial	break	from	traditional	practices	of	making	budgetary	decisions	behind	closed	doors	without	direct	public	input.		
5. Actionable	information	pertaining	to	government	programs	and	spending	is	incorporated	
into	the	meeting	format.	
The	fifth	criteria	from	Sintomer	et	al.	is	that	there	is	some	process	of	accountability	in	which	participants	are	kept	informed	of	the	progress	towards	addressing	the	results	of	previous	deliberation.	This	must	be	adjusted	to	address	only	what	takes	place	within	the	public	assemblies,	given	that	government	action	regarding	demands	is	reserved	for	the	empowerment	dimension.	Therefore,	I	have	modified	this	criterion	to	imply	only	transparency	more	broadly	in	relation	to	government	spending,	informing	citizens	with	regards	to	how	the	budget	is	being	spent.		
		33	
Empowerment	Dimension	Criteria	
6. Individuals,	rather	than	civil	society	organizations,	are	the	base	unit	of	participation	and	
efforts	are	made	to	include	traditionally	excluded	members	of	society.	
The	first	of	the	empowerment-related	criteria	is	that	PB	engages	citizens	directly	rather	than	through	organizations.	While	civil	society	is	an	important	component	in	PB’s	development,	first	there	must	be	public	sphere	in	which	all	may	participate	independent	of	institutional	affiliations	(Lüchmann	2014).	This	is	important	not	just	from	a	perspective	of	procedural	fairness	in	the	public	forums	but	also	as	an	opportunity	for	PB	to	have	the	potential	to	empower	those	previously	unengaged	in	politics.	A	pro-poor	participatory	program	could	nonetheless	engage	exclusively	with	civil	society	organizations	(CSOs)	such	as	neighborhood	associations	as	interlocutors.	This	may	be	an	appealing	option	to	local	administrators	because	organizations	already	active	in	politics	have	the	organizational	capacity	to	more	easily	engage	in	dialogue	with	the	state.	The	strengthening	of	CSOs	is	in	fact	one	of	the	core	outcomes	of	interest	in	this	dissertation,	but	first	it	is	necessary	to	break	from	the	“spontaneous	mediation”	model	of	state-society	relations	where	associations	are	the	sole	connection	point	between	the	public	and	local	government	(Ganuza,	Nez	&	Morales	2014).	While	“associational	tradition”	is	heralded	as	one	of	the	principal	factors	behind	PB’s	success	in	Porto	Alegre	(Avritzer	2012),	it	is	important	to	clarify	that	civil	society	had	initially	proposed	that	associations	would	act	as	natural	representatives	of	the	public.	The	final	format	of	PB	when	implemented	differed	importantly	from	this,	and	was	based	on	the	principle	that	participation	should	be	open	to	all	without	privileging	any	person	or	organization	(Ganuza	&	Baiocchi	2012).		
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7. PB	culminates	in	the	generation	of	a	set	of	concrete	policy	proposals	involving	government	
spending	whose	execution	is	seen	as	(essentially)	binding	by	both	participants	and	
government.	
The	PB	process	should	lead	to	a	clear	set	of	demands	selected	by	participants	and	there	must	be	some	degree	of	obligation	that	these	demands	are	translated	into	real	government	action.	Under	the	Sintomer	et	al.	criteria	the	requirement	is	that	public	deliberation	takes	place,	while	the	authors	explicitly	state	that	this	deliberation	does	not	need	to	result	in	concrete	decisions	being	made.	In	contrast,	an	approach	geared	towards	empowerment	not	only	requires	that	decisions	be	made	but	also	that	these	decisions	lead	to	concrete	government	action.	As	opposed	to	other	existing	participatory	programs	that	are	primarily	interested	in	feedback	or	input	from	citizen,	with	PB	“the	key	democratic	breakthrough	was	that	citizens	vote	on	projects	that	are	then	implemented	by	the	local	state”	(Wampler	2012).	With	expectations	made	clear	with	regards	to	the	specific	demands	to	be	executed,	participants	can	then	hold	public	officials	accountable	in	a	way	that	would	be	impossible	if	public	deliberation	served	only	to	advise	or	orient	government	decision-making.	
The	legitimacy	of	the	demands	from	the	perspective	of	participants	comes	from	their	accurate	representation	of	popular	will	as	expressed	in	the	open	popular	assemblies.	The	“chain	of	popular	sovereignty”	described	by	Ganuza	&	Baiocchi	(2014)	requires	that	there	not	be	substantial	modifications	in	the	demands	from	their	proposal	to	their	execution.	For	the	government	to	treat	the	demands	as	legitimate,	the	demands	must	be	reasonably	within	the	capacity	of	the	local	government	to	execute.	The	structure	of	PB	
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should	guarantee	that	popular	demands	be	carried	out	as	faithfully	as	possible,	while	at	the	same	time	avoiding	the	unrealistic	expectations	that	often	prevail	with	respect	to	the	local	government’s	capacity	to	execute	demands.	This	can	be	addressed	through	a	phase	in	which	proposed	demands	pass	through	a	filter	of	technical	and	financial	viability	before	being	put	to	a	final	vote.	In	addition	to	this,	PB	representatives	may	work	with	government	officials	from	the	relevant	department	to	make	any	necessary	adjustments	before	final	approval.		
8. The	distribution	of	resources	within	PB	occurs	through	a	transparent	process	that	seeks	to	
address	traditional	geographical	and	socioeconomic	inequalities	in	the	access	to	public	goods	
and	public	investment	spending.	
Shifting	local	government	spending	in	infrastructure	and	public	services	towards	traditionally	neglected	neighborhoods	has	been	one	of	the	most	notable	organizing	principles	of	PB	related	to	social	justice.	Referred	to	by	PB	advocates	as	the	“inversion	of	priorities”,	this	involves	the	use	of	measurements	of	relative	need	to	award	a	proportionally	larger	share	of	PB-related	spending	to	the	regions	of	the	city	that	need	it	the	most.	Perhaps	the	most	sophisticated	mechanism	created	to	carry	this	out	can	be	seen	in	Belo	Horizonte,	which	adopted	the	Quality	of	Life	Index	(IQVU)	as	a	way	to	determine	resource	allocation.	The	IQVU	plays	a	central	role	in	the	distribution	of	a	portion	of	PB-related	resources	by	offering	a	comparative	assessment	of	neighborhood	poverty	levels	and	infrastructural	needs	within	a	region	using	an	indicator	that	featured	75	components	(Wampler	2007).	During	the	1990s,	Porto	Alegre	used	an	approach	in	which	each	demand	was	weighted	by	the	population	size	of	the	region	it	would	benefit,	the	relative	lack	of	
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infrastructure	in	that	region	and	the	level	of	priority	assigned	to	the	demand	in	the	assembly	(Fedozzi	2003).	The	minimally	sufficient	measure	to	meet	this	criterion	is	the	distribution	of	resources	through	rules	made	clear	to	participants.	When	spending	patterns	are	left	unclear	or	are	dependent	on	executive	discretion,	there	remains	the	possibility	that	traditional	clientelist	mechanisms	or	political	favoritism	remain	important	in	determining	how	PB	funds	are	spent.	
9. Participation	occurs	both	directly	and	through	representatives	in	a	multi-level	format.	
In	programs	that	contain	only	the	communicative	dimension	of	PB,	participation	is	centered	almost	exclusively	on	the	large	public	assemblies	in	which	citizen	present	their	demands.	My	modification	of	the	Sintomer	et	al.	criteria	requires	that	these	meetings	must	take	place	in	a	decentralized	manner,	at	the	neighborhood	or	regional	level.	This	facilitates	greater	participation	by	reducing	the	costs	of	attendance	while	also	reinforcing	the	focus	on	infrastructure	projects	with	local	impact.	However,	on	their	own,	these	assemblies	typically	meet	only	once	or	twice	a	year	and	do	not	address	the	process	through	which	demands	are	translated	into	projects	executed	by	the	local	government.	More	targeted	negotiations	with	the	government	about	the	final	form	and	implementation	of	the	projects	raised	in	the	assembly	are	better	served	by	the	existence	of	higher-level	bodies	formed	of	representatives	elected	in	the	assemblies	to	carry	out	this	function.	In	the	original	Porto	Alegre	model,	delegates	meet	at	the	regional	level	to	turn	popular	demands	into	concrete	proposals	for	the	budget	while	the	PB	Council	approves	the	final	investment	budget	as	a	whole.	
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The	presence	of	an	organized	body	overseeing	the	final	elaboration	of	the	budget	as	well	as	its	execution	helps	to	ensure	the	faithful	execution	of	popular	demands.	While	the	involvement	of	a	large	number	of	citizens	in	the	budgetary	process	may	be	the	most	visible	hallmark	of	PB	programs,	the	reality	of	translating	popular	will	into	government	action	requires	a	degree	of	adaptation	which	lacks	legitimacy	if	it	is	left	only	to	the	government	to	carry	out.	Delegates	and	councilors	also	learn	about	the	inner	workings	of	the	public	administration	in	a	more	focused	setting	than	the	average	participant,	something	that	could	translate	into	engaging	in	political	activity	outside	of	the	venues	association	with	PB.	
10. Administrative	reforms	are	implemented	that	integrate	citizen	participation	into	the	
decision-making	process	involving	both	the	elaboration	of	the	budget	and	its	execution,	with	
priority	given	towards	honoring	the	outcome	of	the	PB	process.	
The	final	and	most	demanding	requirement	for	a	program	to	be	considered	empowered	is	that	it	becomes	an	integrated	part	of	the	decision-making	process	surrounding	the	annual	budget.	Participants	should	interact	with	not	just	the	department	put	in	charge	of	organizing	the	yearly	cycle	of	meetings,	but	with	the	rest	of	the	local	agencies	charged	with	project	implementation	as	well.	This	is	the	strongest	way	to	guarantee	that	the	product	of	the	participatory	process	leads	to	actual	government	action,	which	then	demonstrates	to	all	those	who	contributed	time	and	effort	that	their	participation	can	provide	tangible	benefits.	Though	financial	and	technical	realities	make	the	possibility	that	the	PB	process	be	completely	binding	neither	realistic	nor	necessarily	desirable,	there	should	be	some	degree	of	obligation	on	the	part	of	public	officials	to	carry	
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out	popular	will	as	expressed	through	the	different	phases	of	the	PB	cycle	as	fully	and	faithfully	as	possible.		
Categories	of	PB	
Using	the	above	criteria,	I	divide	cases	into	two	broad	groups	–	multi-dimensional	participatory	budgeting	(MPB)	and	consultative3	participatory	budgeting	(CPB).	For	a	program	to	be	considered	MPB,	there	must	be	evidence	of	at	least	two	items	from	the	second	set	of	empowerment	criteria.	For	CPB,	only	the	first	five	basic,	communicative	criteria	are	met,	fitting	the	basic	Sintomer	et	al.	definition	but	including	no	more	than	one	of	the	five	additional	criteria.	MPB	has	two	sub-categories	based	on	the	number	of	empowerment	criteria	satisfied,	with	partial	MPB	referring	to	instances	where	two	or	three	are	present,	and	full	MPB	including	either	four	or	all	five.	In	the	following	section	I	will	use	examples	from	my	field	research	to	illustrate	each	of	these	categories.	I	then	present	the	data	collected	for	my	sample	of	Brazilian	municipalities	along	with	the	indicators	used	to	classify	each	individual	PB	program.	I	go	into	detail	as	to	the	way	coding	was	conducted,	the	decision	rules	used	to	classify	cases,	and	discuss	the	methodological	implications	of	this	approach.	Finally,	I	offer	an	overview,	based	on	this	measurement	strategy	as	applied	to	Brazilian	municipalities,	of	the	prevalence	of	each	type	of	PB	over	time.		
	
																																																								
3 In Brazil, councils, forums and other collegial bodies convened by the government as either 
consultivo or deliberativo. Consultivo, or consultative, is used in this context as a legal term to 
refer to bodies whose decisions are entirely non-binding. 
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I	have	three	categories	of	participatory	budgeting	that	will	serve	as	the	basis	for	my	measurement	approach.	These	three	categories	are:	
1. Consultative	Participatory	Budgeting	(CPB)	2. Partial	Multi-Dimensional	Participatory	Budgeting	(Partial	MPB)	3. Full	Multi-Dimensional	Participatory	Budgeting	(Full	MPB)				
Consultative	Participatory	Budgeting	[CPB]:	My	first,	and	most	basic,	category	of	PB	types	is	“consultative	participatory	budgeting.”	A	case	of	CPB	must,	at	a	minimum,	involve	citizens	articulating	demands	related	to	government	expenditures	on	an	annual	or	biannual	cycle	in	uniquely	purposed	public	fora	that	feature	some	transparency	regarding	government	spending	processes.	A	PB	program	that	falls	within	this	category	may	have	a	second	level	representative	body	but	its	duty	would	be	to	merely	oversee	the	execution	of	demands	raised	in	the	public	assemblies.	Meaningful	public	deliberation	may	occur	within	the	meetings	but	any	necessary	adaptations	of	the	demands	to	fit	technical	or	financial	realities	still	take	place	behind	closed	doors	and	without	additional	citizen	input.	There	is	little	to	no	dialog	between	the	government	and	the	public	during	the	planning	phases	where	demands	are	transformed	into	feasible	actions	that	the	government	can	execute.	
One	instance	of	CPB	is	the	participatory	budgeting	program	that	has	been	implemented	in	Vacaria,	a	municipality	of	around	60,000	inhabitants	located	in	a	primarily	agricultural	region	in	the	interior	of	Rio	Grande	do	Sul4.	PB	was	implemented	in	2009	following	the	election	of	Eloi	Poltronieri,	the	city’s	first	PT	mayor	who	remained	in	office																																																									
4 Background information collected across multiple visits in 2014 during the course of field 
research, including interviews with the Mayor, the PB Coordinator and the leader of the city’s 
Union of Neighborhood Associations. 
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until	2016.	The	basic	format	of	the	annual	PB	cycle	involves	a	series	of	regional	meetings	where	the	public	votes	on	a	series	of	demands	that	are	submitted	by	community	leaders	to	the	Mayor’s	Cabinet	prior	to	the	meeting.	The	mayor	himself	will	typically	begin	these	meetings	by	providing	a	general	account	of	the	different	components	of	the	local	budget,	and	a	review	of	different	public	works	and	investment	projects	carried	out	in	the	previous	cycle.	After	the	mayor	concludes	his	speech,	the	floor	is	open	for	debate	regarding	the	demands	up	for	a	vote,	although	by	the	mayor’s	own	account	it	is	rare	for	any	participant	to	speak	because	each	neighborhood	within	the	region	arrives	already	organized	around	a	specific	demand.	The	rules	state	that	the	government	is	obliged	to	execute	the	demand	that	receives	the	most	votes	while	the	second	and	third	are	optional	depending	on	the	availability	of	resources.	Delegates	are	elected	in	proportion	to	the	number	of	participants	present,	but	there	is	no	regular	process	during	which	the	delegates	meet	on	any	other	occasion.	
PB	in	Vacaria	meets	the	basic	requirements	corresponding	to	the	communicative	dimension	of	PB,	but	has	almost	nothing	that	ties	it	to	a	broader	project	to	involve	public	participation	in	the	local	governing	process.	There	is	no	permanent	administrative	structure	dedicated	to	PB,	with	only	one	entry-level	worker	from	the	Mayor’s	Cabinet	tasked	with	running	the	logistics	of	the	regional	meetings	as	well	as	filtering	any	communication	from	participants	to	the	mayor.	Assistance	is	provided	outside	working	hours	by	political	appointees	from	other	sectors	of	the	administration.	Funding	for	the	projects	considered	either	obligatory	or	optional	is	achieved	piecemeal	through	earmarks	and	other	transfers	from	the	state	and	federal	government	negotiated	with	other	politicians	affiliated	with	the	PT.	Because	anywhere	from	one	to	three	projects	could	be	
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executed	in	a	region	and	the	size	of	said	projects	may	vary,	the	final	result	could	be	that	money	is	disproportionately	allocated	to	certain	regions.	Participants	are	not	made	aware	of	this,	as	there	is	no	accountability	specifically	linking	government	officials	with	the	execution	of	PB	projects	in	the	city,	nor	is	there	any	unified	source	of	information	detailing	the	progress	made	towards	executing	the	demands	voted	upon	in	previous	years.	
Full	Multi-Dimensional	Participatory	Budgeting	[Full	MPB]:	Full	MPB	entails	the	inclusion	of	at	least	eight	of	the	ten	criteria,	with	institutional	characteristics	that	approximate	the	full	set	of	reforms	first	adopted	in	Porto	Alegre	in	the	1990s.	Under	full	MPB,	empowerment	is	facilitated	through	the	presence	of	multiple	representative	bodies	organized	at	different	levels	(e.g.	neighborhood,	regional	and	city-wide).	In	these	cases	PB	is	integrated	into	the	heart	of	local	administrative	budgetary	decision-making	process,	and	participation	is	connected	to	actual	government	allocation	decisions	responding	to	PB	demands	selected	through	the	yearly	cycle.	This	provides	the	strongest	level	of	certainty	that	the	local	government	will	faithfully	carry	out	the	budget	agreed	upon	according	to	democratic	rules	decided	upon	by	participants	themselves.	The	legitimacy	of	these	decisions	as	representative	of	public	will	is	strengthened	due	to	efforts	to	prevent	the	new	institution	from	being	captured	by	individuals	or	communities	with	greater	levels	of	economic,	political	or	social	capital.		
Canoas,	a	large	industrial	suburb	of	Porto	Alegre	with	over	300,000	residents,	offers	an	example	of	a	full	MBP	program.	PB	was	first	introduced	PB	in	2009	after	the	city	elected	its	first	PT	mayor,	Jairo	Jorge	da	Silva5.	Just	as	in	Vacaria,	the	mayor	himself	travels	to	the																																																									
5 Information obtained during three site visits in March and April 2014 during case selection, 
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meetings	held	at	the	regional	level	in	which	citizens	in	attendance	vote	amongst	a	list	of	demands	compiled	by	the	administration	prior	to	the	meeting.	He	speaks	at	length	about	the	composition	of	the	local	budget	and	the	different	public	works	projects	his	administration	has	carried	out.	The	rules	require	that	each	demand	be	defended	by	a	member	of	the	community	before	going	for	a	vote,	although	community	members	and	administration	officials	believe	that	people	nonetheless	arrive	with	their	decisions	made.	However,	a	number	of	institutional	features	are	present	in	Canoas	that	connect	the	program	with	a	broader	administrative	project	to	implement	structural	reforms	of	the	way	in	which	the	city	government	engages	with	local	residents.	
Through	the	annual	PB	cycle	in	Canoas,	technically	viable	demands	of	reasonably	large	scope	enter	the	city	budget,	with	ample	dissemination	of	the	final	results	of	annual	deliberations	and	a	specific	monetary	amount	of	the	local	budget	divided	equally	across	the	city’s	regions	(approximately	US$	300,000	for	2015).	While	the	demands	are	compiled	by	the	administration,	they	come	from	other	instances	of	citizen	engagement.	These	include	a	weekly	program	in	which	the	Mayor,	along	with	his	full	cabinet,	visit	city	neighborhoods	on	a	Saturday	morning	to	hear	complaints	and	provide	answers	to	local	problems	as	well	as	a	series	of	assemblies	that	invite	public	participation	to	improve	specific	public	services.	
Instead	of	speaking	only	broadly	about	public	investment	projects,	as	was	the	case	in	Vacaria,	specific	figures	are	given	about	the	completion	of	demands	for	the	region	as	well	as	for	the	city	as	a	whole.	Each	assembly	features	details	about	all	of	the	previous	demands	that	the	region	has	voted	upon	since	PB	was	first	implemented,	giving	a	detailed	account	of																																																																																																																																																																																			
attending a PB assembly on all three occasions and interviewing the department head in charge 
of all of the city’s participatory programs as well as the Coordinator specifically in charge of PB. 
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what	has	been	executed	as	well	as	a	timeline	as	to	when	pending	demands	will	be	completed.	Participation	takes	place	both	directly	in	the	assemblies	as	well	as	through	delegates	and	councilors	who	meet	with	government	officials	year-round.	There	is	a	government	department	that	coordinates	PB,	along	with	all	of	the	other	actions	contained	in	the	government’s	citizen	engagement	strategy.	As	a	sign	of	recognition	of	the	strength	of	the	local	program,	Canoas	was	selected	to	host	the	Brazilian	PB	Network	from	2014-2015.	As	should	be	clear,	it	is	in	these	types	of	multidimensional	PB	programs	that	we	should	expect	to	find	strongest	support	for	the	development	and	civic	engagement	propositions	put	forth	by	proponents	of	the	PB	approach.	
Partial	Multi-Dimensional	Participatory	Budgeting	[Partial	MPB]:	In	between	the	CPB	and	MPB	categories	lies	my	intermediate	group	of	PB	approaches	that	I	refer	to	as	partial	MPB.	Municipalities	in	this	category	have	implemented	a	PB	program	that	meets	all	of	the	communicative	criteria	but	falls	short	of	meeting	all	of	the	empowerment	criteria.	Partial	MPB	may	have	limitations	such	as	involving	only	CSOs	in	the	program’s	representative	bodies	or	lack	a	clear	method	for	distributing	resources	across	regions	of	the	city.	However,	there	must	be	at	least	some	degree	of	institutionalization	of	PB	within	the	local	government	administration	and	at	least	two	of	the	first	four	empowerment	criteria	must	be	met.		
Erechim	is	a	city	of	nearly	100,000	residents	located	around	200	miles	north	of	Porto	Alegre,	near	Rio	Grande	do	Sul’s	northern	border	with	the	state	of	Santa	Catarina.	As	was	the	case	with	Vacaria	and	Canoas,	the	municipality	of	Erechim	implemented	PB	in	2009	following	the	election	of	the	city’s	first	PT	mayor6.	Unlike	either	of	the	other	two	cities,																																																									
6 Background information collected in the course of case study research over the course of 2014. 
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Erechim’s	participation	occurs	primarily	at	the	neighborhood	level	rather	than	the	regional	level.	The	public	assemblies	themselves	are	organized	by	region,	with	a	brief	summary	of	local	finances	given	to	all	in	attendance.	Afterwards,	participants	break	into	groups	by	neighborhood.	They	propose,	defend	and	then	vote	amongst	themselves	on	one	demand	and	a	delegate	to	defend	it.	The	delegates	of	the	region	meet	together	at	City	Hall	at	a	later	date	to	determine	how	to	fit	as	many	demands	of	the	region	as	possible	within	the	fixed	value	given	to	all	regions.	
	 In	comparison	to	the	first	two	cases,	what	is	perhaps	the	strongest	aspect	of	the	PB	approach	in	Erechim	is	the	role	played	by	deliberation	both	directly	between	participants	and	via	representatives	with	the	administration.	PB	also	enjoys	a	specifically	designated	bureaucratic	apparatus	that	is	independent	of	the	Mayor’s	Office,	with	a	team	of	full-time	staff	housed	in	the	Department	of	Planning.	However,	two	aspects	of	Erechim’s	program	cause	it	to	fall	short	of	reaching	full	MPB.	First,	the	permissible	scope	of	the	demands	dealt	with	in	PB	fora	is	extremely	limited	and	primarily	focused	on	subsidies	to	community	organizations.	Second,	participation	stops	at	the	selection	of	demands	at	the	regional	level,	without	any	involvement	in	the	final	elaboration	of	the	budget	or	formals	mechanisms	of	accountability	regarding	the	execution	of	demands.		
As	should	be	clear,	these	categories	of	PB	across	Brazilian	municipalities,	along	with	the	default	category	of	municipalities	that	have	not	implemented	any	PB-style	reforms,	offer	a	wide	range	of	program	features	that	should	theoretically	reveal	themselves	when	evaluating	the	impact	of	PB	on	citizen	engagement	in	politics	and	the	local	provision	of	basic	services.	In	the	following	chapters,	I	employ	this	categorization	schema	in	an	analysis	
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of	these	types	of	outcome	variables.	Before	moving	to	the	analytical	portion	of	this	project,	however,	I	first	offer	a	brief	description	of	the	data	collection	efforts	that	allow	for	such	an	analysis	to	be	carried	out.	
	
Data	Collection	and	Classification	Methods	In	order	to	place	the	Brazilian	municipalities	that	will	be	the	focus	of	my	study	into	one	of	my	categories	of	PB,	I	rely	on	a	data	set	collected	as	part	of	the	Participatory	Budgeting	Census,	which	covers	all	Brazilian	municipalities	with	a	population	of	over	50,000	for	each	four-year	mayoral	term	from	1989-1992	to	2009-20127.	Using	existing	data	collected	during	two	research	projects	to	cover	the	period	from	1989	to	2004	(Ribeiro	&	Grazia	2003;	Wampler	&	Avritzer	2004),	researchers	conducted	telephone	interviews	with	administrative	personnel	responsible	for	each	PB	program	in	2008	in	municipalities	that	were	identified	as	potentially	having	adopted	PB	during	the	current	mayoral	administration.	This	was	repeated	in	2012	with	the	sample	size	adjusted	to	capture	additional	municipalities	that	passed	the	population	threshold,	although	for	these	cases	no	retrospective	research	was	performed	(Spada	2014).	The	Census	codes	a	municipality	as	having	PB	for	the	four-year	administration	that	was	coming	to	an	end	the	year	of	the	survey	if	it	met	the	five	Sintomer	et	al.	criteria.	In	2008	there	were	560	municipalities	with	a	population	of	50,000	or	more.	By	2012	this	number	had	increased	to	595.	I	limit	my	
																																																								
7 The PB Census data set treats each four-year mayoral term in office dating back to 1988 as a 
single observation. Secondary sources were used to code from 1989-2004 while the project itself 
has taken place for the 2005-2008 and 2009-2012 terms. Both rounds of the Census were 
conducted occurred in the final year of the term of reference, which was 2008 and 2012. 
Applying this measure as an indicator of PB throughout each four-year period would introduce 
on unknown amount of measurement error, as programs may have been initiated or terminated at 
some point during the middle of the term.  
		46	
sample	only	to	those	municipalities	that	qualified	in	2008,	as	the	cities	added	to	the	2012	data	contain	no	information	regarding	PB	in	earlier	years.8		
Using	the	time	periods	identified	in	the	PB	Census	as	a	starting	point,	I	first	searched	for	scholarly	articles,	reports	conducted	by	neutral	third-party	research	institutes	or	NGOs,	as	well	as	theses	and	dissertations	from	Brazilian	universities	for	reference	to	any	of	the	municipalities	identified	in	the	original	data	set.	I	also	sought	out	news	articles	and	government	press	releases	for	any	reference	to	PB	programs.	Finally,	I	conducted	a	general	Internet	search	using	the	name	of	the	municipality	and	references	to	“participatory	budgeting”,	“citizen	participation	in	the	budget”	and	related	terms.	Using	all	of	the	information	from	these	sources,	I	conducted	a	content	analysis	as	the	basis	for	assigning	each	municipality	to	one	of	my	four	categories	of	PB.	Of	the	455	data	points	identified	as	four-year	periods	of	PB	in	the	original	data,	I	was	unable	to	find	any	corroborating	evidence	that	PB	existed	in	38	cases,	with	an	additional	17	time	points	at	which	it	was	possible	to	establish	that	the	case	met	the	five	communicative	criteria	but	there	was	insufficient	information	related	to	the	variables	which	measure	the	five	empowerment	criteria.	Unless	otherwise	noted,	these	cases	will	be	treated	as	consultative	PB.9	When	the	evidence	collected	provided	conflicting	information	with	regards	to	the	variables	upon																																																									
8 Before ultimately deciding to exclude the cities added in the 2012 round of the Census, I 
searched for any indicator of PB previously taking place in all 33 municipalities, not restricting 
myself to the two identified cases in 2012. I found evidence of only one PB program that had 
taken place and ended. Additionally, around one-third of the expanded set consisted of 
municipalities that had formed since 1989, which would exclude them from consideration.  The 
inclusion of these cases, therefore, would have little effect on my analyses in the coming 
chapters. 
9 If theses cases instead were removed entirely from the analyses conducted in the upcoming 
chapters, there is a small increase in the estimated effect of CPB but rarely is this statistically 
significant. If instead these responses are coded as MPB, there is a small but statistically 
significant decrease in MPB’s estimated effect. 
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which	each	case	was	evaluated,	preference	was	given	to	impartial	sources	(academia,	well	known	NGOs)	followed	by	contemporary	(as	opposed	to	retrospective)	accounts	in	news	media,	press	releases	or	similar	public	pronouncements	by	government	officials.		
First,	I	established	the	presence	of	a	PB	program	meeting	the	five	criteria	of	the	communicative	dimension	for	each	two-year	period.	Among	other	benefits,	this	allows	for	the	examination	of	instances	where	PB	ends	or	changes	within	an	administration	and	avoids	confusing	this	with	the	impact	of	a	transition	in	power	following	an	election.	Using	the	time	periods	identified	in	the	PB	Census	as	a	base,	I	searched	for	at	least	one	item	corroborating	the	program’s	existence	in	both	the	first	and	second	half	of	the	four-year	mayoral	term	in	office,	the	same	time	periods	used	in	the	Participatory	Budgeting	Census.	I	then	created	a	series	of	dichotomous	(present/absent)	variables	that	correspond	to	each	of	the	criteria	of	the	communicative	dimension.	P		
I	apply	the	same	methods	to	the	first	two	years	of	the	mayoral	mandate	begun	since	the	collection	of	the	PB	census	(2013	and	2014),	treating	all	municipalities	in	the	sample	as	potential	cases.	To	be	counted	as	having	any	form	of	PB,	some	evidence	of	meeting	the	basic	communicative	criteria	needed	to	be	present	for	each	two-year	period.	Data	with	regards	to	the	additional	variables	are	collected	over	the	span	of	a	given	mayor’s	time	in	office,	and	are	considered	to	be	constant	unless	there	is	evidence	to	the	contrary.			
Next,	to	identify	all	of	the	PB	programs	that	qualify	as	full	or	partial	MPB,	I	again	use	a	dichotomous	decision	rule	for	the	presence	or	absence	of	each	of	the	five	additional	criteria	presented	earlier	in	this	chapter.	For	the	initial	period	of	PB,	two	separate	sources	must	identify	that	particular	design	element	as	present	in	order	to	receive	a	positive	score.	For	
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each	additional	two-year	period,	I	consider	one	source	for	each	indicator	as	sufficient	to	maintain	a	program	within	a	given	category.		
In	order	for	a	case	to	qualify	as	a	case	of	partial	MPB	it	needed	to	receive	a	positive	score	for	at	least	two	of	the	five	indicators.	Full	MPB	programs	were	those	that	met	at	least	four	of	the	five	empowerment	criteria.	The	five	indicators	used	in	this	process	are	as	follows:	
V1:	Are	all	stages	of	the	PB	process	open	to	everyone	without	regards	to	associational	
membership	or	leadership	status?			
If	there	is	exclusivity	in	any	phase,	this	variable	is	not	met,	even	if	at	the	phase	of	popular	assemblies	the	proceedings	are	open	to	all.	As	an	example,	in	cases	where	there	is	a	PB	Council,	a	case	may	satisfy	this	requirement	even	while	having	reserved	seats	on	the	council	for	members	of	associations,	but	it	would	not	if	associational	membership	were	a	requirement	to	become	a	member	of	the	Council.		
V2:	Does	participatory	input	include	demands	that	are	recognized	as	reasonably	
binding?		
To	count	as	meeting	this	requirement,	the	PB	cycle	must	ultimately	result	in	demands	that	are	related	to	concrete	projects	and	collected	in	some	unified	document.	There	must	be	evidence	that,	at	the	conclusion	of	the	PB	cycle,	there	are	specific	projects	or	programs	that	it	is	incumbent	upon	the	local	administration	to	execute	rather	than	simply	having	a	cycle	where	the	government	is	looking	for	ideas	that	may	or	may	not	lead	to	action	being	taken.	The	response	to	this	question	is	negative	if,	for	example,	the	administration	
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generates	a	budget	that	incorporates	input	that	may	have	been	received	through	PB	without	reference	to	specific	projects	having	arisen	from	public	participation.	
V3:	Are	clear	and	objective	criteria	used	to	distribute	the	public	resources	spent	as	a	
result	of	PB?		
There	must	be	some	reference	to	a	method	regarding	the	division	of	resources,	which	could	be	as	simple	as	a	fixed	amount	of	money	to	be	spent	at	the	citywide	or	regional	level.	While	ideally	this	question	would	be	able	to	consider	the	application	of	social	justice	criteria	in	the	distribution	of	resources,	further	information	related	to	this	topic	was	exceptionally	scarce.	
V4:	Is	a	second-level	Council,	Forum	or	other	related	body	specifically	related	to	PB?	
		A	municipality	will	qualify	if	(1).	There	is	a	forum	of	delegates,	a	PB	Council	or	any	other	representative	body	related	exclusively	to	PB	that	has	deliberative	power	over	part	of	the	participatory	process;	or	(2).	there	is	a	representative	body	that	serves	only	to	oversee	the	execution	of	demands	or	perform	a	consulting	role	in	the	PB	process.	“Deliberative	power”	means	that	the	representative	body	must	play	a	role	in	the	formulation,	negotiation	and/or	sanctioning	of	the	final	product	of	the	annual	participatory	process.	A	body	tasked	with	oversight	is	insufficient	to	count	towards	a	case	being	classified	as	multidimensional	
V5:	Is	PB	integrated	into	the	annual	budgetary	decision-making	process?		
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Because	of	the	varying	quality	of	the	data	used	here	and	the	more	subjective	nature	of	the	question,	the	approach	used	for	this	variable	is	to	consider	a	number	of	factors,	with	documented	evidence	of	any	two	on	the	list	below	qualifying	as	sufficient	evidence	that	this	criterion	was	met:	(1)	Inclusion	of	the	final	slate	of	demands	that	came	out	of	the	full	PB	process	into	the	annual	budget	submitted	for	approval	to	the	City	Council;	(2)	introduction	of	political,	fiscal	and/or	administrative	reforms	specifically	referenced	as	being	related	to	PB	or	the	existence	of	a	broader	participatory	reform	project	which	includes	PB;	(3)	presence	of	representatives	from	multiple	government	departments	in	PB	proceedings;	(4)	technical	analyses	of	the	viability	of	proposed	projects;	(5)	debate	and	approval	of	either	the	investment	part	of	the	budget	or	the	entire	budget	as	a	whole	by	some	PB-related	committee	or	larger	voting	body,	(6)	the	existence	of	an	administrative	body	dedicated	towards	the	management	of	PB,	(7)	evidence	of	programs	designed	to	train	delegates	or	councilors	with	regards	to	the	functioning	of	the	popular	budget,	(8)	the	institutionalization	of	PB	through	law	or	executive	decree.		
As	with	any	data	collection	phase	of	a	research	project,	measurement	error	at	this	stage	could	call	into	question	the	findings	of	the	project	as	a	whole.	In	this	particular	case,	the	most	likely	possibility	would	be	false	negatives	due	to	the	absence	of	a	record	of	attributes	of	a	local	PB	program	that	did	in	fact	exist.	Nonetheless,	for	most	cases	(87.91%)	identified	in	the	source	data	set,	I	was	able	to	find	sufficient	data	to	confirm	the	original	data	set’s	classification	of	the	program	as	PB	according	to	the	Sintomer	et	al.	criteria.		Two-thirds	of	the	originally	identified	data	points	for	which	I	was	able	to	find	absolutely	no	evidence	refer	to	the	2001-2004	time	period	(8.5%	of	the	total	observations	in	the	original	data	set),	whereas	there	is	no	similar	clustering	of	cases	with	incomplete	information.	The	
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geographic	distribution	of	cases	for	which	information	was	either	insufficient	or	entirely	missing	mirrors	the	distribution	of	confirmed	observations,	however	their	average	population	is	significantly	less	than	the	overall	average	(130,661	versus	439,241	inhabitants).	Except	for	2014,	I	collected	only	information	on	those	cities	included	in	the	original	data	set.		
As	a	check	on	the	possibility	that	I	could	systematically	be	failing	to	capture	MPB	in	smaller	and	more	rural	municipalities,	I	compared	my	case	coding	to	information	collected	during	preliminary	research	conducted	in	the	field	in	2014,	with	site	visits	to	all	cities	in	the	state	of	Rio	Grande	do	Sul	identified	as	PB	cases	either	during	the	administration	currently	in	office	or	under	its	predecessor	whose	term	ended	in	2012.	I	interviewed	at	least	one	government	official	responsible	for	the	program	using	a	standardized	instrument	that	touched	on	all	ten	criteria,	reaching	out	to	members	of	the	previous	administration	in	situations	where	PB	was	eliminated	after	the	2012	elections.	These	interviews	covered	PB’s	past	as	well	as	present	situation.	I	found	discrepancies	in	only	three	out	of	19	cities	surveyed,	which	covered	11	out	of	68	observations	coded	in	my	data	set10,	both	roughly	equal	to	15	percent	of	the	total.	For	all	three,	the	cities	had	in	fact	met	criteria	that	were	not	detected,	a	distinction	that	mistakenly	labeled	two	cases	of	CPB	as	incomplete	and	one	partial	MPB	case	as	CPB.	The	characteristics	of	the	locations	in	which	these	three	errors	were	located	is	relevant,	because	coding	error	could	be	more	likely	in	smaller	or	more	isolated	cities	and	towns.	However,	while	more	than	half	(10	of	19)	of	the	total	sample	had	under	100,000	residents,	only	one	of	these	was	mistakenly	coded.	Additionally,	the	respondents	selected	were	actively	involved	in	past	or	present	government	management	of																																																									
10 Observations include any time-point coded other than a zero for a given municipality. 
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PB,	a	potential	source	of	bias.	This	would	most	likely	take	the	form	of	false	positives,	with	the	respondent	exaggerating	the	extent	to	which	the	local	PB	experience	met	certain	conditions.	
Moving	from	four-year	to	two-year	periods	made	it	possible	to	find	evidence	of	90	occasions11	in	which	PB	terminated	or	changed	categories	within	rather	than	between	administrations.	Within	this	group,	there	are	42	instances	of	PB	termination	within	a	mayor’s	term,	30	instances	of	PB	being	initiated	within	the	term,	seven	shifts	down	the	list	of	categories	and	six	upgrades.	These	85	within-mandate	transitions,	while	considerably	fewer	than	the	496	that	occur	following	elections,	add	precision	to	the	analyses	in	the	coming	chapters	and	clarify	authorship	of	changes	in	PB	status	that	otherwise	would	be	given	to	changes	in	government.		
Prevalence	and	Tendencies	of	Categories	of	Participatory	Budgeting	
Graph	1	and	Table	1	both	display	the	number	of	municipalities	in	each	two-year	data	period	by	all	of	the	categories	that	have	been	introduced,	showing	the	relative	distribution	of	each	of	the	three	categories	across	time.	All	of	the	categories	of	PB	developed	using	the	criteria	defined	in	this	chapter	are	present	from	the	very	beginning	in	1989-1990.	The	proportion	of	cases	at	any	given	time	pertaining	to	one	of	the	three	PB	categories	holds	relatively	constant	across	time,	as	shown	in	Graph	2.	Approximately	35-45%	of	cases	qualify	as	CPB,	35-45%	meet	the	criteria	for	partial	MPB	and	20-30%	are	full	MPB.	The	total	number	of	municipalities	at	any	given	moment	with	PB	programs	in	place	has																																																									
11 Here I am referring to consecutive time periods (i.e. 2000 to 2002) during which an election 
does not take place. I count each within-mandate change separately, including five municipalities 
with two such transitions and a sixth that transitioned three times during the period measured. 
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remained	fairly	consistent	over	the	past	decade	but	the	specific	cities	that	are	counted	under	this	are	frequently	changing,	with	only	one-third	of	full	MPB,	one-quarter	of	partial	MPB	and	12%	of	CPB	lasting	eight	years	or	longer.	At	no	point	did	full	MPB	constitute	a	majority	or	even	a	plurality	of	PB	cases,	which	raises	doubts	with	regards	to	the	argument	that	the	simplification	and	reduction	of	PB	came	about	only	after	PB	gained	widespread	recognition	and	was	disseminated	to	a	broader	audience	(Baiocchi	&	Ganuza	2014).		
The	data	show	that	MPB	programs	are	more	resilient	across	time	both	in	cases	of	change	or	continuity	of	the	party	in	power	at	the	local	level	when	compared	to	CPB	programs.	I	break	down	the	different	possible	outcomes	of	PB	across	time	periods	based	on	the	corresponding	continuation	or	change	in	the	local	political	context.	Between	each	period,	PB	can	be	maintained	as	it	was	before,	ended	outright,	upgraded	towards	full	MPB	or	downgraded	towards	program	termination.	Table	2	shows	the	frequency	and	proportion	of	each	of	these	four	outcomes	when	there	was	no	change	in	the	party	in	power,	while	Table	3	shows	outcomes	when	there	is	a	change	in	ruling	parties.		
When	a	change	in	power	occurred	in	a	municipality	with	MPB,	more	than	half	the	time	some	format	of	public	participation	was	maintained.	In	place	of	eliminating	the	program	entirely,	new	mayors	were	more	likely	to	“downgrade”	the	programs	in	place	about	as	often	as	they	maintained	them	as	they	were	under	the	previous	mayor12.	Stability	across	periods	in	which	the	same	party	remains	in	power	is	also	less	in	cases	of	CPB.	Comparing	within	each	four-year	mandate,	17%	of	the	programs	in	place	in	the	first	two																																																									
12 The number of observed downgrade and upgrade are greater when partially and fully MPB are 
separate because I include transitions between the two categories. “Downgrading” includes 
transitions to programs that failed to meet the five minimum criteria for CPB. 
		54	
years	were	discontinued	by	the	end	of	the	term,	in	comparison	to	only	7%	of	the	time	in	partial	MPB	and	3%	in	full	MPB.	Even	in	the	case	of	re-election,	30%	of	CPB	programs	did	not	continue	into	the	next	mandate,	which	occurred	in	only	around	16%	of	partial	MPB	and	2%	of	full	MPB	cases.	One	possible	explanation	for	the	greater	duration	of	MPB	is	that,	by	requiring	that	participation	be	in	some	way	institutionalized	within	the	local	state	apparatus,	it	would	be	more	costly	to	terminate.	If	these	programs	are	more	effective	in	increasing	the	resources	devoted	towards	meeting	the	needs	of	participants,	the	political	cost	of	ending	PB	could	be	greater.	Alternatively,	the	higher	rate	of	mayors	terminating	CPB	while	in	power	could	be	an	indicator	that	leaders	who	adopt	that	format	are	simply	less	committed	to	PB	as	a	project	and	thus	are	more	willing	to	cut	the	program	if	problems	arise	or	the	local	political	climate	becomes	less	favorable.	
Briefly	looking	at	the	relationship	between	the	political	party	in	power	and	the	format	of	PB	adopted,	a	substantial	majority	of	full	MPB	programs	have	occurred	under	Workers’	Party	(PT)	administrations,	although	this	is	gradually	decreasing	over	time.	Table	4	displays	the	frequency	and	proportion	of	active	PB	programs	under	PT	control	at	the	middle	of	every	term.	Since	1997-1998,	the	percentage	of	fully	MPB	programs	under	PT	mayors	has	remained	between	70-85%,	although	this	has	dropped	to	60%	for	2011-2012	and	2013-2014.	Surprisingly,	the	percentage	of	mayors	in	partial	MPB	and	CPB	cities	that	belong	to	the	PT	at	any	given	time	period	since	1995-1996	has	been	nearly	the	same,	both	progressing	from	around	40%	to	approximately	55%	since	2005-2006.	More	surprising,	however,	is	the	prevalence	of	PB	within	PT	administrations,	shown	in	Table	5	as	the	percentage	of	PT	mayors	in	office	at	the	time.	Although	for	the	first	decade	of	PB’s	rise	it	
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was	adopted	in	almost	every	city	in	which	the	party	was	elected	to	power,	the	share	of	PT	mayors	with	no	program	at	all	has	jumped	from	7.8%	in	1998	to	57.9%	in	2014.	
This	brief	examination	of	the	data	demonstrates	that	there	is	significant	variation	in	the	presence	of	characteristics	amongst	Brazilian	programs	related	to	PB’s	empowerment	dimension.	Including	cases	of	PB-lite,	only	38	of	the	92	programs	in	place	during	2013-2014	that	are	titled	participatory	budgeting	have	features	that	effectively	connect	citizen	participation	with	actual	governmental	decision-making.	Measured	separately,	MPB	peaked	in	2000	and	has	been	on	a	gradual	decline	since,	but	the	number	of	CPB	and	near	PB	cases	continued	to	increase	until	2010.		
Given	that	programs	that	involve	only	the	communicative	dimension	of	PB	seem	to	be	less	able	to	sustain	themselves	over	time	and	across	administrations,	they	may	also	be	less	capable	of	generating	changes	in	local	political	life	that	could	last	beyond	the	program	itself.	PB	programs	that	contain	empowerment	features	seem	to	more	frequently	survive	transitions	in	power	even	while	being	more	politically	and	financially	costly	to	maintain.	This	suggests	that	these	programs	could	be	able	to	change	the	political	calculus	surrounding	citizen	participation,	transforming	it	from	what	may	have	started	as	a	partisan	political	project	to	a	general	consensus	within	a	city	involving	the	role	of	public	participation	in	the	government	decision-making	process.		
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Conclusion	
The	elaboration	of	a	conceptualization	and	measurement	strategy	that	comprehensively	captures	the	many	different	aspects	of	this	particular	participatory	strategy	has	been	lacking	in	the	large-N	quantitative	research	on	participatory	budgeting.	Adequately	testing	hypotheses	relating	to	the	transformation	of	state-society	relations	requires	that	we	first	are	able	to	distinguish	between	PB	implementations	that	correspond	to	our	theoretical	conception	of	the	program	and	cases	in	which	only	the	basic	shell	of	the	original	PB	concept	has	been	put	into	place.	While	in	some	cities	PB	involves	a	real	link	between	citizen	participation	and	government	decision-making,	in	many	others	it	consists	only	of	a	cycle	of	neighborhood	meetings	loosely	organized	around	the	annual	budget.	My	expectation	is	that	only	programs	that	feature	both	the	communicative	and	the	empowerment	dimensions	of	PB	as	defined	in	this	chapter	can	bring	about	enduring	changes	in	the	ways	in	which	the	local	state,	citizens	and	civil	society	interact.	Programs	that	incorporate	only	features	of	PB’s	communicative	dimension	are	unlikely	to	be	able	to	give	citizens	a	sense	of	political	efficacy,	make	government	more	responsive	to	citizen	needs	or	incentivize	the	construction	of	a	civil	society	that	can	effectively	engage	the	state.		
A	measurement	approach	that	does	not	include	any	features	of	PB	that	go	beyond	a	set	of	open	public	meetings	will	risk	being	disconnected	from	the	theoretical	mechanisms	through	which	the	PB	approach	was	originally	designed	to	deliver	change	in	local	government	spending	patterns	and	service	delivery.		By	creating	categories	that	allow	me	to	capture	the	heterogeneity	in	programs	that	fall	under	the	label	of	“participatory	
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budgeting”	I	will	be	able	to	shed	light	on	the	role	these	additional	criteria	play	in	the	impact	PB	programs	have	had	across	Brazil.	
The	fact	that	previous	research	that	has	relied	on	a	broader,	less	nuanced	measurement	strategy	of	PB	has	still	found	the	approach	to	have	significant	effects	raises	the	possibility	that	the	communicative	dimension	of	PB	alone	is	enough	to	spark	changes	in	local	political	life.	In	these	forms	of	PB,	however,	the	causal	mechanisms	through	which	the	benefits	of	PB	should	emerge	are	not	necessarily	in	place.	When	purely	conceived	of	as	an	information	gathering	mechanism	for	the	city	government,	PB’s	ability	to	substantially	alter	local	spending	behavior	should	be	diminished,	if	not	entirely	absent.	As	a	result,	civil	society	would	have	no	motivation	to	reorganize	itself	in	response	to	a	participatory	incentive	structure	that	cements	the	existing	hierarchy	of	organizations	through	granting	select	groups	the	exclusive	right	to	speak	on	behalf	of	the	community.		Meaningful	changes	in	how	the	government	responds	to	popular	input	and	efforts	to	foster	additional	avenues	for	citizen	engagement	likely	requires	more	than	a	cycle	of	brief	neighborhood	meetings.	This	entails	more	profound	incorporation	of	PB	into	the	government	decision-making	process	as	well	as	the	introduction	of	institutional	rules	that	foster	inclusion,	social	justice	and	transparency.		
In	the	following	chapters	of	this	dissertation	I	continue	to	explore	the	implications	of	the	“thicker”	conceptualization	of	participatory	budgeting	that	has	been	developed	here.	Following	a	series	of	quantitative	analyses	of	the	fiscal	and	development	impact	of	these	distinct	categories	of	PB	in	Chapters	3	and	4,	in	Chapter	5,	I	analyze	a	series	of	contemporary	cases	of	PB	in	a	diverse	sample	of	urban	and	rural	municipalities	that	will	
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allow	for	a	deeper	exploration	of	the	importance	of	linkages	between	PB	as	a	specific	government	program	and	the	wider	project	of	institutionalizing	citizen	engagement	in	local	government.	Combining	qualitative	methods	of	semi-structured	interviews	and	participant	observation	with	a	quantitative	analysis	of	electoral	and	budget	data,	I	explore	the	implications	of	variations	in	the	efficacy	with	which	a	local	administration	is	able	to	translate	popular	demands	into	concrete	action.	Also,	I	discuss	the	political	and	pragmatic	motivations	that	led	PB	to	evolve	over	time	and	across	different	mayors.	When	taken	together,	the	results	in	the	following	three	chapters	speak	both	to	the	importance	of	public	participation	in	open	meetings	as	well	as	to	the	need	for	additional	institutional	reforms	uniquely	designed	to	serve	the	theoretical	underpinnings	of	participatory	budgeting.		 	
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Figure	2.1	-	Number	of	Municipalities	by	PB	Category	
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Figure	2.2	-	Percentage	of	Municipalities	by	PB	Category	
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Table	2.1	-	Number	of	Observations	of	Participatory	Budgeting	(PB)	in	Brazilian	Municipalities	
with	over	50,000	Residents,	1989-2014	
	
Category	 1990	 1992	 1994	 1996	 1998	 2000	 2002	 2004	 2006	 2008	 2010	 2012	 2014	
None	 548	 549	 531	 529	 494	 493	 432	 432	 451	 446	 426	 444	 428	
Full	MPB	 2	 2	 4	 4	 15	 15	 21	 20	 15	 15	 18	 16	 15	
Partial	MPB	 4	 4	 7	 9	 16	 18	 32	 32	 34	 35	 41	 33	 23	
CPB	 5	 4	 9	 10	 23	 22	 32	 31	 24	 26	 31	 23	 22	
	
	
Table	2.2	-	PB	Post-Election	Status	(incumbent	party	victory)	
	
Status	of	PB	 Full	MPB	 Partial	MPB	 CPB	 Total	
Continue	 38	 59	 28	 125	
		 (84.4%)	 (71.1%)	 (49.1%)	 (67.6%)	
End	 1	 13	 17	 31	
		 (2.2%)	 (15.7%)	 (29.8%)	 (16.8%)	
Downgrade	 6	 9	 10	 25	
		 (13.3%)	 (10.8%)	 (17.5%)	 (13.5%)	
Upgrade	 N/A	 2	 2	 4	
		 		 (2.4%)	 (3.5%)	 (2.2%)	
Total	 45	 83	 57	 185	
	
	
Table	2.3	-	PB	Post-Election	Status	(incumbent	party	defeat)	
	
Status	of	PB	 Full	MPB	 Partial	MPB	 CPB	 Total	
Continue	 7	 11	 5	 23	
		 (25.0%)	 (23.9%)	 (8.1%)	 (16.9%)	
End	 12	 23	 48	 83	
		 (42.8%)	 (50.0%)	 (77.4%)	 (61.0%)	
Downgrade	 9	 11	 7	 27	
		 (32.1%)	 (23.9%)	 (11.2%)	 (19.9%)	
Upgrade	 N/A	 1	 2	 3	
		 		 (2.2%)	 (3.2%)	 (2.2%)	
Total	 28	 46	 62	 136	
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Table	2.4	-	Prevalence	of	PB	Models	–	Overall	Total,	Total	under	PT	Mayors	and	Proportion	under	PT	Mayors,	1989-2014	
	
Format	 1990	 1994	 1998	 2002	 2006	 2010	 2014	
None	 548	 536	 503	 471	 483	 467	 498	
None	(PT)	 6	 9	 3	 17	 34	 57	 86	
None	(%	PT)	 (1.1%)	 (1.4%)	 (0.6%)	 (3.0%)	 (6.5%)	 (10.5%)	 (16.1%)	
MPB	(Full)	 2	 4	 15	 21	 15	 18	 15	
MPB	(Full,	PT)	 2	 4	 11	 16	 13	 13	 9	
MPB	(Full,	%	PT)	 (100.0%)	 (100.0%)	 (73.3%)	 (76.2%)	 (86.7%)	 (72.2%)	 (60.0%)	
MPB	(Part)	 4	 9	 19	 35	 37	 43	 24	
MPB	(Part,	PT)	 3	 4	 8	 19	 20	 25	 12	
MPB	(Part,	%	PT)	 (75.0%)	 (44.4%)	 (42.1%)	 (54.3%)	 (54.1%)	 (58.1%)	 (50.0%)	
CPB	 5	 10	 22	 32	 24	 31	 22	
CPB	(PT)	 5	 4	 9	 17	 12	 17	 12	
CPB	(%	PT)	 (100.0%)	 (40.0%)	 (40.9%)	 (53.1%)	 (50.0%)	 (54.8%)	 (54.5%)	
Total	 559	 559	 559	 559	 559	 559	 559	
Total	PT	 16	 21	 31	 69	 79	 112	 119	
	
	
Table	2.5	-	Proportion	of	PT-ruled	Municipalities	by	Status	of	PB	
	
Format	 1990	 1994	 1998	 2002	 2006	 2010	 2014	
None	 28,5%	 27.5%	 7.8%	 20.2%	 37.9%	 40.1%	 57.9%	
MPB	(Full)	 9.5%	 13.7%	 28.9%	 23.1%	 16.4%	 11.6%	 7.5%	
MPB	(Part)	 14.2%	 13.7%	 21.1%	 27.5%	 25.3%	 22.3%	 10.0%	
MPB	 23.8%	 27.5%	 47.3%	 50.7%	 41.7%	 33.9%	 17.6%	
CPB	 23.8%	 13.7%	 23.6%	 24.6%	 15.1%	 15.1%	 10.1%	
Partial	PB	 0.0%	 3.4%	 0.0%	 4.3%	 5.1%	 10.7%	 14.2%	
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CHAPTER	3	–	NO	CHEAP	TALK	–	BUDGETARY	IMPACTS	OF	PUBLIC	
PARTICIPATION	AND	DEBATE	
While	participatory	budgeting	is	often	couched	in	lofty	rhetoric,	people	are	not	driven	to	the	meetings	simply	out	of	an	abstract	sense	of	civic	duty	alone.	The	process	must	promise	tangible	benefits	such	as	improved	public	service	delivery	in	return	for	taking	the	time	and	effort	to	mobilize	one’s	neighborhood	and	attend	a	public	assembly.	In	this	chapter,	I	adopt	the	perspective	put	forth	by	Abers	(2000)	that	a	core	aspect	driving	the	success	of	PB	is	its	“demonstration	effect”	–	the	ability	to	provide	relevant	benefits	to	local	residents	that	reinforces	the	importance	of	public	participation.	Existing	quantitative	research	has	found	PB	to	be	associated	with	changes	in	government	spending	priorities,	specifically	on	health	care	and	sanitation	(Spada	2009;	Touchton	&	Wampler	2014;	Gonçalves	2014),	but	no	links	have	been	demonstrated	in	terms	of	the	actual	mechanisms	that	lead	to	these	outcomes.	Previous	research	(Cabannes	2004;	Schneider	and	Baquero	2006)	finds	that	it	is	the	local	administrative	reforms	that	are	associated	with	PB	that	allow	PB-implementing	governments	to	increase	revenue	flows	through	expanded	tax	collection	and	greater	access	to	state	and	federal	transfers.	If	this	is	the	case,	we	should	expect	to	see	the	adoption	of	PB	by	a	local	government	to	be	associated	with	changes	on	both	sides	of	its	balance	sheet.	Furthermore,	budgetary	effects	appeal	across	the	ideological	spectrum	and	could	be	expected	of	both	CPB	and	MPB.	In	the	following	pages,	I	evaluate	the	basic	proposition	that	PB	should	lead	to	changes	in	local	government	spending	and	whether	assumptions	regarding	the	way	in	which	such	an	effect	takes	place	apply	in	the	absence	of	many	of	the	program’s	original	institutional	features.	
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	 Using	the	data	set	described	in	the	previous	chapter,	I	test	a	series	of	hypotheses	that	anticipate	the	types	of	changes	we	should	see	in	the	fiscal	policy	of	local	government	following	adoption	and	consolidation	of	PB.	The	first	of	these	expectations	is	that	PB	adoption	should	be	associated	with	an	expansion	in	government	spending	on	basic	service	provision	and	infrastructural	projects	addressing	those	issues	most	frequently	raised	in	public	fora,	such	as	street	paving	and	water	treatment.	These	changes	in	spending	priorities	will	be	gradual,	but	should	increasingly	reflect	government	efforts	to	meet	the	needs	of	the	poorer	residents	of	underserved,	peripheral	communities	that	form	PB’s	core	constituency.	As	I	discuss	in	further	detail	below,	results	from	a	fixed	effects,	panel	data	analysis	support	these	claims,	with	urban	infrastructure	spending	particularly	impacted	by	a	continuing	PB	program.	
	 As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	conditions	necessary	for	PB	to	change	government	behavior	may	not	be	present	for	all	of	the	programs	identified	as	PB	by	the	Sintomer	et	al.	(2014)	definition.	When	considering	the	two	categories	of	PB	that	I	have	defined,	multidimensional	participatory	budgeting	(MPB)	and	communicative	participatory	budgeting	(CPB),	we	should	expect	that	while	the	correlation	between	PB	and	spending	holds	for	MPB	it	should	be	less	evident	in	cases	of	CPB.	The	results	of	the	analyses	below	confirm	this	expectation,	offering	a	first	piece	of	evidence	that	institutional	design	is	a	crucial	factor	in	determining	whether	or	not	a	PB	program	has	the	potential	to	bring	about	change	in	local	government	spending	patterns	and,	more	generally,	enhance	the	role	of	a	community’s	marginalized	population	in	the	workings	of	local	government.	
	 To	carry	out	this	analysis,	I	utilize	the	data	introduced	in	the	previous	chapter	to	form	
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a	panel	with	annual	budgetary	data	for	municipal	governments	collected	by	the	Brazilian	Secretary	of	the	National	Treasury,	along	with	a	series	of	municipal-level	demographic	and	political	variables	that	allow	for	the	control	of	potentially	contributing	factors	to	a	local	government’s	spending	patterns	over	time,	such	as	local	economic	conditions,	demographics	and	the	party	in	control	of	government.	Once	again,	to	anticipate	the	results	section	below,	I	find	robust	evidence	that	PB	adoption	and	consolidation	leads	to	a	steadily	increasing	level	of	public	investment	over	time,	as	well	as	increases	in	own-source	revenue	collection.		
Before	presenting	the	full	results	of	the	analysis,	though,	I	first	briefly	review	the	existing	literature	on	the	various	ways	in	which	increased	citizen	participation	in	local	politics	may	affect	government	taxing	and	spending	behavior.	I	will	then	introduce	my	theory	in	greater	detail,	and	offer	the	hypotheses	that	are	derived	from	it.	I	then	move	to	a	series	of	analyses	and	discussion	of	the	results.	
Existing	Literature	on	Citizen	Influence	on	the	Local	Budget	
The	model	of	the	median	voter	was	the	initial	framework	through	which	citizen	preferences	could	be	expected	to	influence	the	budgetary	process	in	most	democratic	political	systems.	In	Downs’	(1957)	version	of	this	model,	government	policy	is	predicted	to	converge	on	the	preferences	of	the	median	voter	due	to	vote-maximizing	politicians	responding	to	citizens	rationally	voting	to	increase	their	utility	function.	This	assumes	perfect	and	costless	information	along	with	policy	preferences	falling	along	a	single	dimension,	where	each	voter	has	a	single-peaked	preference.	Even	when	advancing	his	
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theory,	Downs	acknowledged	the	possibility	of	information	asymmetries	being	used	to	favor	particular	interests.	
In	an	early	challenge	to	the	median	voter	model,	Niskanen	(1971)	introduced	the	concept	of	a	budget	maximizing	bureaucracy	that	drives	spending	upwards	through	their	monopolistic	control	over	public	goods	provision.	McKelvey	(1976)	argued	that	the	multidimensionality	of	real-world	policy	questions	makes	it	possible	for	agenda	setters	to	strategically	manipulate	the	decision-making	processes	so	that	no	outcome	reflects	majority	rule.	The	outcome	of	these	different	mechanisms	is	that	representative	democracy	on	its	own	appears	insufficient	to	bring	about	levels	of	taxing	and	spending	that	best	reflect	the	preferences	of	average	citizens.	
Direct	democracy	mechanisms,	such	as	referenda	and	initiatives,	have	been	studied	for	their	potential	to	overcome	these	issues	and	compel	governments	to	set	budget	priorities	closer	to	the	preferences	of	the	median	voter.	The	bulk	of	this	research	has	focused	on	comparisons	of	subnational	political	units	in	either	the	U.S.	(e.g.	Romer	&	Rosenthal	1979;	Farnham	1990;	Camobreco	1998;	Primo	2010)	or	Switzerland	(Feld	&	Kirchgassner	1999;	Funk	&	Gathmann	2011).	Direct	democracy	manifests	itself	in	both	countries	in	essentially	two	forms:	referenda	through	which	the	public	judges	a	law	or	policy	proposed	by	the	government	and	the	initiative,	where	citizens	themselves	are	the	source	of	the	proposals	on	the	ballot	(Lupia	&	Matsusaka	2004).	Although	an	additional	item	on	one’s	ballot	may	seem	inconsequential	to	the	majority	of	voters	without	a	strong	vested	interest	in	the	issue	at	hand,	a	nationwide	comparative	study	of	US	states	found	that	the	presence	of	direct	democracy	mechanisms	has	spillover	effects	that	serve	to	increase	
		67	
other	forms	of	political	engagement	(Tolbert,	McNeal	&	Smith	2003)	while	also	increasing	political	knowledge	and	internal	political	efficacy	(Bowler	&	Donovan	2002).		
Evidence	regarding	the	policy	impact	of	initiatives	and	referenda	suggest	that	there	is	a	relationship	between	direct	democracy	options	at	the	ballot	box	and	fiscal	restraint.	Matsusaka	(1995)	offers	evidence	that	citizen	participation	in	state-level	voter	initiatives	across	the	U.S.	have	succeeded	in	constraining	government	spending	in	the	second	half	of	the	20th	century,	with	revenue	sources	shifted	from	taxes	towards	user	fees,	and	spending	responsibilities	shifted	from	the	state	to	the	local	level.	Funk	and	Gathmann	(2013)	also	find	that	the	level	of	subnational	spending	in	Swiss	cantons	is	negatively	related	to	the	number	of	direct	democracy	mechanisms	that	are	present.	While	Matsusaka’s	results	indicated	that	voter	preferences	did	not	differ	between	states	with	or	without	budgetary	referenda,	Funk	and	Gathmann’s	results	suggest	that	more	conservative	fiscal	behavior	corresponds	to	more	conservative	attitudes	among	voters	in	the	cantons	with	budgetary	referenda.	
Applying	a	model	in	which	bureaucrats	seek	to	maximize	government	expenditures	along	the	lines	of	Niskanen,	Romer	and	Rosenthal	(1979)	make	the	claim	that	direct	democracy	does	not	resolve	the	issue	of	the	bureaucracy’s	monopolistic	control	over	agenda	setting	with	regards	to	the	budget.	Because	voters	face	only	two	options,	typically	between	a	default	reversion	in	spending	levels	or	a	proposal	put	forth	by	the	bureaucrats	themselves,	they	argue	that	expenditure	will	be	generally	greater	but	never	less	than	the	ideal	point	of	the	median	voter.	In	line	with	this	theory,	evidence	at	the	state	(Camobreco	1998)	and	local	(Farnham	1990)	levels	in	the	U.S.	indicates	that	voter	initiative	processes	
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enhance	the	link	between	voter	preferences	and	fiscal	policies	in	American	states.	An	additional	threat	to	the	efficacy	of	the	initiative	is	that	it	may	be	subject	to	manipulation	by	interest	groups,	particularly	at	the	local	level	(Primo	2010).	
Although	the	mechanism	through	which	citizens	influence	the	decision-making	process	in	referenda	and	voter	initiatives	differs	substantially	from	those	central	to	PB	programs,	both	are	attempts	to	correct	points	at	which	the	institutions	of	representative	democracy	have	been	unable	to	make	socially	optimal	decisions	regarding	public	policies.	Normatively,	the	assumption	that	scholars	of	both	phenomena	act	upon	is	that	decisions	made	by	the	public	in	a	voting	booth	or	a	popular	assembly	are	superior	to	the	outcome	of	traditional	political	processes.	However,	the	faithful	execution	of	the	decisions	of	the	public	still	relies	on	politicians	and	bureaucrats.	Evidence	of	these	instruments	having	an	actual	impact	on	the	behavior	of	government,	then,	needs	to	come	through	evaluations	of	the	extent	to	which	the	policy	output	of	government	deviates	from	its	traditional	trajectory.		
While	both	direct	and	participatory	mechanisms	share	a	general	impetus	to	provide	citizens	greater	influence	within	the	decision	making	process	of	representative	democracy,	there	are	substantive	differences	between	the	two	in	terms	of	means	and	goals.	Direct	democracy	aims	to	bring	government	spending	in	line	with	the	preferences	of	the	median	voter,	involving	minimal	costs	to	participate	(e.g.	merely	casting	a	vote),	and	engaging	a	broad	segment	of	society.	PB,	conversely,	is	intended	to	specifically	mobilize	individuals	that	are	traditionally	left	outside	of	electoral	politics.	In	a	survey	of	eight	municipalities,	Wampler	(2007)	found	that	the	average	level	of	income	and	formal	education	of	PB	delegates	was	lower	than	the	city	as	a	whole.	Civil	society	organizations	such	as	
		69	
neighborhood	associations	were	heavily	overrepresented,	with	nearly	half	of	all	delegates	holding	a	leadership	position	within	an	organization.	Referenda	aggregate	public	preferences	at	one	point	in	time	about	a	particular	question,	while	the	product	of	the	PB	cycle	evolves	through	multiple	stages.	After	demands	are	presented,	negotiation	takes	place	either	directly	in	the	assemblies	or	through	representatives	of	citizen	participants	and	their	government	officials.	Finally,	while	budgetary	referenda	are	most	commonly	used	to	control	the	overall	size	of	government	taxing	or	spending,	PB	is	focused	on	the	way	in	which	available	public	resources	are	distributed.	
In	one	of	the	first	quantitative	studies	to	specifically	address	the	impact	of	PB	on	government	spending,	Marquetti	(2002)	shows	that	the	distribution	of	spending	by	geographical	area	in	Porto	Alegre	was	shifted	towards	poorer	communities,	specifically	those	in	which	public	goods	and	services	were	chronically	undersupplied.	Additionally,	they	found	that	the	policy	areas	selected	within	the	public	assemblies	did	receive	increased	amounts	of	resources,	and	the	distribution	of	spending	evolved	over	time	as	certain	needs	were	met	and	new	priorities	were	identified.	Similar	results	were	discovered	in	Belo	Horizonte	both	by	Pires	(2008)	and	Wampler	(2015).	Comparing	cities	across	the	state	of	Rio	Grande	do	Sul;	Marquetti	&	Berni	(2006)	find	that	the	impact	of	PB	on	taxing	and	spending	is	contingent	on	local	median	income.	In	Porto	Alegre	and	other	relatively	large	and	wealthy	municipalities,	PB	implementation	led	governments	to	expand	efforts	to	exploit	the	local	tax	base.	In	poorer	municipalities,	however,	public	demands	appear	to	have	been	moderated	by	collective	preferences	to	avoid	increased	financial	burden.	
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Using	a	nationwide	data	set	covering	all	cities	with	more	than	100,000	inhabitants	between	1996	and	2000,	Boulding	and	Wampler	(2010)	find	that	PB	municipalities	spend	more	on	health	and	sanitation	than	their	counterparts	that	had	not	implemented	PB.	Expanding	the	scope	of	the	study	to	cover	from	1989	to	2008,	Touchton	and	Wampler	(2014)	find	additional	evidence	that	municipalities	with	PB	increase	health	and	sanitation	spending	and	that	this	effect	increases	with	the	amount	of	time	the	program	has	been	in	place.	Gonçalves	(2014)	reaches	similar	findings	using	a	different	data	set	that	covers	all	of	Brazil	from	1990-2004,	but	focuses	on	proportions	of	the	budget	rather	than	overall	spending.	In	contrast	to	other	works,	though,	she	finds	that	this	increase	in	health	care	funding	came	at	the	expense	of	other	forms	of	social	spending,	suggesting	both	winners	and	losers	will	typically	emerge	from	such	a	shift	in	fiscal	policy.	
All	three	of	the	above	studies,	while	touching	upon	one	element	of	the	local	government	budget,	were	primarily	concerned	with	establishing	the	mechanism	through	which	PB	may	lead	to	improved	standards	of	wellbeing	among	the	citizenry.	PB’s	impact	on	the	composition	of	the	local	budget	was	relevant	primarily	as	a	causal	mechanism	rather	than	a	topic	of	direct	interest.	With	the	budget	itself	as	the	outcome	of	interest	in	this	chapter,	health	and	sanitation	spending	may	not	be	an	ideal	measure	of	the	responsiveness	of	public	policy	to	the	participatory	process.	The	most	pressing	needs	expressed	by	participants	in	a	given	setting	are	likely	to	vary	depending	on	local	context.	Regardless	of	the	particular	policy	areas,	the	nature	of	public	spending	should	change	to	demonstrate	a	focus	on	the	expansion	of	public	goods	to	meet	previously	unmet	needs.	Local	context	may	lead	to	a	particular	emphasis	on	education,	infrastructure	or	health,	but	the	general	mechanism	through	which	PB	turns	popular	input	into	policy	remains	essentially	the	same	
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across	all	three.	Unmet	needs	are	turned	into	concrete	policy	proposals	in	the	form	of	capital	investment	projects.	Independent	of	the	particular	needs	of	a	given	city,	we	should	see	evidence	of	a	responsive	and	active	PB	program	in	local	capital	expenditures.	
Theory	
The	theoretical	impact	of	PB	on	the	contours	of	a	local	government’s	budget	should	emerge	from	a	series	of	institutional	features	that	tend	to	be	associated	with	the	establishment	of	PB,	particularly	in	those	cases	I	have	categorized	as	multidimensional	participatory	budgeting	(MPB).	First,	we	should	most	expect	PB	participants	to	be	initially	motivated	by	specific,	pressing	demands	that	typically	stem	from	the	under-provision	of	public	goods	and	services.		These	demands,	therefore,	will	tend	to	revolve	around	the	need	for	new	public	investments	either	to	resolve	basic	infrastructure	issues	or	to	extend	social	services.	Second,	because	PB	programs	explicitly	target	underserved	neighborhoods	when	mobilizing	participants,	the	typical	demands	brought	to	PB	fora	tend	to	reflect	long-running	deficiencies	in	local	government	services,	and	the	competitive	nature	of	the	participatory	process	can	(theoretically)	help	identify	those	that	are	most	in	need	and/or	those	most	adept	at	expressing	their	demands.	Participation	is	costly,	competition	is	strong,	and	the	decision-making	rules	favor	the	communities	that	can	mobilize	the	most	residents	to	participate.	Third,	the	format	favors	the	selection	of	projects	that	can	be	feasibly	met	within	the	means	of	the	local	budget.	With	the	core	unit	of	participation	at	the	neighborhood	or	regional	level,	the	scale	of	demands	tends	to	remain	reasonably	small.	The	need	to	generate	tangible	benefits	in	a	short	period	of	time	favors	the	selection	of	minor	infrastructure	improvements	such	as	the	paving	of	roads	or	installation	of	a	sidewalk	
		72	
(Abers	2000).	When	such	demands	are	met,	subsequent	citizen	participation	from	the	affected	neighborhood	should	increase,	raising	pressure	on	the	local	government	to	increase	the	amount	of	funding	available	in	future	budget	cycles.		
These	expectations,	then,	lead	me	to	the	first	testable	implication	of	the	theory,	formally	stated	as:	
	
H1:	The	adoption	(and	continued	practice)	of	participatory	budgeting	is	associated	with	a	
subsequent	increase	in	public	works	spending	relative	to	this	sector’s	budget	share	in	previous	
fiscal	years.	
In	the	beginning	years,	PB’s	impact	on	the	budget	occurs	through	the	demands	that	are	raised	throughout	the	annual	cycle	of	meetings.	After	the	first	year,	the	local	government	should	begin	to	execute	at	least	some	of	these	proposals,	with	a	learning	curve	tapering	off	as	the	annual	cycle	begins	to	catch	a	rhythm.	While	the	specific	policy	area	may	vary,	small-scale	local	infrastructure	projects	should	tend	to	dominate.	A	common	focus	in	PB	municipalities	during	the	early	years	of	the	program	has	typically	been	on	addressing	the	state’s	neglect	of	the	city’s	poorer	communities	through	the	expansion	of	the	urban	network	of	basic	infrastructure	(Abers	2000;	Avritzer	2012;	Luchmann	2012).	Independent	of	the	specific	needs	being	addressed,	these	would	all	fall	under	capital	expenditures.	This	differs	from	the	approach	of	Boulding	and	Wampler	(2010),	Touchton	and	Wampler	(2014)	and	Gonçalves	(2014),	all	of	whom	focused	on	the	policy	area	within	which	spending	took	place	rather	than	examining	the	difference	between	capital	and	current	expenditures.	
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H2:	With	the	implementation	of	PB	will	come	a	shift	in	expenditure	patterns	toward	a	
greater	focus	on	basic	infrastructure	expansion	and	improvement.	
While	existing	studies	point	to	healthcare	and	sanitation	spending	as	being	particularly	affected	by	PB,	urban	infrastructure	and	education	are	also	common	themes	in	PB-related	debates.	An	emphasis	on	urban	infrastructure	at	the	beginning	of	Porto	Alegre’s	implementation	was	arguably	a	central	part	of	its	success.	In	comparison	to	building	a	school	or	neighborhood	clinic,	paving	roads	or	building	sidewalks	can	be	carried	out	faster	and	at	far	less	cost,	while	also	being	highly	visible	to	the	local	population.	Additionally,	while	health	care	and	education	are	shared	responsibilities	between	state	and	local	government,	responsibility	for	basic	infrastructure	falls	primarily	on	local	governments.	Because	urban	development	tends	to	be	a	low	priority	on	the	federal	government	agenda,	local	governments	retain	substantial	autonomy	to	set	policy	in	this	area	(Arretche	2010).		
H3:	PB	adoption	should	be	associated	with	an	increase	in	own-source	revenue	collection.	
Given	the	constrained	nature	of	Brazilian	municipalities’	revenue	stream,	to	adequately	address	the	demands	raised	by	PB	participants,	local	governments	implementing	PB	will	tend	to	rely	on	administrative	and	tax	reforms	to	increase	spending	capacity,	either	through	gaining	access	to	additional	intergovernmental	grants	or	enhance	locally	generated	revenue	streams.	Case	studies	of	early	implementations	of	PB	highlight	the	importance	of	finding	ways	to	optimize	the	resources	already	available	(World	Bank	2008),	as	well	as	seeking	new	sources	of	funding	(Ribeiro	&	Grazia	2003).	Brazilian	municipalities	have	a	limited	series	of	options	to	increase	revenue,	and	there	is	frequently	slack	in	the	collection	of	local	taxes	due	to	out	of	date	records	and	low	levels	of	
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enforcement	(Alencar	&	Gobetti	2008).	Additionally,	the	transparency	features	included	within	PB	may	work	to	increase	the	willingness	of	residents	to	pay	higher	taxes	in	exchange	for	tangible	improvements	in	infrastructure	and	government	services	(Schneider	&	Baquero	2006).		
As	participation	matures,	the	preferences	expressed	within	PB	should	become	a	guide	for	local	government	officials	beyond	the	specific	portion	of	the	budget	set	aside	for	public	debate.	Even	if	not	directly	acknowledged,	the	spending	decisions	of	the	administration	in	power	should	theoretically	move	closer	to	the	preferences	of	PB	participants,	as	communication	between	the	latter	and	the	former	becomes	the	norm.	PB	provides	politicians	with	a	detailed	picture	of	the	needs	of	sectors	of	society	that	are	not	represented	in	the	local	policymaking	arena	(Gonçalves	2014).	Even	if	projects	fail	to	win	the	votes	necessary	to	be	incorporated	into	the	final	participatory	budget,	incumbents	seeking	reelection	would	benefit	from	carrying	out	those	demands	if	resources	are	available.	Additionally,	many	of	the	infrastructure	investments	generate	recurring	costs,	such	as	staff	and	supplies,	which	will	accumulate	as	further	investments	are	made.		
H4:	Evidence	of	the	fiscal	impact	of	PB	should	be	stronger	in	MPB	municipalities	than	in	CPB	
cases.	
The	posited	effects	of	PB	on	municipal	fiscal	policy	patterns	should	be	most	evident	in	those	municipalities	I	have	designated	as	cases	of	full	MPB.	Crucially,	the	participatory	process	must	be	linked	to	the	actual	decision-making	process	involving	the	local	government	budget	in	order	for	this	process	to	bring	about	changes	in	local	government	revenue	and	spending	patterns.	Although	open	fora	of	an	advisory	nature	could	lead	to	the	
		75	
indirect	adoption	of	citizen	suggestions,	the	impact	would	be	less	significant	on	both	the	long-term	budgeting	patterns	of	the	government	and	citizens’	sense	of	involvement	in	that	process.	Ultimately	all	budgetary	decisions	are	made	by	the	City	Council	and	Mayor’s	Office,	so	the	PB	features	that	enhance	these	officials’	level	of	commitment	and	accountability	to	citizen	input	is	essential	in	order	to	avoid	changes	in	spending	that	come	from	last	minute	political	elite	negotiations.			
	 With	these	expectations	providing	the	best-case	scenario	for	PB	as	put	forth	by	proponents	of	the	approach,	the	question	now	becomes	whether	such	expectations	hold	up	under	empirical	scrutiny.	As	has	been	evident	throughout	this	discussion,	there	are	many	steps	required	for	the	PB	approach	to	produce	the	intended	benefits	touted	by	its	supporters.	In	the	following	section	I	offer	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	budgetary	step	and	explore	whether	the	anticipated	changes	in	budgeting	priorities	find	any	support	in	the	data.		
Data	My	key	explanatory	variable	is	the	number	of	years	a	particular	type	of	PB	has	been	in	place	for	a	municipality	based	on	my	categorization	schema	laid	out	in	the	previous	chapter.	I	use	three	categories	of	PB:	multi-dimensional	PB	[MPB]	consultative	PB	[CPB],	and	a	more	general	categorization	of	PB	that	includes	both	types	[total	PB].	The	distinction	between	full	and	partial	MPB,	while	useful	for	descriptive	purposes	in	the	previous	chapter,	is	not	a	main	concern	for	the	following	two	chapters.	The	number	of	full	MPB	cases	in	place	at	any	given	point	is	never	greater	than	21	for	the	duration	of	the	panel,	a	number	that	prevents	use	of	this	category	given	the	demands	of	the	approach	that	will	be	used	in	this	analysis.	Thus	by	using	a	more	blunt	categorization	of	municipalities	that	includes	cases	of	
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both	full	and	partial	MPB,	the	principal	analytical	risk	is	a	reduced	possibility	of	finding	significant	differences	between	cases	of	MPB	and	CPB.		
For	each	version	of	the	PB	independent	variable,	I	employ	a	count	measure	for	the	cumulative	number	of	years	that	a	given	PB	program	has	been	in	place	within	a	municipality.	As	the	original	data	set	provides	data	for	two	year	time	periods,	I	assume	that	the	particular	PB	program	was	in	place	for	both	years.	A	one-year	lag	is	applied	to	the	beginning	of	every	program	in	order	to	allow	for	the	fact	that	budgets	are	developed	one	year	in	advance	of	their	actual	implementation.	When	municipalities	transition	from	MPB	to	CPB	or	vice-versa,	they	are	treated	as	if	they	just	began	a	new	program,	although	in	the	cases	where	the	two	are	combined	they	are	treated	as	a	continuous	program.	The	count	begins	at	zero	in	the	small	number	of	cases	where	cities	switch	from	MPB	to	CPB	or	re-institute	PB	after	a	lapse.	Beginning	the	count	where	it	had	previously	been	stopped	has	a	very	minor	effect	on	the	coefficient	and	does	not	change	the	statistical	significant	of	any	findings	presented	in	this	chapter.	
The	data	related	to	municipal	budgets	were	collected	from	the	Brazilian	Treasury	Secretary	[STN]’s	FINBRA	database,	which	features	detailed	financial	data	on	Brazilian	municipalities	from	1989-2012.	All	municipalities	are	required	to	report	budget	execution	annually	to	both	the	STN	as	well	as	a	state-level	body	for	auditing	purposes.	Spending	is	measured	either	by	type	(current	versus	capital)	or	in	groupings	of	public	policy	areas,	such	as	health	and	sanitation.	The	spending	categories	used	remain	constant	throughout	the	period	under	analysis.	All	prices	were	converted	to	2010	Brazilian	reais	[R$]	using	the	IBGE’s	IPC-A,	a	commonly	used	inflation	index.	The	annual	population	estimate	of	the	IBGE	
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is	used	to	calculate	each	of	these	on	a	per	capita	basis.	When	reported	as	percentages,	expenditure	categories	are	divided	by	the	total	amount	spent	for	that	year	and	income	is	measured	as	a	proportion	of	the	total	receipts.	Due	to	the	heavily	skewed	nature	of	the	data,	a	logarithmic	transformation	is	used	on	the	per	capita	values.	These	FINBRA	data	were	used	to	calculate	the	following	five	dependent	variables:		
	
Investment	spending.	The	STN	defines	investment	spending	as	a	subcategory	of	capital	expenditures	which	are	related	to	the	planning	and	execution	of	public	works	projects,	such	as	the	acquisition	of	land,	the	purchase	of	building	materials	or	equipment	to	be	installed	as	a	part	of	the	project	(STN	2012).	According	to	hypothesis	1	and	2,	we	should	expect	this	to	increase	as	PB	is	implemented	and	matures.		
	 	
Spending	by	function	–	housing	and	urban	infrastructure,	health	and	sanitation,	and	
education	and	culture.	Separately	from	the	classification	of	current	and	capital	expenditures,	the	FINBRA	contains	expenditures	broken	down	into	different	groups	of	policy	areas.	Over	time,	these	have	become	increasingly	disaggregated,	but	12	categories	have	been	used	since	the	1980s.	The	focus	of	previous	research	on	the	impact	of	PB	on	government	spending	has	been	in	the	area	of	“health	and	sanitation.”	I	also	include	two	additional	categories	–	“housing	and	urban	infrastructure”	and	“education	and	culture”	–	in	order	to	assess	municipal	spending	patterns	that	incorporate	other	frequently	made	demands.		
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Own-source	revenue	is	measured	as	the	sum	of	all	local	government	revenue	streams	that	are	both	regulated	and	collected	by	the	local	government.	The	two	primary	taxes	over	which	local	governments	hold	original	jurisdiction	are	the	IPTU,	a	tax	on	urban	property,	and	the	ISS,	a	tax	on	services.	Fees	can	either	be	applied	uniformly	to	all	residents	or	business	owners	or	be	specifically	charged	to	users	of	a	public	service.	Because	transfers	provide	a	majority	of	local	government	revenue	and	the	collection	of	taxes	and	fees	depends	on	actively	maintaining	a	registry	of	taxable	land	and	services,	own-source	revenue	is	potentially	determined	as	much	by	political	will	as	by	local	economic	characteristics	(Orair,	Gouvea	&	Leal	2014).	While	locally	collected	taxes	and	fees	are,	on	average,	25.9%	of	total	revenue	for	Brazilian	municipal	governments	(Araújo	and	Siqueira	2016.	196)13,	they	have	a	substantial	impact	on	the	amount	of	resources	available	for	discretionary	spending	that	are	typically	open	for	debate	in	PB	discussions	(Gerigk	and	Clemente	2011).	
Additional	Explanations	for	Government	Fiscal	Behavior	
In	this	section	I	introduce	a	series	of	controls	that	add	to	the	subsequent	models	other	potential	factors	important	in	explaining	local	fiscal	revenue	and	expenditure	patterns.	Electoral	data	from	the	Supreme	Electoral	Tribunal	(TSE)	allow	me	to	incorporate	the	role	that	political	competition	and	partisan	politics	may	play	in	local	fiscal	policy.	Economic	and	demographic	data	from	the	IBGE	and	Ministry	of	Health	provide	the	basis	for	measures	of	both	the	potential	supply	of	public	revenue	along	with	demand	for	particular	government	
																																																								
13 Positively correlated with population size. the average for municipalities above the population 
cutoff used for our data set is 34.1% (ibid). 
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services.	The	specific	sources	for	each	variable	along	with	summary	statistics	are	detailed	in	the	Appendix.	
Below	are	the	specific	variables	constructed	from	these	data	sources	used	in	order	to	control	for	theoretically	important	factors	in	local	fiscal	policy:	
1.	Ideology	is	a	continuous	measure	on	a	ten-point	scale	ranging	from	left	to	right,	matched	to	the	political	party	of	the	mayor	in	power.	The	mayor’s	ideology	could	be	expected	to	drive	spending	patterns,	with	the	traditional	expectation	that	left-wing	governments	will	tend	to	tax	more	and	increase	spending,	particularly	on	social	services	and	education.	I	use	the	scores	derived	from	Power	and	Zucco’s	(2012)	parliamentary	survey,	which	asks	every	four	years	for	members	of	the	national	congress	to	place	all	of	the	major	political	parties	on	a	one	to	ten	scale.	The	survey	is	conducted	every	four	years,	and	therefore	the	score	of	a	party	is	updated	to	reflect	changing	political	dynamics.		
	
2.	Partisan	alignment	is	measured	by	two	dummy	variables,	one	of	which	registers	if	the	political	party	of	the	mayor	is	in	the	coalition	of	the	president	and	the	second	registers	if	the	mayor’s	party	is	in	the	coalition	of	their	state’s	governor.	While	an	imperfect	proxy	for	ideology,	the	political	party	of	the	mayor	has	other	potential	impacts	on	government	spending	behavior.	In	particular,	co-partisanship	across	different	levels	of	government	may	increase	the	resources	available	for	a	local	government	to	spend	as	well	as	influence	the	supply	of	public	goods	made	available	by	state	and	federal	government	to	a	city’s	residents.	Indeed,	considerable	evidence	from	Brazil	suggests	that	both	transfers	and	direct	spending	
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increase	for	cities	whose	mayors	belong	to	the	same	political	party	or	coalition	as	the	governor	or	president	(Ferreira	and	Bugarin	2007;	Brollo	and	Nannicini	2012).	The	impact	on	local	budgeting	patterns	of	these	benefits	of	co-partisanship,	however,	is	not	straightforward.	On	one	hand,	the	final	effect	of	this	may	be	that	partisan	alignment	leads	to	increased	levels	of	spending	on	public	works	and	infrastructural	improvement	in	marginalized	areas	because	of	the	increased	resources	and	possible	increase	in	spending	discretion	that	may	come	with	those	resources.	However,	if	the	state	or	federal	government	directly	intervenes	to	improve	infrastructure	and	expand	the	social	services	available	to	the	public,	the	mayor	may	reduce	the	levels	of	public	investment	made	directly	by	the	local	government.	Thus	it	remains	an	empirical	question	what	type	of	impact	co-partisanship	will	have	on	local	budgeting	patterns.		
	
3.	Competitiveness	of	elections	is	measured	by	using	the	margin	between	the	first	and	second	place	candidates	for	mayor	in	the	most	recent	election.	As	only	some	elections	included	a	runoff,	only	results	from	the	first	round	of	elections	are	used.	More	competitive	local	elections	in	Brazil	have	been	linked	to	increased	public	goods	provision	in	one	study	in	Brazil	(Arvate	2013)	but	were	found	to	have	no	effect	on	responsiveness	in	Mexico	(Cleary	2007).	Competitive	elections	may	moderate	the	effects	of	the	ideology	of	the	ruling	party	and	bring	policy	closer	to	that	of	the	median	voter	(Solé	Ollé	2003).	
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4.	Legislative	fragmentation	is	measured	using	Laakso	and	Taagepera’	(1979)	Effective	Number	of	Parties	(ENP)	index,	applied	to	the	City	Council.	Fragmented	governments	may	lead	to	higher	levels	of	spending	to	satisfy	the	increased	number	of	parties	necessary	to	form	a	ruling	coalition	(Persson	et	al	2007).	While	the	executive	branch	introduces	the	budget	in	Brazilian	local	government,	a	heavily	divided	City	Council	can	undermine	the	executive	through	adding	inefficient	amendments	(Cavalcante	2013).		
	
5.	Political	budget	cycles	that	influence	government	spending	have	been	identified	at	different	levels	of	government	across	a	range	of	national	contexts.	While	local	politicians	do	not	have	the	same	power	to	manipulate	macroeconomic	factors	such	as	inflation	or	the	level	of	employment,	studies	have	pointed	to	a	number	of	different	ways	in	which	politicians	can	manipulate	the	size	and	composition	of	public	spending	for	electoral	gain.	Baleiras	and	da	Silva	Costa	(2004)	find	strong	evidence	of	increased	public	investment	during	pre-electoral	periods	in	Portuguese	municipalities	that	are	enhanced	if	the	incumbent	is	running	for	re-election.	In	Brazil,	Sakurai	and	Menezes	Filho	(2010)	find	that	aggregate	spending	increases	in	the	year	prior	to	local	elections,	with	increased	current	expenditures,	reduced	investments,	and	less	collection	of	own	source	revenue.		
	
6.	Budgetary	dynamics	include	two	measures:	change	in	revenue	and	size	of	the	previous	year's	deficit.	Change	in	revenue	is	measured	as	the	first	difference	of	total	budget	receipts,	and	is	meant	to	capture	fiscal	shocks	that	could	drive	sharp	changes	in	spending	behavior.	
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The	deficit	is	measured	as	the	difference	between	receipts	and	expenditures	over	total	receipts	for	the	previous	year.	The	expectation	is	that	deficits	in	a	given	year	will	constrain	local	governments	in	the	following	year,	particularly	in	the	case	of	infrastructure	spending.	Federal	mandates	set	minimum	levels	of	spending	in	particular	public	services,	so	adjustments	must	fall	on	discretionary	spending.	
	
7.	Local	economic	and	demographic	characteristics	Local	factors	that	could	influence	the	supply	and	demand	for	public	goods	are	controlled	for	through	GDP	per	capita,	total	population,	population	density	(all	logged)	along	with	the	percentage	of	the	population	between	0	to	15	and	60	or	above.	GDP	per	capita	directly	impacts	the	resources	available	to	the	local	government	through	taxation	and	it	serves	as	a	proxy	for	income	levels	serves	as	a	potential	indicator	of	need.	A	greater	percentage	of	the	population	of	school	age	should	be	associated	with	higher	education	spending,	while	an	increase	in	the	proportion	of	elderly	residents	should	have	a	similar	effect	on	health	care.	
Model	
Both	the	qualitative	and	quantitative	literature	identify	relationships	between	PB	adoption	and	various	local	characteristics	that	could	lead	to	spurious	findings	when	seeking	to	explain	government	revenue	and	expenditure	patterns.	PB	tends	to	be	adopted	in	larger	cities	with	higher	than	average	levels	of	per	capita	income	and	education.	Furthermore,	important	aspects	of	the	demand-side	of	public	spending,	such	as	the	existing	level	of	infrastructure	or	the	actual	preferences	of	local	voters,	cannot	be	measured	using	
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available	data.	As	a	way	of	overcoming	this	dilemma,	Touchton	and	Wampler	(2014)	match	cases	based	on	information	from	the	decennial	census	in	their	analyses	of	the	effects	of	PB	on	healthcare	spending	and	public	welfare.	However,	this	only	partially	addresses	the	lack	of	key	annual	demographic	data,	as	there	may	be	substantial	variation	that	takes	place	between	the	census	years.	Additionally,	matching	on	Census	data	assumes	that	demographic	characteristics	adequately	capture	most	of	the	meaningful	variation	between	municipalities.		
	 As	an	alternative	approach	to	address	heterogeneity	between	adopting	and	non-adopting	municipalities,	I	include	unit-specific	fixed	effects	in	my	baseline	model.	This	transforms	the	equation	so	that	each	variable	is	centered	around	its	individual	mean,	with	the	estimation	taking	into	account	only	the	variance	that	takes	place	within	the	unit	of	analysis	(in	this	case,	a	municipality).		In	the	absence	of	a	more	complete	set	of	local	data,	fixed	effects	addresses	omitted	variable	bias	without	making	additional	assumptions	about	the	source	of	said	bias.		An	additional	benefit	is	that	there	can	be	correlation	between	the	fixed	effects	and	the	independent	variables	used	in	the	equation.	The	unobserved	unit	effects	are	likely	correlated	with	PB	implementation,	while	fixed	effects	do	not	resolve	issues	with	time-varying	heterogeneity,	the	political	and	demographic	variables	introduced	in	the	previous	section	along	with	GDP	per	capita	are	introduced	to	account	for	most	of	the	residual	unexplained	variation.	
	 The	baseline	model	used	to	test	the	hypotheses	put	forth	earlier	in	this	chapter	takes	the	form:	
BUDGETij	=	β1PBit	+		β2Xit	+	αi	+	εit	
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PB	represents	the	number	of	years	a	PB	program	has	been	in	place	within	a	municipality	and	X	is	a	vector	containing	the	political,	demographic	and	economic	control	variables	mentioned	in	the	previous	section.	The	unit-specific	fixed	effects	are	represented	by	α	which	varies	across	units,	but	not	across	time,	and	ε	is	the	observation-specific	error	term.	The	data	form	a	panel	with	annual	observations	on	559	Brazilian	municipalities	between	1999	and	2012.	While	this	panel	contains	only	10%	of	the	country’s	5,570	
municípios,	as	of	2010	they	contained	61.2%	of	the	country’s	total	population14.	For	the	first	model	below,	I	use	only	the	broader	classification	of	PB	as	defined	by	the	Sintomer	et	al.	criteria,	measured	as	the	total	cumulative	number	of	years	an	active	program	has	been	in	place.	Preliminary	diagnostic	tests	indicate	the	presence	of	autocorrelation,	so	a	lagged	dependent	variable	is	used	to	model	the	dynamics	present	in	the	data.	Cluster-robust	standard	errors	are	reported	and	used	as	the	basis	for	statistical	significance	of	the	coefficients.	Summary	statistics	are	available	in	Table	1.	Further	detail	about	the	model	specification	and	estimation	techniques	may	be	found	in	this	chapter's	Appendix.	
Findings	
I	begin	by	testing	my	first	hypothesis,	which	states	that	PB	should	be	associated	with	an	increase	in	spending	on	capital	investments.	In	the	first	column	of	Table	2,	investment	spending	is	expressed	as	a	percentage	of	the	overall	budget	with	the	second	column	using	the	logged	per	capita	total.		In	both	equations,	the	PB	variable	is	positive	and	significant,	with	each	additional	year	of	PB	bringing	about	an	estimated	1%	increase	in	the	
																																																								
14 This is due to the fact that PB data was only collected for municipalities with over 50,000 
residents. 
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amount	invested	and	adding	.08	percentage	points	to	investment	spending's	share	of	the	budget.	When	looking	at	the	budget	share	invested,	ten	years	of	PB	would	have	the	same	impact	on	the	budget	as	moving	between	the	two	furthest	ideological	extremes	observed	within	our	sample.	
The	results	for	the	control	variables	largely	conform	to	expectations,	but	there	are	some	interesting	differences	between	the	two	measurements	of	investment	spending.		Ideology	is	highly	significant	when	considering	the	percentage	of	the	budget	but	not	for	total	amount	invested,	suggesting	that	mayors	belonging	to	parties	on	the	right	side	of	the	ideological	spectrum	prefer	capital	to	current	expenditures	but	do	not	increase	overall	spending	to	do	so.	Left-wing	mayors	may	proportionally	spend	less	on	investment	because	they	spend	more	on	providing	services	that	would	be	classified	as	current	expenditures.	Conversely,	population	size	and	GDP	per	capita	are	only	significant	for	the	absolute	amount	invested,	which	would	indicate	that	larger	and	wealthier	municipalities	increase	current	and	capital	expenditures	at	a	constant	rate.		
Election	years	substantially	affect	investment	spending	patterns	in	both	relative	and	absolution	term,	consistent	with	the	political	budgetary	cycle	literature	mentioned	in	the	previous	section.	Vote-seeking	behavior	leads	incumbent	politicians	to	increase	visible	infrastructure	projects	leading	up	to	the	elections.	The	fact	that	the	elections	variable	was	also	significant	when	proportions	of	spending	were	used	means	that	this	emphasis	comes	at	the	cost	of	underfunding	other	government	programs.	One	potential	explanation	for	this	is	that	new	projects	are	highly	visible,	easily	targeted	at	particular	constituencies	and	credit	is	more	clearly	attributed	to	the	mayor	currently	in	office	in	comparison	to	ongoing	
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social	programs,	which	may	be	associated	with	other	levels	of	government	or	past	administrators	(Drazen	&	Eslava	2010).			
The	significant	and	positive	relationship	between	margin	of	victory	and	investments	could	be	a	sign	that	mayors	or	parties	with	stronger	control	over	local	politics	are	better	able	to	dedicate	spending	to	long-term	goals	while	in	office.	Partisan	alignment	with	the	president	is	not	significant	but	mayoral	alignment	with	the	governor	is,	suggesting	the	governor’s	heightened	role	in	Brazilian	local	finances.	Governors	may	be	better	able	to	selectively	target	benefits,	and	parliamentary	amendments	available	to	all	political	parties	mean	that	central	government	favoritism	need	not	necessarily	be	contingent	on	alignment	with	the	President.	As	expected,	public	investments	are	constrained	by	deficits	and	are	highly	responsive	to	shocks	in	revenue.	The	amount	spent	on	investments	increases	with	GDP	per	capita	and	decreases	with	population	size	but	there	is	no	evidence	that	these	impact	the	share	of	the	budget	invested,	likely	associated	with	the	fact	that	higher	income	cities	have	more	slack	resources	while	larger	cities	benefits	from	economies	of	scale.		
	 Table	3	contains	the	results	of	the	model	using	spending	broken	down	by	policy	area	to	establish	whether	spending	patterns	in	PB	towns	reflect	a	heightened	emphasis	on	policy	areas	that	are	most	commonly	mentioned	in	PB	demands.	Each	of	the	three	areas	mentioned	previously	is	measured	first	by	using	the	logged	per	capita	total	amount	spent	followed	by	the	share	of	the	year's	budget	spent	in	that	area.	The	first	two	columns	refer	to	housing	and	urban	infrastructure.	The	third	and	fourth	columns	offer	the	results	from	the	health	and	sanitation	models,	and	the	final	pair	of	columns	contains	the	results	from	the	education	and	culture	category.		
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The	estimated	effect	of	PB	on	housing	and	urban	infrastructure	closely	resembles	that	found	for	the	capital	investment	models,	with	each	year	of	PB	increasing	absolute	spending	for	both	by	1	percentage	point	in	absolute	terms	and	.09	percentage	points	as	a	share	of	the	budget.	However,	the	findings	fail	to	reject	the	null	hypothesis	for	education	and	health	spending	measured	in	absolute	terms	and	as	a	share	of	the	budget.		Ideology	is	significant	for	the	two	measures	of	education	and	culture	spending,	and	the	negative	sign	on	the	coefficient	indicates	that	spending	should	go	up	as	the	political	party	of	the	mayor	moves	to	the	left	of	the	ideological	spectrum,	a	finding	that	is	consistent	with	expectations.		Partisan	alignment	with	the	governor's	coalition	increases	the	budget	share	of	housing	and	infrastructure	while	alignment	with	the	President's	coalition	decreases	the	share	of	health	and	sanitation.	The	GDP	per	capita	measure	also	emerges	as	significant,	suggesting	again	that	economic	development	levels	of	a	municipality’s	increase	a	local	government’s	ability	to	address	such	policy	areas	as	housing	and	education.		
These	findings	indicate	that	the	participation	brought	about	by	any	form	of	PB	does	lead	to	significant	shifts	in	spending	behavior	but	that	this	effect	is	not	universal	across	all	areas	of	public	services.	Compared	to	the	impact	that	an	election	year	has	on	spending,	a	PB	program	that	has	been	place	for	eight	years	has	roughly	the	same	effect	on	overall	investment	spending	and	double	the	effect	on	housing	and	infrastructure	spending.	The	political	explanations	raised	in	the	previous	section	receive	partial	support,	although	none	but	electoral	cycles	are	significant	across	all	categories	tested.	Partisan	alignment	with	the	governor,	substantively	large	for	investment	spending,	has	no	impact	on	any	given	policy	area,	suggesting	that	perhaps	governors	can	influence	the	transfer	of	resources	for	specific	projects	but	not	the	assignment	of	recurring	funding	for	health,	spending	or	housing	
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programs.	The	effective	number	of	parties	in	the	City	Council	shows	a	positive	relationship	with	housing	and	infrastructure	and	health	in	relative	terms	but	is	negative	for	education,	potentially	a	signal	that	the	pork	barrel	spending	necessary	to	build	and	maintain	a	larger	coalition	on	the	City	Council	is	more	likely	to	be	centered	on	health	or	infrastructure	projects.	
	 Turning	to	own	source	revenue,	we	see	in	Table	4	that	the	presence	of	a	PB	program	does	seem	to	contribute	to	an	increase	in	local	revenue	generation.	As	with	the	other	dependent	variables,	own	source	revenue	was	measured	both	in	logged	per	capita	terms	as	well	as	a	proportion	of	total	revenue.	PB	program	years	lead	to	an	increase	in	own	source	revenue	generation,	although	only	when	measured	in	per	capita	terms.	As	might	be	expected,	cities	collect	less	revenue	during	election	years	and	their	GDP	per	capita	level	impacts	the	size	but	not	the	proportion	of	own-source	revenue.	Ideology	and	partisan	alignment	have	no	effect,	and	the	share	of	the	young	and	old	population	is	negatively	correlated	with	a	city's	tax	collection.	
	 I	now	move	to	the	portion	of	the	analysis	that	examines	the	independent	effects	of	different	types	of	PB	programs	defined	in	the	previous	chapter.	Table	5	disaggregates	the	PB	variable	into	MPB	and	CPB,	running	all	of	the	previous	regressions	separately	for	each	category.	As	the	coefficients	on	the	control	variables	were	substantively	unaffected,	the	tables	contain	only	the	coefficients	for	the	PB	categories.	MPB	emerges	as	significant	for	both	overall	and	share	of	spending	on	capital	investment	as	well	as	on	housing	and	infrastructure.		In	contrast,	the	only	significant	result	from	CPB	programs	on	spending	is	the	negative	coefficient	that	emerges	for	per	capita	education	and	culture	expenditures.	
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With	own-source	revenue,	however,	CPB	is	significant	when	measured	as	a	percentage	of	annual	revenue,	while	MPB	only	narrowly	approaches	significant	for	per	capita	revenue	(p	=	.101).	
	 The	spending	results	indicate	that	the	significant	findings	are	being	driven	in	large	part	by	the	subset	of	cases	I	have	identified	as	MPB,	those	that	incorporate	popular	participation	within	a	broader	institutional	reform	to	open	the	state	up	to	citizen	voices.	A	public	forum	and	debate	surrounding	the	budget	on	their	own	appear	to	be	not	sufficient	to	guarantee	that	it	effects	change	in	government	behavior.		Debate	must	be	connected	to	the	actual	decision-making	process	by	institutionalizing	mechanisms	through	which	the	final	decision	of	participants	makes	it	way	intact	into	the	final	budget	as	passed	by	the	City	Council.		
Finally,	while	the	preceding	analyses	have	used	a	continuous	measure	of	PB	years,	one	implication	of	my	theory	is	that	any	impact	PB	may	have	on	local	spending	will	likely	plateau	as	fiscal	policy	moves	closer	in	line	with	public	(or	PB	participant)	preferences.	If	the	relationship	is	in	fact	linear,	this	could	indicate	that	PB	develops	in	time	into	a	type	of	special	interest	group,	using	its	power	to	continue	shifting	the	budget	in	one	specific	direction.	Brazilian	local	governments	are	constitutionally	required	to	spend	a	minimum	of	25%	of	their	budget	on	education	and	an	additional	18%	on	healthcare,	and	more	detailed	conditioning	factors	have	been	included	as	administrative	responsibility	for	most	basic	public	services	were	transferred	to	the	municipal	level	in	the	1990s.	Failure	to	comply	with	these	conditions	can	lead	to	the	suspension	of	federal	transfers	and	political	sanctions	on	
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the	Mayor	and	his	or	her	cabinet,	meaning	that	PB’s	political	cost	could	increase	over	time	if	it	eventually	jeopardizes	the	ability	of	a	city	to	meet	other	spending	obligations.	
To	test	for	a	non-linear	relationship	between	the	length	of	time	PB	has	been	in	place	and	government’s	fiscal	behavior,	I	use	an	exponential	growth	curve	with	the	squared	value	of	the	MPB	measure	as	the	primary	explanatory	variable	of	interest.	In	all	cases,	there	is	evidence	of	a	maximum	positive	impact	on	the	spending	measure	at	around	eight	to	ten	years,	with	no	statistically	significant	marginal	benefit	of	additional	years.	The	marginal	effect	of	each	additional	year	of	PB	is	greatest	at	the	program	begins,	as	officials	begin	to	address	pent	up	demand	that	previously	was	insufficiently	addressed	by	the	local	government.	Over	time,	PB’s	share	of	the	budget	stabilizes,	and	there	is	no	further	increase	in	the	amount	of	resources	it	receives	from	year	to	year	after	it	matures	beyond	a	certain	point.	The	investments	generated	by	PB	itself	many	times	lead	to	repeating	current	expenditures	to	staff	and	maintain	the	facilities	that	were	built.	Given	that	the	budget	is	finite	and	much	of	it	is	already	legally	bound	towards	specific	purposes,	it	would	be	unrealistic	and,	eventually,	undesirable	for	PB’s	share	of	the	budget	to	grow	any	further.		
Figure	1	and	2	shows	the	marginal	effect	of	PB	years	with	investment	spending	as	the	dependent	variable,	both	per	capita	terms	and	as	a	share	of	the	budget.	This	demonstrates	that	there	is	a	non-linear	relationship	between	the	age	of	a	PB	program	and	budgetary	behavior.	The	marginal	effect	of	each	additional	year	of	PB	increases	for	the	first	years	of	implementation,	but	after	around	a	decade	PB’s	impact	on	government	spending	stabilizes	and	no	longer	increases	over	time.	This	is	consistent	with	the	hypothesis	that	PB	
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brings	public	spending	in	line	with	public	preferences,	estimating	that	it	takes	the	process	stabilizes	in	a	new	equilibrium	after	a	little	more	than	two	mayoral	terms	in	office.		
Robustness	Checks	The	methods	used	in	the	previous	section	endeavor	to	address	such	issues	as	endogeneity	and	omitted	variable	bias	while	at	the	same	time	raising	new	concerns.	For	example,	while	the	fixed	effects	estimator	allows	for	unobserved	effects	that	may	be	arbitrarily	correlated	with	the	explanatory	variables,	the	lagged	dependent	variable	(LDV)	violates	the	strict	exogeneity	assumption	of	OLS	(Wooldridge	2009).	If	there	is	a	general	time	trend,	the	LDV	could	absorb	most	of	the	meaningful	variance	without	explaining	it	and	it	imposes	an	identical	persistent	effect	on	all	explanatory	variables	(Achen	2000).	As	evidenced	by	the	findings	with	the	demographic	controls,	fixed	effects	is	inefficient	when	estimating	the	effect	of	levels	of	independent	variables	(Plümper	et	al	2005).	In	order	to	further	probe	this	issue,	I	compare	a	series	of	different	estimation	techniques	on	the	dependent	variables	used	in	the	previous	section	to	ensure	that	my	findings	are	not	simply	an	artifact	of	the	statistical	methods	that	were	used	in	the	analysis.	
	 For	each	dependent	variable,	I	do	the	following.	First,	I	use	pooled	OLS	with	Driscoll-Kraay	standard	errors.	Second,	I	perform	a	Prais-Winsten	transformation	of	the	fixed	effects	equation	with	an	AR	adjustment,	and	third,	I	use	GLS	with	random	effects	controlling	for	autocorrelation15.	Across	all	of	these	procedures,	the	significance	of	my	PB																																																									
15 Each of these is an alternate method commonly used with panel data to address issues such as 
endogeneity and auto-correlation. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are relatively robust in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity, temporal or spatial correlation. The Prais-Winsten transformation 
with an AR adjustment is intended to remove autocorrelation by transforming the data and 
estimating the coefficients using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), imposing a common 
pattern of autocorrelation for all observations. Random-effect GLS treats each unit’s error as 
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variable	in	all	of	the	spending	models	remains	largely	consistent.	Under	the	two	methods	that	do	not	include	fixed	effects,	the	demographic	variables	are	significant	in	the	expected	direction,	including	the	share	of	school-aged	children	being	positively	correlated	with	education	spending.	Tables	of	all	the	above	findings	are	included	in	the	Appendix.		
	 An	alternative	explanation	for	variation	in	the	performance	of	different	PB	programs	could	be	related	to	partisan	politics.	Mayors	belonging	to	the	PT,	the	party	that	first	implemented	PB,	may	be	more	committed	to	faithfully	executing	it	along	the	lines	of	the	original	Porto	Alegre	experience.	Touchton	and	Wampler	(2014)	found	that	the	presence	of	a	PT	mayor	enhanced	PB's	effects	on	well-being	indicators	and	growth	of	civil	society	organizations.	The	MPB/CPB	distinction	could	be	an	imperfect	proxy	for	the	different	effects	of	PB	with	and	without	the	PT	in	control	over	the	local	government.	In	order	to	account	for	this	possibility,	I	used	an	interaction	term	containing	a	PT	mayor	dummy	variable	with	the	general	PB	indicator	for	all	of	the	above	equations.	To	avoid	issues	with	multicollinearity,	I	replaced	the	ideology	index	with	dummy	variables	representing	right-wing	and	non-PT	left-wing	parties	using	the	three-category	classification	provided	by	Rodrigues	(2002).	As	the	results	for	the	remaining	control	variables	were	not	substantively	changed,	Table	6	contains	only	the	coefficients	for	the	interaction	terms	broken	down	by	dependent	variable.	
	 The	interaction	term	is	significant	only	for	capital	investments	(measured	both	in	per	capita	and	percentage	terms)	and	the	share	of	the	budget	spent	on	healthcare	and	sanitation.	For	healthcare,	the	sign	is	negative,	although	the	PB	variable	itself	remains																																																																																																																																																																																			
randomly drawn from a common intercept rather than assigning each unit an intercept. 
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insignificant	as	it	did	in	the	original	equation.	Given	the	strong	positive	effect	of	PT	mayors	outside	the	interaction	term,	this	may	be	an	indication	that	PB	moderates	the	party's	emphasis	on	that	particular	policy	area.	While	significant,	the	coefficients	on	the	PT	interaction	with	PB	years	for	capital	investments	is	smaller	than	that	estimated	when	using	MPB,	indicating	that	the	MPB/CPB	distinction	between	programs	is	not	simply	a	proxy	for	the	effects	of	PT	rule.			
	 To	test	for	endogeneity	related	to	PB	adoption,	I	created	three	dummy	variables,	one	for	the	mayoral	mandate	prior	to	PB	adoption,	another	for	the	first	mandate	of	PB	and	then	additionally	one	that	captures	programs	that	have	been	in	place	for	at	least	one	four-year	mandate.	The	pre-adoption	variable	is	consistently	negatively	signed	and	statistically	significant	for	capital	investments	and	infrastructure.	This	effect	could	indicate	that	PB	is	put	into	place	to	meet	a	real	need	for	investments	and	infrastructure	spending.	If	a	mayor	has	an	agenda	of	focusing	on	infrastructure	investment,	participatory	budgeting	could	be	one	tool	that	he	or	she	uses	in	order	to	make	better-informed	decisions	as	to	where	improvements	are	most	needed.	On	the	other	hand,	if	existing	infrastructure	is	considered	adequate,	there	may	be	less	demand	for	local	government	leaders	to	adopt	PB.	Alternatively,	perceived	inaction	on	the	part	of	the	pre-adoption	mayor	may	motivate	the	election	of	a	reformist	candidate.	The	positive	coefficient	on	the	pre-PB	indicator	when	revenue	is	the	dependent	variable	points	to	the	possibility	that	there	are	unobserved	time-varying	factors	not	controlled	for	by	the	fixed	effects	that	are	associated	both	with	PB	adoption	and	revenue	collection.	This	would	be	consistent	with	the	possible	explanation	that	I	presented	in	the	last	section,	with	a	programmatic	affinity	common	to	both	CPB	and	measures	to	boost	local	revenue	collection.	
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	 Additional	robustness	checks	include	the	use	of	year	dummies	as	opposed	to	a	time	trend,	the	removal	of	extreme	outliers,	and	a	re-specification	of	my	PB	measure	into	two	dummy	variables	based	on	duration.	While	the	dummy	year	variables	were	jointly	statistically	significant	in	all	of	the	original	models,	this	did	not	change	any	of	my	substantive	findings.	Using	three	standard	deviations	above	or	below	the	mean	outlier	lead	to	the	dropping	of	an	average	of	1%	of	observations	while	significantly	increasing	the	R-squared	and	F-test	statistics.		Measuring	PB	with	two	dummy	variables,	one	for	PB	in	the	first	mandate	and	the	other	for	all	subsequent	years,	returns	results	that	support	an	increasing	effect	over	time	that	is	not	biased	by	cases	with	exceptionally	long-running	programs.	Tables	containing	the	detailed	results	from	all	of	the	above	tests	can	be	found	in	the	Appendix.	
Discussion	
In	general,	the	results	from	these	analyses	confirm	that	participatory	budgeting	is	capable	of	changing	government	fiscal	behavior,	conditional	on	the	way	in	which	the	program	was	designed.	There	is	strong	support	for	hypotheses	regarding	the	effect	of	PB	on	government	spending,	although	the	results	on	revenue	collection	are	more	ambiguous.	Even	using	the	more	inclusive	definition	of	PB	programs,	the	coefficient	on	the	number	of	years	a	program	has	been	in	place	is	positive	and	significant	for	both	the	percentage	as	well	as	overall	per	capita	total	of	capital	investment	expenditures,	supporting	the	hypothesis	that	PB	increases	investment	spending.	The	positive	effect	of	PB	on	housing	and	urban	infrastructure	demonstrates	that	PB	guides	spending	towards	topics	that	are	frequently	raised	by	citizens	rather	than	just	serving	as	an	excuse	to	grow	the	overall	size	of	
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government.	Both	healthcare	and	education	are	heavily	determined	by	federal	mandates	and	financed	through	earmarked	grants,	giving	the	local	executive	less	discretion	to	modify	spending	levels.	PB	could	still	shift	the	how	resources	are	spent	on	health	and	education,	and	the	inelasticity	of	spending	in	these	two	categories	may	explain	why	these	particular	indicators	were	unaffected	by	PB.		
The	findings	also	indicate	that	municipalities	gradually	increase	their	own-source	revenue	as	PB	is	implemented	and	institutionalized.	Unlike	spending,	the	effect	found	seems	to	be	driven	by	cities	with	CPB,	and	the	effects	are	inconclusive	when	looking	at	MPB	on	its	own.	Given	that	PB’s	direct	link	to	the	budget	is	primarily	through	spending,	it	would	be	highly	unlikely	that	MPB	is	affecting	government	behavior	without	demonstrating	an	impact	on	public	expenditures.	A	more	plausible	hypothesis	is	that	EPB	adoption	and	the	implementation	of	efforts	to	increase	tax	collection	efforts	are	both	parts	of	a	larger	toolkit	of	public	policies	that	are	adopted	by	mayors	with	a	reformist	agenda.	
The	nonlinear	relationship	between	PB	years	and	these	fiscal	policy	patterns	lends	support	to	the	idea	that	a	new	equilibrium	forms	as	public	spending	falls	in	line	with	the	preferences	of	PB	participants,	as	budgetary	change	comes	quickly	at	first	and	then	stabilizes	after	approximately	eight	years.	As	the	number	of	cases	in	place	for	over	10-15	years	increases,	future	research	could	explore	whether	this	means	that	participants	shift	their	preferences	from	capital	to	current	goods,	or	focus	more	on	health	and	education	after	basic	infrastructure	needs	have	been	met.	
Finally,	the	distinction	between	multidimensional	PB	and	consultative	PB	programs	that	I	laid	out	in	Chapter	2	appears	to	be	an	important	one	in	that	we	see	a	far	more	
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substantial	effect	on	fiscal	behavior	in	the	cases	of	MPB.	The	insignificance	of	CPB	across	spending	categories	shows	that	only	the	subset	of	cases	that	incorporate	pathways	towards	citizen	empowerment	are	driving	the	impact	that	has	thus	far	been	attributed	to	a	broader	family	of	experiences.	The	stronger	effect	of	CPB	in	comparison	with	MPB	on	revenue	collection,	however,	calls	into	question	the	findings	that	first	pointed	to	an	effect	on	the	local	government’s	effort	to	maximize	own-source	revenue.	We	can	then	say	that	the	findings	provide	strong	support	that	PB	has	an	impact	on	the	expenditure	side	of	the	fiscal	ledger,	but	the	question	of	how	this	increased	spending	is	financed	requires	further	consideration.	
	 Conclusion	
	 This	chapter	introduced	the	results	of	a	series	of	analyses	that	provide	empirical	evidence	of	a	link	between	participatory	budgeting	and	government	spending	behavior.	PB	leads	to	the	insertion	of	public	demands	regarding	basic	needs	into	the	budget,	directing	more	resources	towards	capital	investments.	Spending	changes	rapidly	at	first	to	meet	repressed	demand,	slowing	down	after	it	comes	to	reflect	the	preferences	of	those	participating	in	the	program.	Although	the	findings	were	mainly	inconclusive	with	regards	to	own-source	revenue	generation,	there	was	evidence	to	suggest	that	an	endogenous	relationship	exists	between	CPB	and	own-source	revenue,	perhaps	due	to	similarities	in	their	political	appeal.	
Perhaps	most	importantly,	the	findings	in	this	chapter	support	the	distinction	between	PB	cases	according	to	their	institutional	characteristics.	The	simplified	structure	used	by	CPB	proves	to	be	insufficient	to	bring	about	change	in	local	spending	priorities.	PB	
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is	only	able	to	have	an	impact	on	the	political	decision-making	process	when	it	is	accompanied	by	measures	which	facilitate	the	inclusion	of	otherwise	marginalized	communities,	allow	for	meaningful	deliberation	through	a	representative	body,	and	institutionalize	the	role	of	public	participation	in	the	budgetary	decision-making	process	so	that	the	decisions	reached	at	the	end	of	each	year	are	treated	as	obligations	rather	that	mere	suggestions.	This	has	clear	implications	with	regards	to	existing	quantitative	research,	with	the	possibility	that	thus	far	the	effect	of	PB	as	originally	conceived	has	been	underestimated.	
	 The	specific	categories	of	spending	that	appear	most	responsive	to	PB	initiatives	across	different	local	contexts	are	crucial	and	noteworthy,	especially	given	the	particular	context	of	housing	and	urban	infrastructure	within	the	Brazilian	federalist	pact.	While	the	responsibilities	for	providing	basic	health	care	and	primary	education	are	distributed,	monitored	and	financed	through	an	elaborate	system	that	involves	all	three	levels	of	government,	tasks	such	as	paving	roads,	installing	drainage	or	building	public	housing	units	have	been	largely	left	to	the	city	governments	to	address	as	they	see	fit.	With	public	pressure	focused	on	these	basic	needs	in	the	setting	of	public	meetings	at	the	neighborhood	level,	PB	programs	appear	to	have	led	local	governments	to	pay	more	attention	to	these	issues	and	begin	to	address	them.		
	 The	analyses	in	this	chapter	confirm	the	hypothesized	link	between	PB	and	local	fiscal	policy	behavior.	PB	implementation	can	be	seen	as	contributing	to	a	shift	and	expansion	of	capital	investments,	but	whether	or	not	this	translates	into	an	actual	expansion	in	the	level	of	public	goods	and	services	offered	to	the	population	is	still	
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uncertain.	Identifying	a	link	between	public	participation	and	spending	behavior	is	only	a	first	step	towards	establishing	whether	or	not	PB	leads	to	benefits	that	accrue	to	both	participants	and	the	city	in	its	entirety.	In	the	next	chapter,	I	focus	on	basic	public	goods	related	to	housing	and	urban	infrastructure	such	as	treated	running	water	and	trash	collection.	If	the	increased	spending	identified	in	this	chapter	as	resulting	from	MPB	is	applied	to	citizen	demands,	the	local	government	should	expand	access	to	these	goods	than	would	have	occurred	in	the	program’s	absence.
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Table	3.1	–	Summary	Statistics	
Variable	 Mean	 SD	 Min	 Max	 SD	Between	 SD	Within	 N	
%	Investment	 10.793	 6.2	 0	 48.148	 3.757	 4.953	 8594	
%	Infrastructure	 11.393	 6.247	 0	 50.63	 4.331	 4.5	 8560	
%	Healthcare	 24.195	 8.866	 0	 56.842	 6.364	 6.163	 8576	
%	Education	 28.711	 7.703	 0.269	 69.607	 6.569	 4.267	 8551	
Investment	(log	pc)	 4.487	 0.844	 0.031	 8.315	 0.577	 0.621	 8540	
Infrastructure	(log	pc)	 4.526	 0.905	 0.094	 8.208	 0.675	 0.61	 8481	
Healthcare	(log	pc)	 5.396	 0.742	 2.502	 7.79	 0.503	 0.546	 8492	
Education	(log	pc)	 5.59	 0.53	 3.062	 8.045	 0.375	 0.374	 8542	
PB	 0.592	 2.147	 0	 23	 1.653	 1.372	 8944	
MPB	 0.4	 1.843	 0	 23	 1.461	 1.124	 8944	
CPB	 0.122	 0.779	 0	 13	 0.497	 0.6	 8944	
Election	year	 0.25	 0.433	 0	 1	 0	 0.433	 8944	
Ideology	 5.858	 1.831	 1.6	 8.64	 1.18	 1.4	 8932	
Margin	Victory	 29.994	 21.737	 0.028	 98.668	 12.212	 17.986	 8928	
ENP	 5.906	 1.821	 1	 17.329	 1.447	 1.108	 8936	
Governor	Coalition	 0.418	 0.493	 0	 1	 0.226	 0.438	 8944	
President	coalition	 0.611	 0.487	 0	 1	 0.227	 0.431	 8944	
GDP/pc	(log)	 9.339	 0.732	 7.443	 12.12	 0.702	 0.209	 7826	
Population	(log)	 11.664	 0.814	 10.057	 16.247	 0.808	 0.096	 8944	
%	0-15	y.o.	 28.681	 5.263	 14.47	 48.44	 4.426	 2.853	 8944	
%	60+	y.o.	 8.613	 2.576	 2.273	 20.24	 2.316	 1.132	 8944	
%	Own-source	rev	 14.193	 8.891	 0	 65.287	 8.37	 3.046	 8598	
%	Deficit	 -0.944	 7.903	 -70.83	 102.243	 3.179	 7.241	 8598	
Change	revenue	 0.075	 0.141	 -2.183	 2.416	 0.025	 0.139	 7863	
Change	tax	sharing	 0.059	 0.296	 -3.144	 2.935	 0.049	 0.292	 7794	
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Table	3.2	–	Years	of	Participatory	Budgeting	and	Local	Capital	Investments	
	
Investments	 Investments	
	
Per	Capita	
(log)	 (%	of	budget)	
PB	 .0102**	 .085**	
	
(.0044)	 (.038)	
Ideology	 .0080	 .128***	
	
(.0050)	 (.047)	
Election	Year	 .0783***	 .946***	
	
(.0115)	 (.109)	
Margin	of	Victory	 .0011***	 .012***	
	
(.0003)	 (.003)	
ENP	 -.0047	 -.043	
	
(.0054)	 (.055)	
Governor	Coalition	 .0513***	 .422***	
	
(.0131)	 (.127)	
President	Coalition	 .0041	 .029	
	
(.0129)	 (.128)	
GDP/pc	(log)	 .2156***	 .577	
	
(.0474)	 (.508)	
Population	(log)	 -.5103***	 -1.232	
	
(.1328)	 (1.528)	
0-15	%	 -.0187***	 .054	
	
(.0068)	 (.063)	
60+	%	 .0179	 .460***	
	
(.0147)	 (.152)	
%	Deficit	 -.0192***	 -.172***	
	
(.0010)	 (.046)	
Change	Revenue	 1.6155***	 10.586***	
	
(.0684)	 -1474	
Lagged	Investment	 .4377***	 .356***	
	
(.0155)	 (.020)	
Year	 .0127***	 -.172***	
	
(.0043)	 (.046)	
Constant	 -18.97***	 354.56***	
	
-7793	 (80.89)	
R2	(within)	 .433	 .215	
N	 7294	 7382	Note:	*	=	90%	confidence.	**	=	95%	confidence	level.	***	=	99%	confidence	level	
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Table	3.3	-	Years	of	Participatory	Budgeting	and	Local	Government	Spending	by	Policy	Area	
	
Infrastructure	 Infrastructure	 Health	 Health	 Education	 Education	
	
(log	pc)	 (%)	 (log	pc)	 (%)	 (log	pc)	 (%)	
PB	 .0109***	 .093***	 .0005	 -.21	 -.0010	 -.050	
	
(.0035)	 (.033)	 (.0019)	 (.038)	 (.0011)	 (.032)	Ideology	 .0040	 .066	 -.0017	 -.060	 -.0025*	 -.108***	
	
(.0052)	 (.042)	 (.0022)	 (.042)	 (.0012)	 (.036)	Election	Year	 .0394***	 .486***	 .0394***	 .486***	 -.0171***	 -.309***	
	
(.0109)	 (.088)	 (.0109)	 (.088)	 (.0060)	 (.114)	Margin	Victory	 .0003	 .002	 .0001	 .001	 .0001	 -.004*	
	
(.0003)	 (.002)	 (.0001)	 (.003)	 (.0001)	 (.002)	ENP	 .0144***	 .091*	 .0027	 .106**	 -.0058***	 -.129***	
	
(.0053)	 (.046)	 (.0027)	 (.050)	 (.0014)	 (.040)	Governor	Coalition	 .0198	 .197*	 .0015	 -.015	 .0002	 -.030	
	
(.0135)	 (.119)	 (.0066)	 (.127)	 (.0039)	 (.115)	President	Coalition	 -.0076	 -.135	 -.0053	 -.258*	 .0044	 .110	
	
(.0135)	 (.114)	 (.0066)	 (.134)	 (.0039)	 (.110)	GDP/pc	(log)	 .1286**	 -.375	 .1255***	 -.554	 .1380***	 .134		 (.0506)	 (.448)	 (.0260)	 (.440)	 (.0158)	 (.393)	Population	(log)	 -.1961	 .471	 -.2843***	 .066	 -.2639***	 -.255		 (.1397)	 (1.14)	 (.0698)	 (1.17)	 (.0442)	 (1.16)	%	0-15	 -.0173***	 -.012	 -.0080**	 .194***	 -.0262***	 -.437***	
	
(.0065)	 (.055)	 (.0031)	 (.062)	 (.0026)	 (.054)	%	60+	 -.0220*	 -.040	 -.0238***	 -.035	 -.0314***	 -.408***	
	
(.0127)	 (.108)	 (.0065)	 (.127)	 (.0045)	 (.114)	%	Deficit	 -.0097***	 -.060***	 -.0053***	 -.004	 -.0028***	 .058***	
	
(.0011)	 (.009)	 (.0005)	 (.008)	 (.0003)	 (.009)	Change	Revenue		 .8609***	 3.650***	 .6377***	 2.27***	 .4427***	 -3.99***		 (.0639)	 (.623)	 (.0432)	 (.804)	 (.0420)	 (.643)	Lagged	DV	 .4780***	 .434***	 .5102***	 .445***	 .5809***	 .445***	
	
(.0193)	 (.016)	 (.0250)	 (.019)	 (.0261)	 (.023)	Year	 .0229***	 -.032	 .0392***	 .351***	 .0182***	 -.133***	
	
(.0050)	 (.040)	 (.0032)	 (.046)	 (.0017)	 (.039)	Constant	 -42.12***	 84.13	 -73.41***	 -691.6***	 -31.30***	 303.6***	
	
-9185	 (72.64)	 -5981	 (84.30)	 -3083	 (71.17)	
R2	 .4146	 .2195	 .7609	 .3296	 .8395	 .2471	
Within	 7238	 7333	 7275	 7347	 7324	 7338			
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Table	3.4	–	Years	of	Participatory	Budgeting	and	Own-Source	Revenue	
	
Own-Source	 Own	Source	
	
Revenue	(log)	 Revenue	(%)	
PB	 .0029*	 .027	
	
(.0015)	 (.020)	Ideology	 .0031	 .035*	
	
(.0019)	 (.021)	Election	Year	 -.0124**	 -.371***	
	
(.0054)	 (.059)	Margin	Victory	 .0002*	 .004**	
	
(.0001)	 (.001)	ENP	 .0026	 .048*	
	
(.0024)	 (.026)	Governor	Coalition	 -.0012	 -.034	
	
(.0055)	 (.063)	President	Coalition	 .0047	 -.027	
	
(.0061)	 (.064)	GDP/pc	(log)	 .1987***	 .490**		 (.0251)	 (.235)	Population	(log)	 -.1646**	 -1.277*		 (.0690)	 (.754)	%	0-15	 -.0207***	 -.081***	
	
(.0031)	 (.029)	%	60+	 -.0537***	 -.352***	
	
(.0068)	 (.073)	%	Deficit	 .0001	 -.018***	
	
(.0003)	 (.004)	Change	Revenue	 -.0276*	 -.018***		 (.0163)	 (.004)	Lagged	DV	 .6003***	 .621***	
	
(.0181)	 (.024)	Year	 .0307***	 .091***	
	
(.0023)	 (.020)	Constant	 -58.68***	 -163.0***	
	
-4214	 (36.0)	
R2	 .8183	 .4358	
Within	 7318	 7323	
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Table	3.5	-	Multidimensional	Participatory	Budgeting,	Consultative	Participatory	Budgeting,	and	the	Composition	of	Local	Government	Spending	
	
PB	(CPB+MPB)	 MPB	 CPB	
Investments	(log	pc)	 .0102**	 .0124**	 .0010	
	
(.0044)	 (.0057)	 (.0061)	
Investments	(%)	 .085**	 .113**	 -.033	
	
(.040)	 (.053)	 (.054)	
Infrastructure	(log)	 .0109***	 .0107***	 .0072	
	
(.0035)	 (.0040)	 (.0062)	
Infrastructure	(%)	 .093***	 .092***	 .055	
	
(.033)	 (.036)	 (.053)	
Healthcare	(log)	 .0005	 .0018	 -.0015	
	
(.0019)	 (.0023)	 (.0047)	
Healthcare	(%)	 -.021	 .004	 -.037	
	
(.038)	 (.040)	 (.101)	
Education	(log)	 -.0010	 -.0003	 -.0039*	
	
(.0011)	 (.0014	 (.0022)	
Education	(%)	 -.050	 -.030	 -.088	
	
(.032)	 (.040)	 (.058)	
Own-Source	Revenue	(log)	 .0029**	 .0026	 .0043	
	
(.0015)	 (.0016)	 (.0029)	
Own-Source	Revenue	(%)	 .027	 .002	 .077**	
	
(.020)	 (.024)	 (.039)		
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Table	3.6	-	Participatory	Budgeting,	Workers’	Party	Rule	and	the	Composition	of	Local	Government	Spending		
	
PB	(all)	 PT	 PB*PT	
Investments	(log	pc)	 .0074	 -.0655**	 .0093	
	
(.0050)	 (.0303)	 (.0057)	
Investments	(%)	 .046	 -.842***	 .1183**	
	
(.041)	 (.289)	 (.0513)	
Infrastructure	(log	pc)	 .0111**	 -.035	 .0014	
	
(.0047)	 (.025)	 (.0063)	
Infrastructure	(%)	 .092**	 -.349	 .016	
	
(.028)	 (.231)	 (.053)	
Healthcare	(log	pc)	 .0016	 .0032	 -.0018	
	
(.0025)	 (.0135)	 (.0028)	
Healthcare	(%)	 .010	 .518*	 -.093*	
	
(.048)	 (.269)	 (.050)	
Education	(log	pc)	 -.0006	 -.0155**	 .0010	
	
(.0015)	 (.0072)	 (.0014)	
Education	(%)	 -.049	 -.053	 .024	
	
(.043)	 (.213)	 (.052)	
Own-Source	Revenue	(log	pc)	 .0042*	 -.0227**	 -.0012	
	
(.0022)	 (.0088)	 (.0021)	
Own-Source	Revenue	(%)	 .036	 -.239**	 -.001	
	
(.029)	 (.108)	 (.028)	
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Figure	3.1	Average	Marginal	Effect	of	Years	of	Multidimensional	Participatory	Budgeting	on	Public	Investment	(logged)	
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Figure	3.2	-	Average	Marginal	Effect	of	Years	of	Multidimensional	Participatory	Budgeting	on	Public	Investment	(percentage	of	total	spending)	
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CHAPTER	4	–	PARTICIPATORY	BUDGETING,	PUBLIC	GOODS	AND	“INVERTING	
PRIORITIES”	
As	the	number	of	local	experiments	involving	public	participation	in	government	policymaking	processes	multiplies,	proponents	of	such	programs	continue	to	identify	an	increasing	number	of	modern	maladies	for	which	participation	may	prove	to	be	a	cure.	Whether	that	participation	is	oriented	toward	primary	education	in	rural	Guatemala	(Altschuler	&	Corrales,	2012),	local	law	enforcement	in	Chicago	(Fung	1999)	or	village	councils	in	India	(Banerjee	et	al.	2010),	giving	ordinary	citizens	a	voice	in	the	policy	design,	implementation,	and	administration	of	a	wide	range	of	government	services	and	programs	is	viewed	as	a	key	strategy	in	bringing	about	an	overall	improvement	in	societal	well-being.	These	benefits	may	accrue	to	the	participant	through	a	greater	sense	of	internal	efficacy,	or	to	the	community	as	a	whole	through	strengthened	bonds	of	solidarity	and	increased	capacity	for	collective	action.	Material	benefits	may	be	measured	in	absolute	terms,	such	as	the	number	of	households	lifted	out	of	poverty	and	the	reduction	of	illiteracy,	or	in	relative	terms	through	evaluations	of	shifts	in	redistributive	policies	that	favor	previously	disadvantaged	ethnic,	territorial	or	socioeconomic	groups.		
While	existing	research	has	demonstrated	links	between	PB	adoption	and	improvements	in	measures	of	local	wellbeing,	it	is	important	to	first	consider	how	such	an	effect	would	occur	and	see	if	it	would	be	reasonable	to	assume	that	this	would	be	possible	across	the	diverse	set	of	practices	captured	by	the	term	“participatory	budgeting.”	Were	PB	to	cause	a	reduction	in	the	local	infant	mortality	rate,	as	an	example,	the	most	direct	path	would	be	through	increasing	access	to	public	healthcare	services.		Even	if	PB	does	not	
		108	
increase	the	amount	of	resources	invested	in	healthcare,	PB	could	still	increase	the	efficiency	of	capital	spending	by	better	identifying	the	neighborhoods	and	communities	with	the	most	pressing	health-care	needs.	While	Gonçalves	(2014)	presents	a	detailed	argument	as	to	how	this	could	be	achieved	simply	via	communication	between	participants	and	administrative	officials	in	the	context	of	PB,	this	makes	the	strong	assumption	that	officials	from	other	sectors	of	the	administration	are	in	regular	attendance	at	PB	functions,	something	unlikely	if	a	program	is	only	superficially	linked	to	the	local	government’s	decision-making	processes.	
In	this	chapter,	I	explore	these	questions	that	concern	the	possible	impact	of	PB	on	those	development	outcomes	that	theoretically	are	most	directly	related	to	the	typical	demands	of	PB	participants.	The	first	section	briefly	summarizes	the	existing	literature	that	addresses	the	pathways	through	which	participation	should	lead	to	increased	provision	of	public	goods.	It	is	in	the	area	of	the	most	common	requests	from	PB	participants	that	we	should	see	participation	manifest	itself	in	improved	services.	Using	the	PB	data	set	constructed	in	Chapter	2	along	with	the	results	of	the	2000	and	2010	Brazilian	National	Census,	I	then	compare	municipal	performance	in	terms	of	the	delivery	of	four	key	basic	public	services:	potable	water,	sewage	treatment,	trash	collection	and	electricity.	I	use	a	difference-in-differences	approach	using	the	two	previous	rounds	of	the	census,	addressing	potential	issues	of	omitted	variable	bias	by	using	the	CPB	as	control	cases	for	the	MPB.16	
																																																								
16 The many differences between the annual budgetary data and the decennial census requite a 
new approach to address methodological concerns, particularly endogeneity. As this technique 
discards over half of the observations in the data set, it was not used in the previous chapter, 
when alternative solutions were available given the structure of the data. 
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The	chapter	then	concludes	with	a	discussion	of	the	policy	implications	of	the	dissertation	thus	far.	
Participation	and	Public	Goods	
Gonçalves	(2010;	2014)	identifies	three	principal	mechanisms	through	which	participation	can	lead	to	improved	public	goods	provision.	First,	such	programs	tend	to	attract	low-income	participants	who	are	not	typically	involved	in	local	policymaking	processes,	thus	allowing	the	possibility	for	greater	attention	to	the	community	needs	of	this	marginalized	population.	Second,	these	interactions	between	this	marginalized	sector	of	the	public	and	government	officials	throughout	the	different	stages	of	the	PB	cycle	provide	the	local	government	with	detailed	information	about	citizen	needs,	both	through	formal	demands	made	in	the	assemblies	as	well	as	informally	in	meetings	with	delegates	and	councilors.	This	greater	flow	of	information	between	constituents	and	policymakers	should	also	lead	improved	public	goods	provision.	Third,	the	level	of	oversight	that	participants	or	their	regional	representatives	can	exert	in	many	PB	programs	should	increase	the	likelihood	that	the	projects	are	executed	in	an	effective	and	efficient	manner,	with	relatively	low	levels	of	waste	and	corruption.	
An	abundance	of	work	finds	support	for	the	claim	that	the	typical	PB	participant	tends	to	be	on	the	low	end	of	a	SES	scale.	Wampler	(2007)	conducted	surveys	in	eight	different	municipalities	and	found	that	across	all	of	these	cases,	the	majority	of	participants	were	on	the	low	side	of	the	SES	scale.	In	a	national	survey	comparing	different	types	of	participatory	institutions,	57.3%	of	respondents	involved	in	a	PB	program	fell	in	the	lower	income	brackets,	compared	to	36.4%	of	participants	in	municipal	conferences	(Vaz	2013,	
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80-81).	These	SES	profiles	of	PB	participants	are	in	part	a	result	of	the	incentive	structure	built	into	the	program	that	mobilizes	residents	from	the	areas	most	lacking	in	basic	infrastructure	(Abers	2000,	150-153).	Spending	decisions	influenced	by	this	population	should	be	expected	to	help	bridge	the	gap	in	access	to	basic	public	goods	between	the	wealthier	regions	of	the	city	and	the	communities	that	participate	in	PB.	
The	information	exchange	function	of	PB	is	perhaps	its	least	controversial,	and	can	be	defended	by	arguments	from	across	the	ideological	spectrum.	The	demands	themselves	are	information	to	City	Hall	about	problems	they	may	or	may	not	be	aware	of.	Less	formally,	contacts	between	city	officials	and	citizens	in	both	public	assemblies	as	well	as	meetings	with	delegates	have	created	channels	through	which	community	needs	can	be	communicated	even	if	they	fall	outside	of	the	purview	of	PB.	At	a	minimum,	PB	lowers	the	information	costs	faced	by	public	officials	when	trying	to	determine	how	to	spend	resources	on	infrastructure	improvements	while	increasing	the	likelihood	that	resources	are	focused	on	areas	where	the	highest	level	of	need	is	present	(Gonçalves	2014,	101-103).	
In	the	international	comparative	research	on	participatory	institutions,	the	capacity	of	participants	to	use	these	spaces	to	hold	government	officials	effectively	accountable	for	spending	behavior	has	been	seen	as	one	of	their	primary	benefits.	In	Brazil,	Zamboni	(2007)	found	that	municipalities	with	PB	had	fewer	irregular	administrative	practices	cited	by	the	Federal	Accountability	Agency	than	their	non-PB	counterparts.	As	part	of	the	annual	PB	cycle,	the	local	administration	typically	produces	informational	pamphlets	at	the	beginning	of	the	fiscal	year	that	provides	information	to	the	public	about	the	status	of	the	previous	year's	PB	demands	and	projects.	The	first	round	of	meetings	with	PB	participants	
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often	entails	a	general	explanation	of	the	functioning	of	the	local	budget	and	its	composition.	Although	the	information	provided	may	not	be	sufficient	for	a	full	understanding	of	government	finances,	it	does	empower	residents	to	persistently	press	government	officials	about	their	community's	demand	until	it	is	executed	(World	Bank	2008).		
Theoretically,	all	of	these	features	of	PB	programs	that	actively	seek	to	incorporate	previously	marginalized	citizens	into	the	local	policymaking	process,	from	demand-making	to	oversight,	will	translate	into	more	effective	provision	of	those	public	services	most	in	demand	among	this	population.	The	empirical	work	on	this	proposition,	though,	is	somewhat	less	clear,	and	the	applicability	
	 The	first	attempts	to	empirically	identify	the	effects	of	PB	on	public	service	delivery	took	the	form	of	quantitative	case	studies,	comparing	the	distribution	of	investments	across	regions	of	the	city.	In	Porto	Alegre,	Marquetti	(2002)	found	that	participatory	budgeting	successfully	redirected	investment	resources	to	communities	with	higher	levels	of	need.	Both	planned	and	executed	investment	totals	were	broken	down	for	the	16	regions	of	the	city	and	he	found	that	investments	were	effectively	dedicated	to	regions	that	had	higher	levels	of	poverty	and	irregular	housing.	This	investment	was	then	reflected	in	expanded	services	as	measured	by	square	meters	of	asphalt	used	to	pave	the	roads,	the	number	of	public	street	lamps	installed,	and	tons	of	trash	collected.	Pires	(2008)	conducted	a	similar	study	of	Belo	Horizonte,	finding	that	the	least	developed	strata	of	neighborhoods	in	the	city	received	between	four	to	ten	times	more	spending	on	public	works	projects	across	ten	years	of	PB	implementation	than	the	richest	strata,	as	defined	by	the	city’s	
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quality	of	life	index	(70).	He	highlights	Belo	Horizonte's	reliance	on	a	need-based	index	that	offered	a	clear	measure	of	the	distribution	of	resources	across	regions	of	the	city	that	allowed	for	an	improved	targeting	of	public	policy	efforts	across	different	sectors	of	the	local	administration.		
	 A	report	by	the	World	Bank	(2008)	combines	a	case	study	of	Porto	Alegre	with	a	difference-in-differences	comparison	of	all	Brazilian	municipalities	between	1991	and	2000.	The	study	found	evidence	that	PB	reduces	poverty	rates	and	increases	household	access	to	running	water	and	the	city’s	sewer	system.	The	lower	poverty	rates	emerged	only	in	a	subsample	of	cases	in	which	PB	had	been	in	place	for	most	of	the	period	in	question.	However,	the	study	also	finds	that	the	city’s	reduction	in	infant	mortality	rates	and	increased	wages	during	the	period	analyzed	were	no	better	than	those	of	other	comparable,	non-PB	Brazilian	cities.	
	 Boulder	and	Wampler	(2010)	also	based	their	analysis	between	the	1991	and	2000	census	but	additionally	considered	the	amount	of	resources	available	to	each	municipality	as	a	necessary	condition	to	be	able	carry	out	the	projects	selected	within	PB.	They	specifically	limit	their	analysis	to	municipalities	with	over	100,000	inhabitants,	and	find	only	a	slight	decrease	in	the	poverty	rate.	In	addition,	these	authors	found	no	discernible	effect	on	a	wide	array	of	additional	outcome	variables	such	as	local	HDI,	literacy	and	life	expectancy	(129-131).	Touchton	and	Wampler	(2014)	expand	the	number	of	observations	and	time	period	covered	substantially	by	using	yearly	observations	from	1989	to	2008.	In	this	study,	with	years	of	PB	as	the	primary	independent	variable,	they	find	the	program	has	a	statistically	significant	effect	on	the	reduction	of	infant	mortality,	attributing	this	to	
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increases	in	healthcare	spending	also	associated	with	PB	municipalities	(1456-1458).	Gonçalves	(2014)	arrives	at	similar	conclusions	using	different	analytical	methods	and	sample	design.	She	finds	that	not	only	does	PB	lead	to	increases	in	healthcare	education	and	reductions	in	infant	mortality,	but	also	that	the	impact	of	additional	healthcare	spending	on	infant	mortality	increases	when	PB	is	in	place	(104-105).	Where	Touchton	and	Wampler	considered	only	cities	with	100,000	or	more,	and	used	propensity	score	matching	to	address	omitted	variable	bias,	Gonçalves	used	fixed	effects	with	census	aggregation	units	that	represent	1970	municipal	boundaries	and	cover	the	entire	country.	Research	then	is	beginning	to	offer	tentative	conclusions	that	point	toward	a	positive	impact	of	PB	on	certain	government	spending	and	development	outcomes.	
	 One	thing	missing	from	this	research	though	is	evidence	for	a	direct	link	between	the	specific	set	of	practices	that	fall	under	the	PB	label	and	the	outcome	variable	of	interest.	Pires	(2011)	highlights	this	issue	by	pointing	to	a	general	flaw	in	the	current	literature	on	participatory	institutions	–	effects	are	not	measured	in	terms	of	the	direct	products	of	the	institutions	in	the	spheres	within	which	they	are	designed	to	target.	For	example,	the	mechanism	connecting	community	involvement	in	the	decision-making	process	on	neighborhood-level	infrastructure	projects	to	a	decline	in	poverty	rates	is	not	immediately	clear.	While	the	World	Bank	report	linked	participatory	budgeting	to	a	decline	in	the	poverty	rate,	the	federal	government	assumes	responsibility	for	employment	policy	in	Brazil	and	they	cite	no	evidence	that	income-generating	activities	are	the	topic	of	public	demands.	Even	in	the	case	of	increases	in	healthcare	spending	that	have	been	identified	elsewhere,	a	decrease	in	infant	mortality	would	have	to	first	involve	an	expansion	of	health	
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care	facilities,	their	maintenance	and	staffing	at	appropriate	levels,	and	particular	strategies	to	address	pediatric	health.		
	 Both	Touchton	and	Wampler	(2014)	and	Gonçalves	(2014)	improve	upon	earlier	studies	by	identifying	increased	healthcare	spending	as	a	mechanism	through	which	PB	could	have	an	impact	on	a	particular	indicator	of	well	being.	The	fact	that	the	analyses	differ	substantially	in	the	methods	used	while	reaching	a	similar	conclusion	lends	greater	credibility	to	the	way	in	which	PB	works	as	a	promoter	of	public	health.	However,	health	care	may	not	always	be	a	primary	motivating	factor	for	local	government	officials	when	first	implementing	the	program.	Basic	improvements	in	the	access	to	public	goods	such	as	paved	roads	are	frequently	mentioned	while	other	public	policy	tools	exist	to	encourage	participation	surrounding	healthcare	related	decisions.		
As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	healthcare	spending	and	services	are	controlled	largely	by	the	federal	government	through	mandates,	making	it	harder	to	identify	the	share	of	healthcare	expansion	that	reasonably	could	be	attributed	to	local	influences,	with	or	without	PB	in	place.	Also,	at	the	same	time	these	local	experiments	with	participatory	budgeting	are	taking	place,	multiple	presidential	administrations	have	put	substantial	effort	into	the	decentralization	of	health	service	administration	coupled	with	a	federally	backed	guarantee	of	universal	access	to	basic	healthcare	treatment	(Paim	et.	al.,	2011).	These	efforts	then	almost	certainly	contributed	as	well	to	declining	infant	mortality	rates	and	other	related	health	outcomes.	
The	research	conducted	thus	far	provides	strong	support	for	the	contention	that	that	PB	succeeds	in	its	mission	of	“inverting	priorities,”	shifting	the	government’s	focus	
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from	wealthy	regions	of	the	city	towards	those	with	the	greatest	need.	In	this	chapter,	I	take	the	next	step	and	examine	the	end	result	of	these	shifts	in	government	attention.	My	primary	output	variable	will	be	the	provision	of	basic	infrastructure.	This	choice	is	driven	by	my	contention	that	there	should	theoretically	be	a	fairly	direct	link	between	spending	in	these	areas	and	measureable	expansion	of	the	service	in	question.		
Hypotheses	
	 In	order	to	advance	the	extant	research	on	the	theoretical	benefits	of	PB	for	community	development,	I	propose	two	hypotheses	related	to	participatory	budgeting's	impact	on	the	basic	set	of	services	made	available	to	a	city's	residents.	They	are	as	follows:		
	
H1:	Public	service	provision	in	PB	cities	will	reach	a	higher	percentage	of	households	than	
such	provision	in	comparable	non-PB	cities.	
In	the	previous	chapter,	the	findings	indicated	that	municipalities	that	adopted	participatory	budgeting	gradually	increased	expenditures	on	housing	and	urban	infrastructure	as	a	policy	area	and	public	investments	more	generally.	While	additional	resources	are	a	necessary	step	towards	increasing	public	access	to	basic	infrastructure,	the	level	of	spending	itself	is	no	guarantee	that	they	were	applied	towards	projects	that	fulfilled	public	demands.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	test	whether	or	not	the	additional	funding	has	effectively	led	to	the	expansion	of	basic	services,	an	essential	step	towards	PB	holding	long-term	substantive	relevance	for	local	residents.	
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The	availability	of	basic	infrastructure	in	residential	areas	is	particularly	well	suited	to	evaluate	the	immediate	impacts	of	participatory	budgeting.	Participation	is	geographically	organized	with	participants	mobilized	on	the	basis	of	where	they	live.	Demands	are,	therefore,	likely	to	reflect	common	issues	shared	amongst	residents	of	a	given	area.	Services	such	as	running	water	and	sewage	treatment	are	typically	either	present	or	absent	for	an	entire	neighborhood,	at	least	in	an	urban	setting,	providing	a	fundamental	need	shared	by	all	residents.		In	the	absence	of	running	water	or	in	areas	where	untreated	household	waste	is	discharged	into	public	spaces,	the	first	demands	made	by	the	community	are	likely	to	center	on	meeting	these	basic	needs.	While	we	could	expect	the	focus	of	public	demands	to	shift	once	these	needs	are	met,	it	is	less	likely	that	collective	decisions	made	by	residents	would	focus	on	other	topics	if	basic	neighborhood	infrastructure	were	left	unaddressed.	
	
H2:	The	effect	of	PB	on	public	service	provision	will	be	more	likely	to	emerge	under	
MPB,	where	the	integration	of	citizen	participation	into	the	local	government’s	decision-
making	process	is	a	feature	of	the	program	
	
One	of	the	principal	contributions	of	this	research	has	been	to	identify	key	elements	of	the	PB	approach	that	allow	us	to	categorize	subsets	of	programs	that	previously	have	all	fallen	under	the	PB	label.	My	distinction	between	PB	programs	that	empower	citizens	and	those	that	merely	allow	perfunctory	participation	emerged	in	previous	chapters	as	
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important	in	identifying	the	spending	impact	of	PB.	With	this	chapter,	I	now	apply	this	same	categorization	of	PB	to	an	analysis	of	public	service	provision	and	the	impact,	if	any,	PB	has	on	this	critical	area	of	government	performance.	
Data	
	 For	my	main	explanatory	variable,	I	rely	on	the	data	set	and	classification	system	introduced	in	Chapter	2	to	create	a	series	of	binary	“treatment	indicators”	representing	exposure	to	participatory	programs	between	2000	and	2010.	To	qualify	as	a	case	of	treatment,	a	PB	program	must	have	been	in	place	for	at	least	five	consecutive	years	within	this	ten-year	period.	Cases	where	PB	had	already	been	in	place	at	the	time	of	the	2000	census	were	excluded	to	ensure	that	the	pre-treatment	measure	is	accurate	and	consistent.	
	 All	of	the	dependent	variables	were	collected	from	the	2000	and	2010	rounds	of	the	Brazilian	Census	and	represent	the	percentage	change	in	the	share	of	urban	households	with	a	particular	service	between	2000	and	2010.	The	variables	are:	
1. Sanitary	disposal	of	household	waste	either	into	a	main	sewage	system	or	a	septic	tank.	2. Access	to	potable	running	water	from	a	public	water	system	3. Trash	collection	at	least	once	a	week	4. Housing	deemed	“adequate”,	defined	as	having	all	three	of	the	previous	public	services	(water,	sewerage,	and	trash	collection)	in	addition	to	a	density	of	no	more	than	two	adult	residents	per	room	
The	first	three	indicators	are	meant	to	tap	into	those	basic	public	goods	or	services	that	are	of	immediate	and	practical	relevance	to	the	daily	lives	of	citizens.	Decentralization	
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reforms	carried	out	in	the	1990s	placed	some,	if	not	all,	responsibility	for	service	provision	even	if	previous	levels	had	been	determined	by	state	or	federal	policy.	By	2000,	trash	collection	and	road	maintenance	had	become	exclusively	local	responsibilities	in	Brazil,	whereas	water	and	sewage	could	either	be	administered	exclusively	by	the	city	or	in	partnership	with	a	state	agency.	
An	additional	factor	that	makes	these	indicators	particularly	suitable	to	test	the	hypotheses	put	forth	is	that	they	tap	into	public	goods	and	services	that	are	easily	identified	as	being	either	present	or	absent	for	a	given	area.	This	intersects	with	the	incentives	provided	by	the	rules	structure	of	PB,	which	rewards	mass	mobilization	at	the	neighborhood	level	(Abers	2000).	While	access	to	these	goods	is	measured	at	the	household	level,	the	logistics	of	physically	expanding	sewage	or	water	lines	makes	the	dynamics	resemble	that	of	a	collective	good	(Rezende	and	Marques	2008).		We	should	expect	to	see	participatory	budgeting	help	communities	overcome	the	collective	action	dilemma	that	this	entails.	
Control	variables	were	selected	to	account	for	different	phenomena	present	in	the	Brazilian	and	international	urban	development	literature.	All	but	one	of	the	variables	were	also	used	in	the	previous	chapter,	with	the	exception	being	the	percentage	of	residents	who	were	born	in	the	same	state,	available	only	in	the	Census.	A	sharp	change	in	share	of	migrants	from	other	parts	of	the	country	could	represent	the	combination	of	an	increased	stress	on	existing	local	infrastructure	with	a	decline	in	local	social	capital.	All	data	were	collected	by	
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the	IBGE,	and	all	but	the	municipal	GDP	per	capita	were	part	of	the	census.	Summary	statistics	are	presented	in	Table	1.	17	
1.	 Resident	population	
2.	 Population	density	
3.	 Percentage	of	households	located	in	urban	areas	of	the	municipality	
4.	 Municipal	GDP	per	capita,	averaged	over	two	years	(1999-2000	and	2009-2010)	in	2010	Brazilian	reais	
5.	 Percentage	of	urban	households	declaring	that	they	neither	owned	nor	rented	the	land	they	were	living	on,	as	a	proxy	for	slums	and	other	types	of	irregular	housing	
6.	 Percentage	of	residents	born	within	the	state		
Methods		 In	determining	the	proper	way	to	test	the	two	hypotheses,	we	face	many	of	the	same	obstacles	as	in	the	previous	chapter.	Endogeneity	in	this	situation,	for	example,	could	result	from	our	lack	of	a	measure	of	a	local	administration’s	policy	entrepreneurship,	which	could	lead	to	simultaneously	the	adoption	of	PB	and	the	expansion	of	the	basic	grid	of	public	services.	There	are	neither	the	degrees	of	freedom	nor	adequate	data	to	cover	all	potential	phenomena	that	could	address	all	of	these	potential	endogeneity	concerns.	In	a	basic	OLS	regression,	omitted	variable	bias	would	result	if	PB	adoption	were	related	to	an	unspecified																																																									
17 All data are from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), retrieved through 
the IBGE Automatic Recovery System (http://sidra.ibge.gov.br). All indicators were collected as 
a part of the 1991, 2000 and 2010 Census, except for the municipal GDP for capita, which the 
IBGE estimates annually. 
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cause	that	was	also	correlated	with	any	of	the	dependent	variables.	Selection	bias	is	a	substantive	concern,	and	existing	research	highlights	multiple	factors	that	could	impact	both	the	decision	to	select	into	treatment	(adopting	PB)	as	well	as	play	a	role	in	determining	the	level	of	public	service	provision.	
The	last	chapter	addressed	these	issues	through	the	used	of	fixed	effects,	which	de-means	every	variable	for	each	observation	by	the	unit	mean,	using	only	within-unit	variable	to	estimate	the	equation.	While	this	approach	deals	with	time	constant	heterogeneity,	it	assumes	that	there	is	no	unobserved	heterogeneity	that	varies	over	time.	When	observations	were	available	annually	and	the	panel	had	a	T	of	over	10,	as	was	the	case	for	local	government	finance,	the	threat	posed	by	unobserved	heterogeneity	was	minimal,	but	with	only	two	observations	and	a	ten-year	gap	between	the	two	this	is	more	likely	to	be	an	issue.		
Given	that	both	pre-	and	post-treatment	values	of	all	the	independent	variables	are	available	and	the	treatment	is	binary,	a	difference-in-difference	approach	is	possible.	However,	a	number	of	potentially	serious	violations	of	basic	DID	assumptions	call	for	additional	adjustments	to	be	made.		The	traditional	DID	model	assumes	that,	absent	the	treatment,	there	would	be	no	difference	in	the	change	of	the	dependent	variable	across	the	treatment	and	control	groups	(Abadie,	2005).		We	know	from	existing	research,	which	has	been	discussed	throughout	this	dissertation,	that	PB	adoption	is	related	to	multiple	factors	that	could	reasonably	be	expected	to	also	affect	public	infrastructure	provision,	such	as	city	size,	geographic	location,	education	levels,	local	economic	size	and	levels	of	local	inequality	(Marchetti	2004;	Wampler	2010;	Spada	2014).	At	first	glance,	an	instrumental	variable	
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approach	would	be	well	suited	for	this	particular	situation.	Unfortunately,	because	all	of	the	factors	related	to	PB	adoption	could	affect	each	of	our	dependent	variables,	we	are	left	without	a	suitable	instrument	that	could	be	used	in	a	two-step	model.		
A	common	route	taken	by	researchers	with	observational	data	and	possible	endogeneity	in	the	treatment	assignment	process	is	to	construct	a	control	group	using	a	matching	method	to	build	a	control	group	based	on	observable	variables.	When	matching	and	DiD	are	put	together,	the	strict	assumption	that	treatment	and	control	groups	only	substantively	differ	by	treatment	status	is	relaxed	(Lechner	2011).	However,	even	though	propensity	score	matching	could	be	justified	in	situations	such	as	Touchton	and	Wampler	(2010)	or	even	the	previous	chapter	of	this	dissertation,	this	particular	treatment	specification	involves	a	selection	process	that	would	be	more	difficult	to	accurately	model	For	a	program	to	qualify	as	treatment,	it	must	have	been	in	place	for	at	least	five	years,	which	means	that	it	must	somehow	survive	beyond	a	single	four-year	local	election	cycle.	This	taps	in	to	characteristics	of	the	city	and	its	elected	officials	that	are	distinct	from	those	which	help	determine	the	initial	decision	to	adopt.		
A	total	of	43	cities	adopted	multi-dimensional	PB	between	2001	and	2005,	the	window	of	eligibility	to	qualify	for	treatment	status.	Beyond	the	30	whose	programs	went	on	to	last	at	least	five	years,	13	were	ended	after	only	one	election	cycle,	but	the	result	of	the	election	itself	does	not	fully	explain	the	different	paths	taken	in	each	city.	Eight	cities	terminated	their	PB	program	following	an	incumbent’s	loss	of	an	election	while	five	incumbents	simply	did	not	continue	the	program	during	their	second	term	in	office.	The	reelection	of	the	adopting	mayor,	although	present	in	all	but	one	treatment	case,	is	not	sufficient	on	its	own	
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to	explain	the	continuation	of	PB	beyond	one	term.	A	match	made	that	only	considers	the	adoption	decision	would	ignore	a	potentially	relevant	distinction	between	those	who	were	able	to	maintain	the	program	intact	and	those	that	failed.	Beyond	the	initial	decision	to	adopt,	the	competence	and	commitment	of	the	local	administration	are	relevant,	as	the	program	and	the	administration	both	have	to	face	the	sanction	of	voters	and	balance	potential	competing	interests	with	other	projects	that	have	been	put	into	place.	Ignoring	this	aspect	of	the	treatment	could	lead	to	false	positive	findings,	as	the	quality	of	administration	could	be	behind	the	expansion	in	public	goods	provision.	
	 As	an	alternative	control	group	to	test	for	the	relevance	of	participatory	institution	design,	I	use	cities	that	adopted	either	consultative	or	‘incomplete'	PB,	subject	to	the	same	basic	requirements	that	were	used	to	define	the	treatment	cases.	The	eligible	program	must	be	adopted	after	2000	and	then	remain	in	place	for	at	least	five	of	the	ten	years	between	2000	and	2010.	This	works	both	as	an	appropriate	method	to	test	MPB’s	performance	in	its	own	right	while	also	helping	us	answer	Hypothesis	2,	which	refers	to	the	qualities	of	PB	that	lead	to	its	success.	In	addition	to	using	cases	of	communicative	PB,	I	expand	the	definition	and	partially	relax	the	five	core	PB	criteria	from	Sintomer	et	al	(2013),	as	discussed	in	Chapter	2.		These	include	participatory	initiatives	inspired	by	PB	but	that	may	go	by	another	name,	borrowing	structural	features	such	as	decentralized	meetings	where	local	officials	meet	with	community	members	but	without	actually	resulting	in	public	debate	on	budgetary	matters.	While	these	cases	may	fail	to	meet	the	basic	criteria	for	consultative	PB,	they	nonetheless	serve	as	a	pro-participation	public	policy	signal	whose	continued	presence	reflects	positively	on	certain	capabilities	of	the	administration	in	office.	If	participatory	policy	adoption	was	merely	a	signaling	mechanism	
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for	other	government	programs	that	drive	positive	result,	the	actual	content	of	the	policies	should	matter	little	and	therefore	there	should	be	no	significant	effect	when	restricting	our	sample	to	just	these	cases.	
Applying	the	original	treatment	selection	criteria	leads	to	36	control	cases	to	accompany	the	30	treatment	municipalities.	Table	2	presents	summary	statistics	and	the	results	from	t-tests	comparing	the	treatment	group	to	this	control	group	as	well	as	the	full	set	of	untreated	municipalities.	The	MPB	treatment	group	has	higher	levels	of	service	provision,	has	a	larger	population,	is	more	urbanized	and	denser	with	greater	GDP	per	capita	in	comparison	to	the	group	of	cities	that	never	adopted	PB.	The	cities	that	have	never	implemented	PB	have	a	higher	rate	of	residents	living	with	ambiguous	land	tenancy,	higher	rates	of	extreme	poverty	and	a	higher	percentage	of	residents	born	within	the	state.	The	control	group	composed	of	other	PB	cases,	however,	significantly	differs	only	for	access	to	running	water,	with	an	average	percentage	of	households	below	the	treatment	group.		
Tables	3	shows	the	results	obtained	using	fixed	effects	to	estimate	the	effect	of	participatory	budgeting	on	infrastructure	provision	where	the	control	group	is	composed	of	the	cities	that	never	adopted	PB.	Table	4	presents	estimates	from	the	difference-in-difference	model	with	the	consultative	PB	cases	as	the	baseline	points	of	comparison.	Due	to	a	severe	negative	skew,	a	multivariate	Box-Cox	power	transformation	was	performed	on	all	but	the	housing	dependent	variable,	which	follows	a	normal	distribution.	The	results	show	a	positive	effect	of	PB	on	sewage	treatment	and	adequate	housing	but	no	effect	on	trash	collection	or	running	water	using	both	methods.	In	the	first	model	with	the	“never-PB”	
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control	group,	the	estimated	effects	on	both	adequate	housing	and	waste	treatment	more	than	doubled,	reaching	7.77	percent	in	the	case	of	adequate	housing.	
The	above	findings	support	both	of	the	hypotheses	presented	earlier	in	the	chapter.	Implementation	of	a	participatory	budgeting	program	with	characteristics	that	effectively	link	participation	both	to	the	budgetary	decision	making	process	itself	as	well	as	to	practices	that	encourage	broad	and	equitable	participation	is	associated	with	improvements	in	the	material	daily	lives	of	residents.	Furthermore,	when	compared	to	cities	with	programs	that	draw	on	the	same	basic	inspiration,	the	estimated	impact	actually	increases	in	size.	
Even	with	the	PB	control	group,	there	still	remain	alternative	explanations	that	may	be	behind	the	findings	of	the	previous	section.	I	will	discuss	three	of	them	briefly	and	share	the	results	of	robustness	tests	that	offer	further	support	for	the	earlier	results.	The	first	of	these	relates	to	a	key	assumption	for	the	use	of	difference	in	differences.	To	bolster	the	argument	that	the	treatment	and	control	group	would	have	evolved	similarly	during	the	period	used	for	the	analyses,	researchers	frequently	look	further	back	in	the	data	to	establish	the	existence	of	a	common	trend.	Although	not	available	for	all	of	the	variables,	the	1991	census	contained	the	same	questions	regarding	trash	collection,	running	water	access	and	sewage	treatment.	I	test	for	the	presence	of	unaddressed	heterogeneity	by	repeating	the	same	method	used	on	the	2000-2010	data,	except	in	this	case	absent	the	treatment	there	should	be	no	significant	coefficient	on	the	interaction	between	treatment	group	and	time.	On	the	other	hand,	a	significant	finding	would	suggest	that	unmeasured	heterogeneity	is	influencing	the	results.	
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Table	5	shows	summaries	of	the	findings	for	each	of	the	three	measures.	The	methods	used	are	the	same	as	in	the	main	analysis,	with	the	exception	of	two	control	variables.	Percentage	of	residents	born	out	of	the	state	was	unavailable	for	the	1991	data	and	no	viable	replacement	was	available,	while	GDP	per	capita	was	replaced	by	income	per	capita	(measured	in	2010	Brazilian	reais).	There	is	no	“treatment”	effect	for	trash	collection	and	access	to	proper	waste	disposal,	however	there	is	a	significant	coefficient	for	the	interaction	term	in	the	running	water	model.	Measurement	error	or	the	presence	of	omitted	variable	bias	could	be	behind	this	particular	result,	but	the	error	seems	to	be	associated	only	with	this	particular	measure.	When	using	t-tests	comparing	the	treatment	and	sample	groups,	water	access	was	the	only	variable	that	significantly	differed	between	the	two	groups.	Making	this	finding	even	more	anomalous	is	the	fact	that	this	is	the	one	area	where	I	find	no	effect	of	PB	on	service	provision.	Thus,	what	this	suggests	is	that	whatever	is	driving	the	differences	in	the	expansion	of	water	service	during	the	1990s	was	not	related	to	the	impact	PB	had	in	my	analysis	of	the	2000s.		
With	the	parallel	trends	assumption	satisfied,	the	validity	of	my	findings	still	relies	on	the	validity	of	the	distinction	that	separates	the	treatment	and	control	cases.	One	approach	to	checking	the	robustness	of	my	specification	of	the	treatment	variable	by	trying	other	treatment	definitions	for	which	there	is	no	reason	to	expect	a	treatment	effect.	For	both	groups,	the	actual	duration	of	treatment	varies	from	a	minimum	of	five	years	to	a	maximum	of	nine	years,	with	nearly	every	case	starting	out	in	either	2001	or	2005,	both	of	which	come	immediately	after	local	elections	are	held	simultaneously	throughout	the	entire	country.	While	all	members	of	the	2005	cohort	needed	to	keep	PB	through	2010	in	order	to	meet	the	duration	requirement,	around	one-third	of	the	2001	cohort	terminated	
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PB	after	the	2008	election.	Instead	of	using	the	type	of	PB	adopted	to	determine	treatment	status,	I	separate	the	two	groups	based	on	year	of	adoption,	with	the	cities	that	adopted	in	2001	classified	as	treatment	cases	and	the	rest	as	control.	Alternatively,	I	use	the	duration	of	PB	and	define	the	treatment	group	as	only	those	that	had	the	program	in	place	for	the	maximum	of	nine	years,	which	removes	the	group	of	cities	that	discontinued	after	the	2008	election.	Supporting	the	main	analysis,	neither	alternative	specification	was	significant.		
Conclusion	Chapter	3	established	that	participatory	budgeting	influences	a	local	government’s	funding	priorities,	leading	administrations	in	PB	municipalities	to	spend	more	on	investment,	housing	and	infrastructure	than	they	would	have	without	a	PB	program	in	place.		The	findings	in	this	chapter,	while	more	limited	in	scope,	indicate	that	the	raised	levels	of	investment	spending	encouraged	by	PB	do	in	fact	lead	to	an	increase	in	public	goods	provision	in	the	area	of	basic	infrastructure.	Together,	the	two	findings	illustrate	a	clear	causal	pathway	through	which	public	participation	leads	to	public	policy	outcomes	as	a	function	of	characteristics	derived	from	a	common	institutional	format	transmitted	horizontally	and	gradually	over	time.	As	such,	both	the	basic	mechanisms	and	positive	impact	of	PB	is	confirmed	by	the	present	research.	
First,	decentralized	public	spaces	are	opened	to	members	of	the	public	where	all	have	an	equal	voice	in	a	discussion	of	budgetary	matters	that	are	relevant	to	the	daily	lives	of	residents.	By	placing	the	nucleus	of	participation	at	the	neighborhood	level,	demands	reflect	concerns	shared	by	all	in	the	community.	The	focus	on	smaller-scale	infrastructure	coupled	with	genuine	equality	in	influence	leads	to	a	socioeconomic	participant	profile	nearly	the	mirror	image	of	traditional	methods	of	citizen	engagement.	Second,	participation	
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takes	place	on	multiple	occasions	with	broad	participation	giving	way	to	more	demanding	direct	interactions	between	government	officials	and	representatives	chosen	by	the	public	assemblies,	allowing	communities	to	have	control	over	the	product	of	the	assemblies	as	demands	are	transformed	into	the	final	budget.		
Because	the	legitimacy	of	these	representatives	is	derived	from	within	PB	itself	rather	than	from	status	as	a	traditional	political	intermediary,	this	helps	to	ensure	that	the	budget	as	implemented	is	a	faithful	representative	of	public	preferences.	The	repeated	interactions	that	take	place	between	members	of	the	local	government	and	neighborhood	participants	lead	citizens	to	become	more	confident	of	their	ability	to	have	input	on	spending	matters	and	officials	to	feel	increasingly	comfortable	with	sharing	information	and	decision-making	responsibilities.	Initial	gains	perceived	by	both	parties	helps	to	reinforce	the	incentive	each	has	to	continue	participating,	and	over	time	the	budget	amount	open	to	public	debate	increases.	
Finally,	accountability	continues	after	the	budget	is	passed	with	representatives	elected	by	the	community	having	the	clear	responsibility	to	ensure	that	the	decisions	made	in	assemblies	are	carried	out	in	full.	The	final	participatory	budget	is	an	explicit	agreement	that	entails	the	local	government	taking	on	responsibilities	regarding	specific	projects	for	which	they	can	be	held	accountable.	In	contrast	to	participatory	institutions	that	focus	on	public	policy,	it	is	this	focus	on	direct	and	tangible	goals	that	enables	citizens	to	carry	out	effective	oversight	because	expectations	are	made	clearly.	
	 While	the	current	empirical	findings	support	both	the	proposed	mechanism	and	impact	of	PB,	a	more	qualitative	look	at	how	PB	is	currently	practiced	can	provide	a	deeper	
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and	richer	understanding	of	these	primary	findings.	In	the	next	chapter,	I	provide	examples	from	a	diverse	set	of	municipalities	in	the	state	of	Rio	Grande	do	Sul.	Through	the	exploration	of	archival	data,	in-depth	interviews	and	participant	observation	in	nearly	a	dozen	cases	at	every	phase	of	the	development	cycle,	the	large-N,	quantitative	findings	of	the	past	chapters	will	be	described	through	examples	of	implementations	that	vary	substantially	from	the	initial	successes	that	have	been	the	focus	of	the	majority	of	scholarly	attention.	Additionally,	through	a	focus	on	transitions	in	power,	the	longer	term	implications	of	substantial	changes	in	the	rules	governing	participation	or	its	termination	altogether	will	be	applied	to	analyzing	the	prospects	for	PB	in	the	years	ahead	as	well	as	what	impact,	if	any,	may	persist	even	in	circumstances	where	the	institution	of	PB	itself	is	extinguished.		 	
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Table	4.1	–	Summary	Statistics	
	
Mean	 SD	 Min	 Max	 Obs	
Water	(%)	 88.19	 16.90	 0.55	 98.96	 1118	
Waste	(%)	 68.67	 27.85	 1.25	 99.97	 1118	
Trash	(%)	 92.94	 11.54	 0	 99.99	 1118	
Adequate	(%)	 51.83	 25.55	 0	 92.45	 1118	
Population	 202158	 571510	 39196	 11172609	 1118	
Density	(sq.	
km.)	 677.04	 1602.94	 0.44	 13018	 1118	
Urban	(%)	 87.16	 15.51	 1.55	 100	 1118	
GDP/pc	 7499.28	 6681.47	 916.90	 75357.73	 1118	
In-State	(%)	 85.87	 11.97	 25.35	 99.60	 1118			 	
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Table	4.2	-	Comparison	of	Means	(2000	values)	
Variables	 Group	 Mean	 SD	 Minimum	 Maximum	 T	 p!=0			 Treat	 93.29	 5.67	 78.51	 99.75	 		 		
Water	(%)	 CG-All	 83.77	 19.87	 0.63	 99.75	 -2.61	 0.009			 CG-PB	 88.24	 14.83	 40.13	 99.95	 -1.72	 0.09			 Treat	 93.66	 7.17	 70.13	 99.8	 		 		
Trash	Collection	(%)	 CG-All	 86.73	 16.38	 0	 99.75	 -2.29	 0.02			 CG-PB	 93.6	 6.85	 73.05	 99.99	 -0.02	 0.97			 Treat	 74.48	 19.05	 27.84	 99.68	 		 		
Waste	(%)	 CG-All	 69.47	 30.31	 1.25	 99.67	 -2.48	 0.01			 CG-PB	 78.04	 21.52	 9.97	 99.89	 0.65	 0.51			 Treat	 52.27	 15.47	 18.16	 82.19	 		 		
Adequate	(%)	 CG-All	 41.77	 25.59	 0	 85.22	 -2.21	 0.02			 CG-PB	 56.02	 22.07	 6.54	 81.2	 0.74	 0.46			 Treat	 304621	 419683	 51002	 2100131	 		 		
Population	 CG-All	 100344	 106860	 39196	 1266570	 -6.95	 0			 CG-PB	 268321	 318266	 46215	 1565815	 -0.36	 0.72			 Treat	 93.54	 7.94	 72.93	 100	 		 		
Urban	(%)	 CG-All	 82.08	 18.21	 1.52	 100	 -3.41	 0			 CG-PB	 93.39	 6.68	 76.74	 100	 -0.07	 0.94			 Treat	 6.84	 6.41	 0.96	 24.4	 		 		
Extreme	Poverty	(%)	 CG-All	 13.19	 12.9	 0.34	 55.07	 2.66	 0.008			 CG-PB	 6.25	 6.07	 0.16	 21.68	 -0.34	 0.72			 Treat	 7930.33	 5692.01	 1516.2	 30399.56	 		 		
GDP	per	capita	(R$)	 CG-All	 5383.53	 5705.03	 916.9	 75357.73	 -2.34	 0.01			 CG-PB	 7507.29	 4735.39	 2311.75	 24145.2	 -0.29	 0.76			 Treat	 2128.71	 3196.81	 10.68	 11448.44	 		 		
Density	(sq.	km.)	 CG-All	 321.94	 789.43	 0.44	 7986.4	 -8.17	 0			 CG-PB	 1512.7	 2644.74	 9.72	 10017.87	 -0.77	 0.43			 Treat	 0.646	 0.056	 0.524	 0.742	 		 		
HDI-M	 CG-All	 0.583	 0.096	 0.283	 0.777	 -3.51	 0.005			 CG-PB	 0.661	 0.06	 0.546	 0.82	 0.93	 0.35			 Treat	 0.55	 0.6	 0.42	 0.67	 		 		
Gini	 CG-All	 0.555	 0.0527	 0.4	 0.72	 -0.02	 0.97			 CG-PB	 56.84	 0.05	 0.45	 0.65	 0.84	 0.4			 Treat	 661	 206	 302	 1192	 		 		
Median	Income	(R$)	 CG-All	 520.44	 208.52	 151	 1150	 -3.56	 0.001			 CG-PB	 738	 314.9	 330	 1680	 1.09	 0.28	
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	Table	4.3	–	Multidimensional	Participatory	Budgeting	and	the	Provision	of	Public	Goods	
	
Adequate	
(%)	 Water	(%)	 Trash	(%)	 Waste	(%)	
PB	 3.435***	 0.004	 0.003	 0.024**	
	
(0.904)	 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.010)	
GDP	per	capita	(R$)	 1.915	 0.154***	 0.174***	 0.031	
	
(2.097)	 (0.031)	 (0.023)	 (0.113)	
Questionable	Tenancy	(%)	 -0.297	 -0.018**	 0.017***	 0.025	
	
(0.329)	 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.029)	
Population	 2.353	 1.197***	 0.949***	 1115	
	
(7.544)	 (0.424)	 (0.359)	 -1579	
Density	(sq.	km.)	 -4.790	 -0.027**	 0.001	 -0.046	
	
(5.578)	 (0.012)	 (0.009)	 (0.042)	
Urban	(%)	 0.129	 0.247***	 -0.104*	 -0.226	
	
(0.093)	 (0.080)	 (0.063)	 (0.287)	
Born	in	State	(%)	 -0.126	 -0.168	 -0.039	 -0.229	
	
(0.150)	 (0.114)	 (0.090)	 (0.442)	
Time	(2010=1)	 8.673***	 0.001	 0.008***	 0.043***	
	
(1.232)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.014)	
Constant	 24.781	 455.1***	 -225.4***	 -264.9	
	
(73.694)	 (100.5)	 (85.15)	 (374.4)	
R2	Within	 0.541	 0.44	 0.68	 0.15	
F	 89.34	 34.68	 105.47	 13.5	
Groups	 385	 385	 385	 385			 	
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	Table	4.4	-	Multidimensional	Participatory	Budgeting	and	the	Provision	of	Public	Goods	(CPB	Control)	
	
Adequate	
(%)	 Water	(%)	 Trash	(%)	 Waste	(%)	
PB	 -4.564	 0.014	 -0.001	 -0.042	
	
(3.861)	 (0.010)	 (0.005)	 (0.035)	
Time	(2010=1)	 -1.768	 0.013	 0.016***	 -0.036	
	
(2.618)	 (0.003)	 (0.005)	 (0.026)	
Time*PB	 7.778***	 -0.001	 0.007	 0.061***	
	
(2.230)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	 (0.021)	
GDP	per	capita	(R$)	 2.997	 0.037	 0.066*	 0.089	
	
(2.239)	 (0.030)	 (0.039)	 (0.133)	
Questionable	Tenancy	(%)	 -2.498***	 -0.005	 -0.006	 -0.078	
	
(0.778)	 (0.010)	 (0.009)	 (0.055)	
Population	 -0.114	 -0.133**	 0.243*	 -0.076	
	
(2.012)	 (0.230)	 (0.146)	 (0.098)	
Density	(sq.	km.)	 -0.49	 -0.001	 0.001*	 -0.004	
	
(1.973)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.017)	
Urban	(%)	 0.776	 0.116***	 0.177***	 1.084	
	
(0.551)	 (0.070)	 (0.060)	 (0.813)	
Born	in	State	(%)	 0.131	 0.177	 -0.096	 -0.229	
	
(0.178)	 (0.064)	 (0.058)	 (0.475)	
Regional	Dummy	 28.26***	 0.045***	 0.023**	 0.230***	
	
(4.267)	 (0.007)	 (0.009)	 (0.039)	
Cons	 -45.3	 -0.079	 -0.033	 -0.777	
	
(64,14)	 (0.310)	 (0.195)	 (1.558)	
R2	 0.6292	 0.25	 0.6743	 0.605	
F	 40.27	 38.3	 41,92	 23.02	
Obs	 112	 112	 112	 112			 	
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Table	4.5	-	Matching	Trends	Test	
	
Water	(%)	 Trash	(%)	 Waste	(%)	
PB	 -1.50	 -1.12	 -7.67	
	
(3,34)	 (2.85)	 (5.70)	
Time	(2000=1)	 1.60	 7.3***	 4.83*	
	
(2.14)	 (2.06)	 (2.54)	
PB*Time	 5.36**	 2.77	 4,71	
	
(2.43)	 (2.50)	 (3.80)	
Income	per	capita	(R$)	 -4.56	 12.32**	 7.11	
	
(5.84)	 (4.89)	 (5.39)	
Questionable	Tenancy	(%)	 0.52**	 0.54**	 0.46*	
	
(0.26)	 (0.22)	 (0.26)	
Population	 0.59	 -8.95*	 -15.96*	
	
(8.93)	 (5.38)	 (8.64)	
Density	(sq.	km.)	 -0.04	 1.03	 2.74*	
	
(1.60)	 (0.98)	 (1.57)	
Urban	(%)	 1.02***	 0.42**	 0.35	
	
(0.19)	 (0.17)	 (0.34)	
Regional	Dummy	 6.45*	 3.01	 25.92***	
	
(3.51)	 (3.67)	 (5.22)	
Constant	 1.82	 66,23	 162.85	
	
(117,84)	 80,53	 (147.6)	
R2	 0.636	 0.6904	 0.5845	
F	 12.06	 17.62	 13.94	
Obs	 112	 112	 112				 	
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CHAPTER	5	–	CONSULTATIVE	OR	MULTIDIMENSIONAL?	DETERMINANTS	OF	PB’S	
INSTITUTIONAL	DESIGN			 Thus	far	I	have	demonstrated	that	a	more	nuanced	categorization	of	participatory	budgeting	is	necessary	to	understand	what	benefits	this	approach	might	provide	in	terms	of	shifting	spending	behavior	in	ways	that	could	have	a	positive	impact	on	local	development	outcomes.	Simply	holding	assemblies	where	budgetary	matters	are	discussed	is	insufficient	on	its	own	to	achieve	the	positive	benefits	attributed	to	the	original	participatory	budgetary	programs.	Participatory	fora	need	additional	measures	to	support	the	inclusion	and	mobilization	of	traditionally	excluded	sectors	of	society.	Institutional	reforms	are	necessary	to	link	the	public	debate	to	the	actual	decision-making	process	surrounding	the	budget.		While	the	importance	of	institutional	design	has	been	discussed	throughout	this	dissertation,	the	process	through	which	PB	programs	take	on	these	different	forms	has	yet	to	be	explored.	The	evidence	provided	thus	far	demonstrates	that	MPB	programs	are	more	effective	than	CPB	in	changing	local	government	taxing	and	spending	patterns	as	well	as	in	expanding	the	network	of	basic	infrastructure	provided	to	citizens.	All	of	the	findings,	however,	beg	the	question	of	why	some	cities	opt	for	an	implementation	of	PB	that	stays	closest	to	the	original	format	while	others	choose	a	partial	route.	In	the	following	pages,	through	an	analysis	of	six	case	studies,	I	offer	a	first	step	in	understanding	the	sources	of	this	variation.	This	chapter	employs	a	comparative	case	study	approach	to	understanding	the	process	through	which	local	governments	decide	on	the	structure	of	PB.	The	goal	is	to	arrive	at	a	possible	explanation	as	to	how	and	why	cities	choose	to	implement	a	particular	form	of	PB.	
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Based	on	the	data	collected,	I	put	forth	the	argument	that	choices	regarding	PB’s	institutional	form	are	made	separately	from	the	decision	to	adopt	the	program.	While	mayoral	policy	preferences	drive	the	decision	to	implement,	choices	regarding	its	institution	design	are	more	contingent	on	other	relevant	social	and	political	actors.	The	“choice”	of	either	CPB	or	MPB	takes	place	indirectly,	coming	about	as	the	product	of	a	sequence	of	smaller,	practical	decisions	made	when	adapting	the	PB	framework	to	local	conditions.	However,	the	role	of	outside	actors	remains	largely	indirect,	by	structuring	the	options	available	to	those	planning	the	details	of	PB’s	rules.	In	a	context	where	civil	society	is	organized	and	non-combative,	investing	the	time	and	effort	into	establishing	an	institutionalized	and	complex	set	of	complementary	participatory	bodies	and	internal	reforms	may	seem	unnecessary	and	cumbersome	to	the	Mayor.	Conversely,	a	context	that	would	reduce	the	chance	of	PB	adoption,	such	as	the	presence	of	a	antagonistic	civil	society	organizations	and	competition	for	power	within	the	governing	coalition,	can	foster	the	adoption	of	MPB	by	placing	early	demands	on	PB	to	satisfy	a	more	diverse	and	initially	skeptical	audience.		 The	empirical	basis	for	this	chapter	rests	on	a	year	of	field	research	conducted	across	a	full	fiscal	budgetary	cycle	in	six	municipalities	in	the	southern	Brazilian	state	of	Rio	Grande	do	Sul.	The	cases	are	split	into	three	pairs	that	are	matched	by	the	year	in	which	PB	was	first	introduced.	The	year	in	which	the	field	research	took	place,	2014,	was	the	second	year	of	the	four-year	Brazilian	local	electoral	cycle	with	elections	held	nationwide	at	the	end	of	2012.	The	first	two	cases	that	will	be	discussed	launched	a	new	PB	program	as	part	of	the	new	administrations	that	took	office	in	2013.	The	second	pair	adopted	PB	at	the	
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beginning	of	the	previous	mayoral	term	in	2009	and	had	mayors	recently	re-elected	to	their	second	term.	Finally,	the	third	pair	adopted	PB	one	term	further	back,	and	opposition	candidates	defeated	the	incumbents	originally	responsible	for	the	program	in	the	most	recent	election.			 First,	I	present	the	general	methodology	of	the	study	along	with	a	brief	review	of	the	relevant	literature.	Then,	each	pair	of	cases	will	be	presented	along	with	a	brief	discussion	of	the	similarities	and	differences	between	the	two	experiences.	After	all	three	pairs	have	been	introduced,	I	evaluate	how	they	relate	to	the	expanded	criteria	introduced	in	Chapter	2	and	what	aspects	of	the	context	in	each	city	can	best	explain	the	presence	or	absence	of	institutional	features	linking	popular	participation	to	actual	government	policy.	The	chapter	concludes	with	a	discussion	of	policy	implications	and	future	trends	for	participatory	budgeting	in	Brazil	and	elsewhere	in	the	world.	While	understanding	the	process	through	which	PB	becomes	either	MPB	or	CPB	is	useful	in	its	own	right,	it	is	also	important	to	rule	out	the	possibility	that	PB’s	institutional	format	is	not	endogenous	to	the	policy	outcomes	that	were	the	focus	of	the	previous	two	chapters.	At	first	glance,	PB	design	choice	could	appear	to	be	merely	a	reflection	of	the	mayor’s	preferences	at	the	time	the	program	was	introduced.	Were	this	to	be	the	case,	the	measure	of	institutional	design	used	in	this	dissertation	may	in	fact	be	serving	as	a	proxy	for	the	level	of	commitment	the	local	executive	has	towards	developing	a	participatory	program.	A	strictly	consultative,	non-binding	form	of	PB	would	be	the	natural	choice	of	a	mayor	who	is	unwilling	to	pay	serious	attention	and	act	on	the	expressed	needs	and	demands	of	the	public.	
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The	evidence	presented	in	this	chapter	suggests	that,	while	the	Mayor	and	his	or	her	administration	are	the	most	influential	actors	in	making	the	decision	to	adopt	PB,	the	institutional	form	which	it	takes	is	conditioned	by	contextual	factors	that	are	often	unrelated	to	participation-related	policy	preferences.	The	contours	of	the	political	situation	of	the	mayor	at	the	time	PB	is	implemented,	including	the	strength	of	the	mayor’s	coalition,	the	configuration	of	local	civil	society	and	availability	of	resources	for	investments,	create	incentives	that	could	steer	the	mayor	towards	CPB	or	MPB.	Over	time,	the	decisions	made	at	this	initial	juncture	become	self-reinforcing,	even	if	the	opposition	comes	to	power.	
Determinants	of	PB’s	Form	and	Function	
	 Establishing	local	characteristics	that	enable	or	inhibit	participatory	budgeting’s	adoption	and	development	has	been	a	central	concern	of	the	comparative	research	on	participatory	budgeting	over	the	past	two	decades	cites.	Most	tend	to	focus	on	aspects	of	multi-dimensional	PB	programs	such	as	the	effective	transfer	of	power	from	government	to	citizens	(Wampler	2007),	the	degree	of	representation	of	traditionally	excluded	groups	(Baiocchi,	Heller	&	Silva	2011),	and/or	the	degree	to	which	PB	is	capable	of	generating	spillover	effects	that	touch	upon	other	parts	of	political	life	(Souza	2011).	Scholars	have	differed	on	those	factors	that	most	influence	whether	or	not	PB	is	successfully	adopted.	The	two	main	schools	of	thought	attribute	responsibility	either	to	existing	civil	society	arrangements	or	mayoral	initiative,	and	either	could	plausibly	be	extended	to	explain	differences	in	the	breadth	and	depth	of	participatory	reforms	accompanying	PB	in	a	particular	context.	A	PB	program	which	gives	citizens	effective	decision-making	authority	is	either	attributed	to	the	strength	and	configuration	of	local	civil	society	(i.e.	Avritzer	2009)	or	is	primarily	a	product	of	mayoral	preference	mediated	
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by	the	local	political	context	(i.e.	Wampler	2007;	Romão	2014).		In	the	context	of	MPB	versus	CPB	adoption,	an	organized	civil	society	with	a	history	of	non-clientelistic	interaction	with	the	local	government	would	be	a	necessary	precondition	for	MPB	to	develop.	Alternatively,	the	choice	of	either	CPB	or	MPB	could	be	simply	a	direct	expression	of	the	Mayor’s	policy	preferences	with	regards	to	public	participation.		
Case	Selection	and	Research	Methods	In	contrast	to	the	quantitative	approach	of	the	previous	two	chapters,	here	I	use	a	combination	of	basic	qualitative	tools	shared	across	the	social	sciences.	Across	the	span	of	a	full	annual	PB	cycle,	I	shadowed	six	participatory	budgeting	programs	from	the	preliminary	meetings	held	before	the	main	assemblies	through	to	the	passing	of	the	municipal	budget,	which	took	place	between	March	and	December	of	2014.	The	overarching	aim	was	to	develop	explanations	for	the	variation	in	what	is	practiced	under	the	label	“participatory	budgeting.”	In	particular,	I	focused	on	the	interests	and	objectives	of	the	local	government	with	respect	to	public	participation,	the	tools	with	which	the	state	pursues	its	interests	when	designing	and	administering	PB	and	the	relative	ease	with	which	the	state	is	able	to	impose	its	will	on	participants	and	members	of	civil	society.		Case	selection	took	place	beginning	in	November	of	2013,	and	involved	an	iterative	process	of	using	data	previously	collected	along	with	further	research	on	the	situation	of	PB	after	the	beginning	of	a	new	mayoral	term	on	January	1	of	that	year.	As	a	first	step,	I	chose	a	structure	for	my	case	set	centered	on	variation	along	the	temporal	dimension,	with	matched	pairs	or	groups	around	three	distinct	“ages”	of	PB,	measured	as	the	number	of	years	since	the	program	was	first	locally	introduced.	A	nearly	uniform	tendency	of	mayors	to	implement	PB	their	first	year	in	office	led	to	a	natural	clustering	of	cases	at	one,	five	and	
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nine	years	since	first	introduction.	To	ensure	further	similarity	along	explanatory	variables	of	potential	interest,	I	imposed	a	particular	electoral	context	for	each	of	the	three	time	points	–	all	newly	introduced	PB	cases	needed	to	involve	a	candidate	and	party	elected	for	the	first	time	in	the	most	recent	election,	those	at	five	years	must	have	reelected	the	PB-adopting	incumbents	and,	at	nine	years,	the	incumbent	administration	which	had	been	first	responsible	for	PB	must	have	been	defeated	in	2008	after	two	terms	in	office.	The	universe	of	potential	cases	was	limited	to	the	42	municipalities	in	the	state	of	Rio	Grande	do	Sul	with	at	least	50,000	inhabitants	in	2012	that	were	included	in	the	Participatory	Budgeting	Census.	Three	sub-categories	were	used	that	correspond	to	phases	in	the	development	of	PB:	“New	Adopters,”	“Maturing	Programs,”	and	“Transition	Programs.”	New	adopters	are	defined	as	those	municipalities	that	had	just	initiated	implementation	in	2013.	Maturing	programs	were	those	that	had	been	in	place	for	at	least	the	previous	four	years,	and	transition	programs	were	those	that	had	experienced	at	least	two	continuous	terms	in	office	with	PB	before	the	incumbent	party	lost	to	an	opposition	party	in	the	most	recent	election.	The	latter	two	categories	were	constructed	by	combining	the	Participatory	Budgeting	Census	with	2012	electoral	results,	confirmed	by	on	site	visits	or	phone	contact.	For	the	“new	adopter”	cases,	identification	was	made	using	electoral	manifestos	for	the	winning	candidates	in	the	22	cities	that	had	never	previously	implemented	PB,	combined	with	Internet	searches	of	local	government	press	releases.	Officials	from	municipalities	identified	in	the	first	phase	were	then	contacted,	either	by	telephone	or	in	person,	in	order	to	ascertain	whether	or	not	implementation	of	a	PB	program	had	in	fact	taken	place.	This	identified	a	total	of	nine	eligible	municipalities	evenly	distributed	amongst	the	three	
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categories,	although	further	investigation	led	to	one	case	from	each	category	being	dropped	due	to	incompatibility	with	the	project.18		Having	identified	the	cases	of	interest	as	well	as	the	city	officials	responsible	for	running	the	program,	I	returned	in	March	of	2014	and	began	accompanying	each	program	through	the	different	phases	of	their	participatory	budgeting,	which	continued	through	December	of	that	year.19	Although	the	final	structure	of	research	varied	as	a	result	of	differences	in	local	practices,	each	contained	all	of	the	following	components:	1) A	first	visit	before	the	PB	cycle	commences	while	focused	on	getting	what	could	be	considered	the	“official	record”	of	the	administration’s	participatory	budgeting	programs.	I	conducted	an	in-depth,	semi-structured	interview	with	the	person	in	charge	of	local	PB	using	the	same	basic	script	for	all	six	cases.	I	collected	any	readily	available	information	that	addresses	the	outcomes	from	previous	years	and	the	rules	and	calendar	for	2014.	I	established	a	tentative	schedule	for	visits	for	the	rest	of	the	year.	2) I	attended	the	full	sequence	of	meetings,	assemblies,	and	any	other	steps	in	the	yearly	cycle	for	at	least	two	subdivisions	of	the	city,	keeping	the	same	areas	throughout	the	year	whenever	feasible.	This	led	to	a	minimum	of	three	additional	site	visits	of	three	days	to	five	days	each	scattered	throughout	the	year.	In	the	days	between	the	events	for																																																									
18 The “new adopter” was Canguçu, the “maturing program” was Canoas and the “transition 
program” was Gravataí. The first two of these cases were briefly mentioned in vignettes used to 
present PB categories in Chapter 2. The programs in place for 2014 in Canguçu and Gravataí 
ultimately failed to qualify according to the basic definition of participatory budgeting used in 
this dissertation. Canoas was ineligible because it operated on a two-year cycle, and almost all of 
the debate within the representative forums was not scheduled to take place until 2015.  
19 The scheduling of each program and the number of suitable observational opportunities at each 
phase of the annual cycle varied substantially between cases, making this “simultaneous” 
accompaniment of programs possible. In Vacaria, where the annual cycle began in February, I 
returned in February of 2015 to cover what had been missed in 2014.  
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two	regions,	I	would	spend	the	day	in	the	PB	Office	or	shadowing	the	PB	Coordinator	if	not	otherwise	occupied	with	interviews20.		3) I	conducted	snowball	interviewing,	beginning	from	the	first	round	of	meetings,	seeking	to	substantiate	the	administration’s	claims	as	to	the	accomplishments	of	PB	thus	far	and	establish	the	opinions	of	other	actors	regarding	PB.	Three	main	groups	were	targeted:	civil	society	leaders,	‘ordinary’	participants	whose	primary	civil	engagement	was	PB	itself,	and	officials	within	the	administration	that	were	not	directly	affiliated	with	PB.	Recruitment	for	the	first	two	took	place	during	the	neighborhood	meetings	while	contact	with	other	members	of	the	administration	took	place	through	the	PB	department.	A	total	of	40	formal	interviews	were	conducted	during	the	course	of	the	study,	in	addition	to	hundreds	of	briefer	conversations	regarding	events	as	they	unfolded.	4) I	went	through	archives	kept	by	the	PB	department	and	City	Hall,	collecting	documents	to	substantiate	claims	made	by	interviewees	as	well	as	explore	tentative	explanations	I	may	have	reached	in	the	course	of	the	study.	This	most	frequently	took	the	form	of	combing	through	the	records	kept	by	the	PB	department	in	addition	to	checking	official	records	of	meetings	and	examining	the	final	budget	as	passed	by	the	City	Council.		My	decision	to	pursue	this	particular	strategy	was	motivated	by	three	main	factors.	First,	while	it	may	have	been	possible	to	build	off	of	quantitative	research	on	PB	adoption	to	test	for	factors	that	determine	the	selection	of	either	CPB	or	MPB,	this	would	run	the	risk	of	overlooking	some	of	the	more	complex	interactions	that	may	be	involved	in	the	decision-making	process.	Second,	I	was	interested	in	broader	contextual	factors	that	may	have																																																									
 
		142	
changed	in	recent	years	as	a	result	of	extended	PT	control	of	the	national	government	and	what	at	the	time	was	nearly	two	decades	of	continuous	economic	growth.	Third,	I	specifically	chose	to	combine	observation	with	interviews	and	archival	research	due	to	my	own	personal	experience	interacting	with	PB	organizers	while	working	with	an	NGO	in	Porto	Alegre,	in	which	I	was	able	to	see	how	PB’s	subjective	nature	made	it	particularly	subject	to	political	spin.	By	observing	the	way	in	which	PB	interacted	with	participants	as	well	as	with	other	areas	of	the	local	administration,	I	would	be	better	able	to	assess	how	far	PB	went	in	actually	incorporating	the	many	different	features	of	MPB.			 The	subjective	nature	of	participatory	budgeting’s	primary	goals,	which	include	improving	state-society	relations,	empowering	previously	excluded	citizens	and	transferring	effective	decision-making	power	to	citizens,	means	that	quantitative	analysis	is	limited	in	its	capacity	to	measure	PB’s	overall	performance.	The	partially	ethnographic	approach	that	I	use	also	enables	us	to	see	informal	ways	in	which	the	different	actors	within	participatory	budgeting	interact	with	the	broader	local	political	context,	peeling	back	the	rhetoric	frequently	adopted	by	both	participants	and	local	officials	to	paint	their	efforts	in	a	more	favorable	light.			 In	the	following	section,	I	explore	the	differences	between	the	cases	that	best	explain	the	trajectory	that	each	has	followed,	breaking	these	down	into	four	main	categories.	Civil	society	is	examined	in	terms	of	its	strength	and	self-organization	along	with	the	way	in	which	it	relates	with	the	adopting	administration.	I	contextualize	mayoral	support	for	participation	by	considering	the	congruencies	between	PB	and	the	administration’s	other	policy	goals	along	with	the	human	and	fiscal	resources	put	at	the	disposal	of	the	PB	process.	Third,	I	look	at	the	power	dynamics	that	condition	the	mayor’s	
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ability	to	carry	out	his	agenda,	both	within	the	administration	as	well	as	with	the	opposition	and	City	Council.	Finally,	I	look	at	the	effect	of	broader	political	and	economic	dynamics	unique	to	each	pair	of	cases	as	it	relates	to	incentives	and	choices	available	only	at	particular	junctions	in	time.			 The	remainder	of	this	chapter	has	two	main	sections,	followed	by	a	conclusion.	The	following	section	will	compare	cases	pairwise,	discussing	the	four	contextual	factors	introduced	in	the	previous	paragraph	while	classifying	each	program	as	either	CPB	or	MPB.	Afterwards,	all	six	cases	are	discussed	together	to	identify	common	relationships	between	the	contextual	factors	and	the	type	of	PB	adopted.	Finally,	the	conclusion	looks	at	the	implications	of	the	findings	with	a	particular	emphasis	on	the	role	that	other	levels	of	government	could	foster	a	climate	that	favors	the	adoption	of	a	multi-dimensional	participatory	format.	
New	Adopters	–	Farroupilha	and	Santana	do	Livramento		 The	first	pair	of	municipalities,	Farroupilha	and	Santana	do	Livramento,	show	how	adverse	contexts	influence	decision	choices	that	later	lead	to	characteristics	associated	with	multi-dimensional	PB.	As	I	will	show	in	this	section,	PB	in	Farroupilha	incorporated	many	institutional	aspects	that	would	enable	it	to	develop	as	a	decision-making	space,	while	Santana	do	Livramento	did	little	more	than	hold	a	yearly	round	of	neighborhood	assemblies	that	remained	entirely	disconnected	from	the	budget-making	process.	Given	each	local	context,	most	of	the	research	discussed	in	the	previous	section	would	lead	one	to	assume	that	the	relationship	would	be	reversed.	First,	while	Livramento’s	mayor	belonged	to	the	PT,	the	party	played	a	relatively	minor	role	in	the	coalition	elected	in	Farroupilha.	Second,	the	umbrella	association	of	neighborhood	groups	in	Farroupilha	had	extensive	
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clientelist	ties	to	the	outgoing	administration	and	attempted	to	obstruct	PB’s	introduction	before	the	program	had	officially	been	announced.	By	contrast,	Santana	do	Livramento	launched	a	community	outreach	strategy	before	formally	initiating	PB,	and	the	faithful	execution	of	popular	PB	policies	was	a	part	of	the	state	party’s	strategy	to	win	support	for	state	and	federal	candidates	in	the	2014	election.			 The	comparative	advantage	that	Farroupilha	enjoyed	over	Santana	do	Livramento	was	that	constant	effort	was	necessary	to	win	and	maintain	trust	and	engagement	amongst	both	government	members	and	citizen	participants.	In	Farroupilha,	coalition	partners	in	charge	of	most	of	the	local	government	needed	to	be	convinced	to	support	PB	and	cede	space	in	the	budget	for	public	demands.	In	order	to	mobilize	and	win	the	trust	of	residents	that	had	previously	never	been	active	in	local	civic	life,	it	was	paramount	that	the	PB	process	be	perceived	as	both	procedurally	fair	and	then	effective	by	carrying	out	the	agreed	upon	demands	as	quickly	as	possible.	At	the	same	time,	maximizing	participation	levels	and	presenting	feasible	demands	was	essential	in	order	to	win	necessary	support	within	the	administration	to	see	that	the	demands	are	incorporated	into	the	yearly	budget	and	their	execution	prioritized	the	following	year.	The	design	of	PB	in	Farroupilha	reflects	immediate	concerns	about	the	short-term	viability	of	the	program,	but	the	solutions	to	the	difficulties	faced	at	the	beginning	involve	multiple	empowering	mechanisms	that	are	missing	from	Livramento.		 In	the	2012	election,	Claiton	Gonçalves	of	the	Democratic	Labor	Party	(PDT	–	Partido	Democrático	Trabalhista)	led	a	left-wing	coalition	to	a	resounding	defeat	of	the	incumbent	mayor,	Ademir	Barreta,	with	58	percent	of	the	vote.	Barreta’s	party,	the	PMDB,	had	won	the	past	three	elections	while	the	PDT	had	only	won	one	local	election,	in	1992.	The	PT	was	
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persuaded	to	join	the	PDT,	in	part,	because	Gonçalves	promised	to	implement	PB	if	elected.21	Although	the	PT	had	been	part	of	the	PDT’s	coalition	for	the	previous	two	elections	with	a	candidate	on	the	ticket	for	vice-mayor,	they	had	been	kicked	off	to	accommodate	2008’s	third	place	candidate.	Although	the	new	administration	formed	a	majority	on	the	City	Council,	there	was	significant	tension	within	City	Hall	between	the	three	main	parties	in	the	coalition,	each	of	whom	controlled	multiple	government	departments.		 After	the	election	took	place,	Gonçalves	put	Paulo	Schneider,	a	former	PT	mayoral	candidate,	in	charge	of	crafting	a	proposal	detailing	the	specifics	of	PB	as	implemented	in	Farroupilha.	With	the	help	of	Júnior	Ribeiro,	a	PT	activist	with	experience	in	the	earlier	PB	program	of	neighboring	Caxias	do	Sul,	the	proposal	contained	a	mixture	of	different	adaptations	that	had	successfully	been	used	elsewhere	in	municipalities	that	closer	resembled	their	own.	Soon	after	inauguration,	their	proposal	was	approved	first	by	the	mayor	and	then	by	the	cabinet	as	a	whole	in	a	meeting	called	specifically	for	the	purpose	of	debating	the	mechanics	of	PB.	Every	department	head	could	ask	questions	and	the	blessing	of	a	majority	of	the	cabinet	was	necessary	for	the	program	to	move	forward.			 Neighborhood	associations	in	the	city	were	organized	under	an	umbrella	group	called	the	Union	of	Neighborhood	Associations,	or	UAB	(União	de	Associações	de	Barrio).	After	the	election	but	before	inauguration,	the	UAB	leadership	decided	to	take	a	hard	line	against	PB	to	thwart	the	new	administration’s	plans	to	implement	after	taking	office.	The	UAB	president	gave	interviews	with	the	local	media	accusing	Gonçalves	of	attempting	to	undermine	the	community	movement	by	removing	the	traditional	role	played	by																																																									
21 Background information based on interviews with Paulo Schneider and Júnior Ribeiro on May 
20, 2014 
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neighborhood	leaders	in	guided	municipal	investments	to	their	communities.	Entrenched	neighborhood	groups	that	are	dependent	on	clientelist	relationships	for	their	own	legitimacy	have	everything	to	lose	if	PB	was	successfully	put	into	place,	and	this	type	of	conflict	has	been	identified	in	other	cities	(Silva	2001).			 The	UAB’s	president,	J.C.,22	had	served	on	the	city	council	for	the	PMDB,	and	by	his	own	estimate	at	the	time	all	but	one	association	president	was	affiliated	either	the	PMDB	or	one	of	its	former	coalition	partners.	When	plans	for	PB	were	first	announced	at	the	beginning	of	2013,	J.C.	went	on	the	radio	to	criticize	Schneider	for	having	excluded	the	UAB	when	first	drawing	up	the	proposal.	As	a	result,	he	said,	the	official	orientation	of	the	UA	was	to	discourage	any	participation	under	the	banner	of	PB	while	wanting	to	maintain	the	previous,	exclusive	channels	of	dialogue	between	the	city	and	the	UA.	He	later	offered	a	potential	compromise,	in	which	the	UAB	would	accept	PB	if	40%	of	the	overall	resources	to	be	spent	through	the	program	were	divided	proportionally	to	each	neighborhood	by	population	and	then	given	to	their	association	to	spend	however	they	saw	fit.	Cenci	himself	s	well	as	a	few	other	association	presidents	attended	meetings,	some	of	whom	simply	observed	while	others	participated	more	actively	and	were	elected	as	neighborhood	representatives.		 The	initial	format	of	PB	in	Farroupilha,	which	remained	essentially	unchanged	in	2014,	divided	the	urban	area	of	the	city	into	12	regions,	and	each	of	the	municipality’s	four	rural	districts	formed	its	own	region.	Assemblies	were	held	by	neighborhood,	with	between	two	to	five	neighborhoods	in	each	region.	In	the	assemblies,	which	were	almost	always	conducted	by	Schneider	and	Ribeiro	without	the	presence	of	other	government																																																									
22 Information for this section based on interview with J.C., President of Farroupilha’s Union of 
Neighborhood Associations, July 29, 2014 
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officials,	the	rules	were	explained	and	then	participants	could	propose	investment	projects	for	the	neighborhood.	The	conversations	were	informal;	the	opportunity	to	speak	was	not	limited	by	time	or	formally	structured,	as	was	the	case	in	Livramento.	Rarely	were	there	government	officials	in	attendance	other	than	Schneider	and	Ribeiro,	so	they	were	able	to	make	their	presentation	briefly	and	focused	only	on	PB-related	topics.			 After	debate,	three	demands	were	selected	along	with	one	delegate	per	10	in	attendance	to	move	onwards	to	the	“Technical	Group”	(Grupo	Técnico	-	GT).	The	GT	was	a	meeting	of	the	delegates	from	all	of	the	neighborhoods	who	had	to	decide	amongst	themselves	on	a	list	of	demands	below	a	given	value	that	was	the	same	for	each	region.	They	were	assisted	by	a	city	engineer,	who	previously	performed	site	visits	and	prepared	a	presentation	containing	the	viability	of	each	neighborhood’s	three	demands	along	with	an	estimated	cost	and	a	visual	representation	of	the	work	that	would	be	done.	The	2014	limit	was	R$	500,000	per	region,	equivalent	to	roughly	US$	200,000	at	the	time.	The	citywide	total	of	R$	5,500,000	greatly	surpassed	Livramento,	which	had	only	R$	1,500,000	for	the	city	as	a	whole.		 Moving	to	the	second	of	these	“new	implementers,”	PB	was	first	introduced	in	Santana	do	Livramento	in	the	middle	of	2013	by	Mayor	Glauber	Gularte	Lima	of	the	PT.	Lima,	a	school	teacher	and	one-term	councilman,	won	with	only	30	percent	of	votes	in	a	race	with	no	incumbent	where	five	candidates	received	over	ten	percent.	Although	the	PT	had	contested	all	but	one	mayoral	race	since	1985,	the	highest	vote	share	the	party	ever	received	was	13	percent	in	2008.	The	PT	won	only	four	of	the	17	seats	on	the	City	Council,	and	the	parties	of	the	remaining	representatives	had	all	campaigned	for	candidates	other	than	Lima	during	the	election.	To	be	able	to	establish	a	working	majority	during	his	term	in	
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office,	Lima	would	have	to	cede	both	political	and	fiscal	resources	to	centrist	parties	that	had	a	greater	interest	in	maintaining	the	status	quo,	as	many	of	them	had	also	been	part	of	the	previous	administration.		 PB	was	in	the	formal	platform	of	Lima’s	campaign,	but	effort	towards	defining	the	details	of	how	it	would	be	implemented	only	began	after	he	took	office	and	appointed	a	coordinator	of	community	affairs	to	his	cabinet.	The	coordinator,	Josué	Rodrigues,	was	given	a	broad	mandate	to	engage	with	all	types	of	civil	society	organizations	present	in	the	city	through	both	existing	and	new	institutional	channels23.	In	addition	to	responsibility	for	carrying	out	all	of	the	work	pertaining	to	participatory	budgeting,	he	served	as	a	government	representative	on	nearly	all	of	the	public	policy	councils	that	were	in	place,	ranging	from	education	and	health	to	religious	tolerance	and	rights	of	the	elderly.	After	spending	the	first	half	of	2013	establishing	contact	with	existing	organizations,	he	invited	all	of	the	leaders	to	a	session	where	all	those	in	attendance	could	discuss	and	then	sanction	PB’s	Rules	of	Procedure	(RI,	Regimento	Interno).	Despite	the	fact	that	the	2013	budget	had	already	been	submitted	to	the	City	Council,	assemblies	were	then	held	in	September	and	October	using	the	same	basic	structure	that	would	be	applied	again	in	2014.		 	Although	some	neighborhood	associations	were	active	in	2013,	the	citywide	equivalent	of	the	UAB,	the	Neighborhood	and	Slum	Association	Union	of	Santana	do	Livramento,	or	UNAMOS	(União	das	Associações	dos	Bairros	e	Vilas	de	Santana	do	
Livramento),	had	been	essentially	inactive	for	years.	Rodrigues,	who	had	long	been	active	in	local	civil	society	as	a	leader	in	the	movement	for	Afro-Brazilian	religious	rights	and	
																																																								
23 Background information provided by interviews with Josué Rodrigues and Rogério da Silva 
on May 23 and 24, 2016. 
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freedom,	formed	a	list	of	candidates	that	became	the	leaders	of	the	UNAMOS24	with	the	intent	to	amplify	the	organization	into	a	meaningful	intermediary	between	neighborhood	associations	and	the	city.	Rodrigues	himself	was	on	the	UNAMOS	Executive	Committee	as	Director	of	New	Membership,	in	charge	of	leading	the	associations	down	the	path	towards	full	legal	registration.	Nearly	all	associations	had	leadership	that	was	willing	to	dialogue	with	Lima’s	administration,	possibly	because	the	associations	had	not	been	that	active	under	the	previous	mayor.			 Santana	do	Livramento’s	PB	divides	the	urban	area	of	the	municipality	into	five	regions,	with	all	rural	districts	combined	into	one	additional	region.	Each	region	had	one	assembly	in	which	the	region	would	vote	to	rank-order	three	demands,	the	first	of	which	the	city	promised	to	execute	the	following	year	with	the	second	and	third	carried	out	if	resources	were	available.			 The	assemblies	were	political	affairs	with	speeches	from	different	government	officials	and	members	of	the	city	council,	even	occasionally	the	mayor,	summarizing	the	accomplishments	and	plans	of	their	sector	for	the	region	or	for	the	city	as	a	whole.	While	explaining	the	rules	to	the	assembly,	it	was	emphasized	that	although	formally	there	was	no	limit	on	what	could	be	voted	upon,	in	practice	each	region	had	roughly	R$	250,000	to	spend.	After	a	15-minute	pause	in	which	participants	could	submit	demands	and	discuss	them	with	their	peers,	every	demand	was	given	three	minutes	for	defense.	The	vote	itself	was	on	paper	ballots	distributed	as	people	registered	upon	arrival,	with	space	given	for	each	demand	to	be	ranked	from	one	to	three.	Delegates	were	elected	at	the	same	time,	with																																																									
24 Leadership elections for UNAMOS and all other umbrella neighborhood associations 
discussed in this chapter took place in the form of a single vote between slates of candidates to 
fill all leadership positions.  
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one	delegate	per	20	in	attendance.	Within	the	actual	rules	on	paper,	these	delegates	then	meet	and	vote	on	a	Council,	with	two	council	members	per	region.	The	Council	cannot	make	changes	to	the	demands	that	were	selected	during	the	assembly,	but	they	are	meant	to	be	consulted	by	the	Mayor	about	additional	aspects	of	the	budget	and	approve	the	overall	city	list	of	investment	projects	for	the	following	year.		 In	practice,	the	assemblies	were	the	only	part	of	Livramento’s	official	rules	that	was	actually	implemented	by	the	conclusion	of	this	study.	The	only	meeting	of	all	elected	delegates	during	the	two	years	the	program	was	a	ceremony	at	the	end	of	the	first	year	in	which	they	all	received	diplomas	and	took	pictures	with	the	Mayor.	The	high	aims	in	the	general	structure	laid	out	within	the	RI	were	nowhere	backed	up	by	plans	to	work	up	from	the	very	beginning,	and	by	all	accounts	there	was	no	further	deliberation	regarding	the	budget.	In	reality,	the	only	meeting	held	for	delegates	in	2013	or	2014	was	a	brief	ceremony	with	the	Mayor	towards	the	end	of	2013.			 One	possible	opening	that	could	have	led	to	meaningful	action	by	the	delegates	was	made	on	the	initiative	of	a	professor	in	the	business	administration	department	at	the	newly	opened	satellite	campus	of	a	federal	university.	Weekly	seminars	were	set	up	to	teach	delegates	the	basics	of	the	government	budgeting	process,	taught	by	a	rotation	of	professors	in	his	department,	in	an	attempt	to	help	representatives	understand	the	basic	workings	of	a	local	government	budget.	Rodrigues	canvassed	the	delegates	to	try	to	sign	people	up	to	attend	but	lack	of	interest	led	Rodrigues	to	open	it	up	to	all	local	councils,	and	even	then	the	majority	present	at	the	first	session	were	low	level	political	appointees.			 While	quite	limited	in	terms	of	ambition,	scope,	resources	or	impact	on	government	behavior,	participatory	budgeting	in	Santana	do	Livramento	did	not	seem	to	have	any	
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significant	drawbacks,	as	expectations	were	never	set	high.	The	low	investment	amount	promised	by	the	Mayor	was	feasible	without	relying	on	the	type	of	initiative	shown	in	Farroupilha,	where	Paulo	Schneider	would	closely	follow	the	progress	of	PB	demands	as	they	passed	through	the	city	bureaucracy.		Participants	reported	that	the	neighborhood	organization	and	preparation	for	the	assembly	had	sharply	improved	between	the	first	and	second	year,	although	overall	participation	numbers	had	dropped.	Community	leaders	had	managed	to	put	together	an	arrangement	in	which	one	neighborhood	would	trade	their	votes	this	year	for	support	the	following	year,	a	promising	sign	of	PB’s	ability	to	encourage	cooperation	towards	mutual	benefit.	Nonetheless,	these	benefits	spring	more	from	the	attributes	of	PB	as	a	community	team-building	exercise	than	anything	having	to	do	with	the	budget	itself.	Farroupilha	had	not	yet	reached	a	point	where	demands	seamlessly	entered	the	budget,	but	the	work	of	the	GT	improved	the	quality	of	demands	and	answered	initial	doubts	that	were	raised	as	to	the	capabilities	of	average	citizens	to	make	informed	decisions	involving	the	budget.			 Despite	having	only	began	a	year	earlier,	the	difference	between	participatory	budgeting	as	practiced	in	these	two	cities	was	remarkable.	While	it	may	still	have	been	too	soon	to	say	that	Farroupilha’s	program	had	its	future	secured,	there	are	no	clear	avenues	through	which	Santana	do	Livramento	could	expand	much	further	along	the	lines	of	the	limited	program	that	had	been	put	into	play.	While	opposition	from	within	the	administration	could	have	blocked	PB’s	adoption	in	Farroupilha,	the	need	to	win	the	support	of	other	members	of	the	coalition	ended	up	beneficial,	as	Schneider	and	Júnior	were	forced	to	more	carefully	plan	the	program’s	launch	and	early	years.	The	strong	opposition	of	the	existing	neighborhood	associations	meant	that	the	only	option	available	
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to	the	PB	Coordinator’s	office	was	to	directly	appeal	to	citizens	who	had	been	left	out	of	existing	spaces	for	state-society	interaction,	in	line	with	the	intent	of	PB’s	architects.	The	existence	of	organizations	disposed	to	constructively	engage	Lima’s	administration	in	Livramento,	on	the	other	hand,	took	a	substantial	workload	off	that	city’s	PB	Coordinator,	and	building	up	community	groups		could	also	be	seen	as	completely	coherent	with	PB’s	original	mission.	However,	since	there	was	a	consensus	surrounding	PB	adoption	within	the	coalition,	no	planning	took	place	before	the	administration	was	sworn	into	office.	Once	in	control	over	City	Hall,	the	day-to-day	grind	of	governing	meant	that	it	was	difficult	to	set	aside	for	the	program	the	attention	and	resources	that	would	have	been	necessary	to	even	carry	out	the	rules	that	at	least	existed	on	paper.	
Maturing	Programs	-	Vacaria	and	Erechim		 The	next	pair	of	municipalities,	Vacaria	and	Erechim,	began	PB	in	2009,	one	full	electoral	cycle	before	Santana	do	Livramento	and	Farroupilha.	Both	cities	have	around	100,000	residents	and	serve	as	minor	commercial	hubs	in	the	Serra	Gaúcha	region,	each	located	along	a	major	highway	at	the	northern	border	of	Rio	Grande	do	Sul	with	the	neighboring	state	of	Santa	Catarina.	The	PT’s	mayoral	candidates	were	each	outsiders	in	close	three-way	races	against	incumbents	and	former	mayors	where	a	single	political	party	had	dominated	local	politics	since	the	1970s.			 Despite	the	many	similarities	between	the	two	cities	and	their	elected	officials,	PB	implementation	went	down	significantly	different	paths.	While	PB	in	Erechim	paid	careful	attention	to	building	up	the	community’s	ability	to	self-organize,	Vacaria’s	program	remained	centralized	in	the	Mayor’s	office	and	dependent	on	the	Mayor’s	own	personal	involvement	in	the	process.	While	both	Vacaria	and	Erechim	completed	most	of	PB	
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requests	and	committed	similar	fiscal	resources,	each	program’s	structure	incentivized	a	distinct	pattern	of	projects	and	overall	spending	priorities.	Erechim’s	emphasis	on	building	up	neighborhood	associations	meant	that	PB	resources	went	towards	social	infrastructure	such	as	community	halls.	The	projects	approved	by	Vacaria’s	PB	fell	within	the	lines	of	national	development	programs	for	which	grants	were	available,	including	a	new	daycare	center,	health	clinics	and	sanitation	improvements.			 Neighborhood	associations	along	the	lines	of	what	existed	in	Farroupilha	had	never	formed	in	either	city.	Although	some	communities	in	Erechim’s	rural	districts	maintained	organizations	around	community	chapels,	the	general	phenomena	of	neighborhood	associations	had	never	taken	root.	In	Vacaria,	by	contrast,	associations	were	growing	in	the	years	prior	to	PB’s	introduction,	a	process	in	which	the	PT	itself	had	played	a	role.	While	both	administrations	believed	that	a	primary	purpose	of	PB	should	be	to	strengthen	local	civil	society,	the	structure	of	civil	society	itself	and	its	relationship	with	local	government	influenced	the	way	each	city	set	PB	up	to	fulfill	this	purpose.		 Both	Mayor	Elói	Poltronieri	of	Vacaria	and	Mayor	Paulo	Polis	of	Erechim	promised	to	implement	PB	during	their	first	election	campaign	and	took	concrete	steps	during	their	first	term	in	office	that	demonstrated	that	their	commitment	went	beyond	campaign	rhetoric.	Each	installed	an	Office	of	the	Coordinator	of	PB	inside	the	Mayor’s	Cabinet	right	when	taking	office	and	they	were	able	to	hold	a	full	round	of	assemblies	the	first	year.	An	important	difference	between	the	two	was	what	each	mayor	aimed	to	achieve	by	introduction	participatory	budgeting	in	their	respective	cities.	In	Vacaria,	Poltronieri	had	a	more	functional	view	of	PB	as	a	way	to	facilitate	substantial	improvements	to	the	city’s	poor	infrastructure.	Having	already	formed	the	broader	questions	of	what	would	become	
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his	administration’s	ambitious	public	investment	program,	participatory	budgeting	helped	Poltronieri	in	two	important	ways.	Public	input	helped	target	particular	interventions	such	as	road	pavement	or	the	construction	of	a	daycare	center	so	that	they	better	matched	existing	need,	and	the	role	of	PB	in	project	proposals	was	emphasized	when	applying	for	external	funding.	In	Erechim,	the	creation	of	a	vibrant	and	respected	participatory	institution	in	a	city	with	little	civic	tradition	was	seen	as	valuable	on	it’s	own.	PB	was	a	way	for	the	administration	to	show	the	depth	of	their	commitment	to	turn	local	government	responsive	to	the	public,	one	of	their	main	campaign	pitches.		 Until	the	PT	won	in	2008,	local	politics	in	Erechim	since	the	1970s	had	been	marked	by	the	dominance	of	the	pro-regime	ARENA	during	the	military	dictatorship	through	to	its	successor	parties,	who	had	lost	a	mayoral	election	only	twice	since	1972.	The	outgoing	mayor	at	the	time	of	the	election	had	served	four	terms,	beginning	back	in	1976,	and	the	2008	election	featured	both	the	incumbent	vice-mayor	and	a	former	mayor	from	what	had	been	the	primary	opposition	up	until	that	year.		The	election	of	Polis	and	the	PT	marked	a	significant	break	from	the	past,	and	an	explicit	rejection	of	experienced	candidates	representing	both	the	government	in	power	and	the	institutional	opposition	in	favor	of	a	relatively	unknown	candidate	running	for	a	party	without	any	history	of	substantial	electoral	success.	However,	the	extent	to	which	this	was	a	sign	of	support	for	the	PT’s	political	platform	or	simply	a	rejection	of	the	status	quo	was	uncertain,	and	the	rather	limited	nature	of	political	engagement	in	the	city’s	recent	history	meant	that	hallmark	programs	like	participatory	budgeting	would	need	substantial	modifications	if	they	were	to	succeed	in	a	context	that	had	significant	differences	from	the	major	cities	where	they	were	initially	conceived.	
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	 PB	adoption	was	inserted	into	the	campaign’s	platform	only	after	it	was	approved	by	all	parties	in	the	coalition,	and	the	Mayor’s	cabinet	then	voted	unanimously	on	a	concrete	and	detailed	proposal	that	was	put	together	in	the	time	between	the	election	and	the	beginning	of	his	administration’s	term	in	office.	Unlike	Farroupilha,	where	the	mayor’s	own	support	for	PB	was	uncertain,	Polis	could	have	easily	signed	off	on	PB	without	first	seeking	input	from	other	parties	and	requiring	that	it	secure	the	approval	of	the	Cabinet	as	a	whole.	However,	this	strategy	was	intended	to	give	the	other	members	of	the	coalition	a	sense	of	ownership	of	the	administration’s	PB	program	from	the	very	beginning,	making	them	more	likely	to	facilitate	the	faithful	execution	of	PB	projects	in	the	future.25	In	Farroupilha,	this	process	was	necessary	to	get	support	for	PB	to	ever	get	off	the	ground,	which	was	not	the	case	in	Erechim.	The	rationale	for	going	through	this	approval	process	nonetheless	was	that	it	would	raise	awareness	of	the	importance	of	the	program	to	cabinet	members	from	other	parties	and	establish	PB	as	a	priority	of	the	administration	as	a	whole	rather	than	just	those	within	it	that	belonged	to	the	PT.	The	hope	was	that	this	would	also	convince	members	of	other	parties	to	see	PB’s	success	as	being	in	their	own	best	interest,	rather	than	simply	passing	reputational	benefits	on	to	the	mayor’s	political	party.			 In	addition	to	getting	broader	support	for	PB	within	the	administration,	the	process	of	creating	and	defending	a	proposed	institutional	structure	forced	the	PB	Coordinator’s	Office	to	begin	working	before	the	administration’s	term	in	office	and	work	out	exactly	how	participatory	budgeting	could	work	towards	the	goals	first	established	in	Porto	Alegre	while	taking	place	in	Erechim.	In	particular,	the	administration	prioritized	using	participatory	budgeting	as	a	learning	space	where	citizens	could	build	the	repertoire																																																									
25 Interview with former PB Coordinator Jorge Psidonik, May 17, 2014.  
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necessary	to	productively	engage	with	the	state	that	was	thus	far	underdeveloped	in	comparison	even	to	cities	of	similar	size.	Initial	attempts	to	reach	out	to	neighborhood	groups	that	existed	on	paper	revealed	that	many	had	been	out	of	operation	for	years,	and	visits	to	a	nearby	municipality	of	similar	size	and	history	led	the	government	to	substantially	revise	its	plans.	Initially	hoping	that	existing	organizations	could	take	a	role	from	the	beginning	and	make	decisions	amongst	themselves	about	PB’s	basic	rules,	the	city	realized	that	it	would	have	to	take	on	the	responsibility	of	mobilizing	communities	into	groups	first,	which	meant	that	most	institutional	details	had	to	be	complete	before	the	process	started.	The	PB	Coordinator’s	Office,	which	was	initially	planned	to	be	small	and	in	the	background	when	the	program	began,	was	allocated	additional	resources	and	personnel	to	take	on	a	larger	role.			 Like	Farroupilha,	Erechim’s	PB	program	had	been	agreed	to	by	all	members	of	the	coalition.	Between	the	election	and	swearing	in,	Polis	designated	a	group	led	by	Jorge	Psidonik,	a	union	activist	with	roots	in	the	Catholic	community	movement,	to	draft	up	a	more	complete	plan	as	to	how	the	administration	should	go	about	implementing	PB	once	in	office26.	They	went	around	to	different	cities	in	the	state	and	chose	a	particular	format	used	in	a	city	close	in	size	and	budget	just	across	the	border	in	the	neighboring	state	of	Santa	Catarina.	Once	sworn	in,	Polis	established	an	office	within	the	Mayor’s	Cabinet	that	would	be	dedicated	exclusively	to	PB.	While	the	planning	stage	may	have	in	some	ways	resembled	Farroupilha,	the	fact	that	the	mayor	himself	was	a	member	of	the	PT	had	important	implications	that	placed	PB	in	a	much	stronger	position	within	the	administration.	PB	had																																																									
26 Background information based on interviews with PB Coordinator Teresa Maglieski (April 28, 
2014), Secretary of Planning Anacleto Zanella (April 29, 2014) and former PB Coordinator Jorge 
Psidonik (May 17, 2014). 
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played	a	role	during	the	2008	campaign	as	a	key	component	of	Polis’s	plans	to	renovate	local	political	life,	establishing	a	public	commitment	to	carry	out	PB	that	was	largely	missing	in	Farroupilha.	Additionally,	the	need	to	focus	efforts	on	winning	over	other	members	of	the	administration	was	substantially	reduced	given	the	commitment	of	the	Mayor	and	a	majority	of	his	cabinet.			 The	basic	structure	of	participatory	budgeting	that	was	used	during	Polis’	first	term	treated	the	neighborhood	as	the	principal	unit	of	participation,	similar	to	how	Farroupilha	was	organized.	The	city	was	divided	into	17	regions,	and	82	núcleos,	units	that	could	consist	of	one	or	more	neighborhood.	The	assemblies	were	held	at	the	regional	level,	but	following	speeches	from	the	Mayor	and	the	PB	Coordinator	each	núcleo	split	off	and	deliberated	amongst	themselves	until	they	arrived	upon	a	demand	and	a	set	of	delegate,	awarded	proportionally	based	on	the	number	of	residents	that	were	in	attendance.	The	administration	set	a	fixed	amount	each	year	exclusively	for	PB	projects,	which	was	divided	evenly	amongst	the	regions.	After	all	assemblies	were	concluded,	the	delegates	of	each	region	met	in	a	Delegates’	Forum	and	determined	the	amount	each	núcleo	would	receive	to	carry	out	the	project	selected	during	the	assembly.			 The	set	of	rules	that	the	Polis	administration	ultimately	chose	when	implementing	participatory	budgeting	in	2009	paid	particular	attention	to	stimulate	broad	participation	across	all	neighborhoods,	strengthen	existing	community	organizations	as	well	as	foster	the	creation	of	new	groups	where	none	were	active.	In	early	years,	demands	were	targeted	towards	social	infrastructure	for	these	groups,	such	as	community	halls	for	social	events	and	gymnasiums	that	could	host	afterschool	programs.	These	were	administered	by	associations	that	were	typically	either	newly	formed	or	reactivated	after	remaining	
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dormant	for	many	years.	By	the	end	of	Polis’	first	term,	nearly	all	area	of	the	city	had	formed	some	type	of	collective	organization	and	were	equipped	with	at	least	one	communal	facility,	and	a	series	of	changes	were	made	to	scale	demands	upwards	towards	meeting	larger	needs,	such	as	schools,	health	clinics,	and	road	infrastructure	projects.	Across	his	second	term,	the	fixed	amount	divided	up	by	region	gradually	shifted	from	small	demands	selected	by	the	neighborhoods	towards	larger	ones	chosen	by	a	vote	of	the	region	as	a	whole.			 Vacaria’s	general	political	regime	in	place	from	the	end	of	the	dictatorship	up	to	when	PB	was	first	introduced	in	2009	broadly	resembled	the	three	other	cases	that	have	just	been	presented.	Erechim,	the	PT	was	elected	into	power	after	decades	under	one	dominant	party,	defeating	two	experienced	candidates	with	a	relative	outside	as	their	mayoral	candidate.	Eloi	Poltronieri,	an	agronomical	engineer	who	had	never	previously	run	for	elected	office,	won	the	2008	election	by	under	1,000	votes,	and	was	only	the	third	mayor	elected	since	1972	for	a	party	other	than	the	PMDB	or	its	predecessor,	the	MDB.				 Two	significant	differences,	however,	meant	that	mayor	Poltronieri	had	a	wider	set	of	opportunities	than	the	other	three	mayors	discussed	so	far.	The	two	factors	in	Vacaria’s	background	that	differ	from	the	other	cases	and	guided	the	administration	to	adopt	C	PB	are	both	related	to	the	larger	role	that	the	PT	had	played	in	recent	local	political	history.	Vacaria’s	PT	had	been	on	the	City	Council	since	1992,	and	the	party	even	had	participated	in	the	coalition	of	the	outgoing	administration	that	had	been	in	office	from	2005	to	2008.27		The	first	PT	city	council	member,	Romeo	Biazus	had	been	trying	to	foster	the	development	of	community	groups	since	he	first	took	office,	although	for	over	ten	years	he	had	only	the																																																									
27 Background information based on interviews with Elói Poltronieri (April 16, 2014) and 
Iolanda da Silva Silveira (May 19, 2014). 
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discretional	funding	and	small	staff	allotted	to	every	councilperson.	His	efforts	were	substantially	amplified	after	he	was	elected	vice-mayor	in	2004,	splitting	the	ticket	with	Aquiles	Susin	of	the	PMDB,	with	a	policy	agenda	that	marked	a	substantive	shift	to	the	left	for	the	city’s	dominant	party.	As	Mayor,	Aquiles	Susin	gave	Biazus	human,	political	and	economic	resources	to	expand	his	community	organizing	efforts,	which	eventually	became	a	project	focused	on	creating	a	city-wide	umbrella	group	to	bring	together	the	city’s	disperse	community	organizations	and	collectively	negotiate	with	the	local	government.			 Biazus,	along	with	the	PT	members	who	participated	in	the	campaign	and	administration,	strongly	pushed	for	the	introduction	of	participatory	budgeting	to	complement	and	strengthen	his	efforts,	As	a	compromise,	Susin	agreed	to	hold	occasional	meetings	outside	business	hours	and	in	the	neighborhoods	themselves	with	a	rotating	list	of	existing	neighborhood	associations.	All	from	the	community	could	attend	and	present	issues	and	needs	that	were	going	unaddressed	by	City	Hall,	which	could	include	the	presentation	of	proposals	that	would	help	resolve	these	issues,	although	any	further	action	that	would	be	taken	was	entirely	at	the	Mayor’s	discretion.	During	this	time	Susin	and	Biazus	also	presented	a	general	accounting	of	their	administration’s	accomplishments	and	goals,	explain	the	city’s	budgetary	situation	and	respond	to	any	question	that	those	in	attendance	may	have	related	to	local	government	issues.	This	program,	called	“Prefeito	nos	
Bairros	[Mayor	in	the	Neighborhoods]”,	would	even	have	met	the	five	basic	PB	criteria	if	the	meeting	cycle	took	place	according	to	a	fixed	schedule	that	was	somehow	linked	to	the	government’s	own	internal	schedule	for	preparation	of	the	budget.	While	participation	beat	expectations	the	first	year	and	increased	and	increased	the	following	year,	conflicts	within	the	governing	coalition	grew	and	came	to	overpower	Susin’s	agenda	and	monopolize	his	
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attention.	While	the	citywide	umbrella	group	would	become	a	reality	by	the	end	of	the	term,	the	Mayor’s	neighborhood	meetings	gradually	became	less	frequent	and	eventually	came	to	a	stop	by	his	final	year,	around	when	the	PT	withdrew	its	support	in	order	to	prepare	for	the	2008	election.		 When	elected	to	office,	Poltroneri	had	access	to	resources	that	one	could	easily	assume	would	have	facilitated	a	deeper,	multidimensional	model	of	participatory	budgeting.	Three	of	these	resources	would	prove	to	be	particularly	salient	in	steering	Poltronieri	towards	CPB.	First,	civil	society	was	already	well	into	a	process	of	development	in	which	the	PT	had	played	a	decisive	role.	This	meant	that	not	only	was	local	civil	society	capable	of	taking	on	responsibilities	for	mobilizing	participants	from	the	beginning,	but	also	that	they	would	be	particularly	inclined	to	help	a	PT	administration	given	the	strong	relationship	between	certain	party	members	and	community	leadership.	Second,	residents	had	already	gained	experience	in	presenting	projects	and	making	claims	on	public	resources	through	Susin’s	“Prefeito	nos	Bairros.”	As	the	PT	had	been	largely	responsible	for	administering	the	program,	party	activists	and	political	appointees	that	were	returning	to	City	Hall	with	Poltronieri	would	have	some	familiarity	with	community	interaction,	and	those	that	had	helped	directly	on	the	project	would	already	be	familiar	with	community	needs.	Third,	nearly	four	years	in	government	gave	party	elites	concrete	administrative	experience,	and	the	Susin	administration	had	important	lessons	learned	from	how	his	reformist	agenda	was	thwarted	by	intense	resistance	even	from	within	his	own	party.	In	addition	to	these	contextual	factors,	the	mayor	himself	campaigned	heavily	on	the	issue	of	addressing	deficiencies	in	local	urban	infrastructure.			 The	structure	of	Vacaria’s	participatory	budgeting	program,	first	introduced	in	in	
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2009	and	fully	in	place	for	2010,	remained	largely	unchanged	through	to	my	site	visits	in	2014.	The	city	was	grouped	into	ten	regions	(later	11),	and	one	assembly	is	held	in	each	region.	Detailed	accounts	are	given	as	to	the	status	of	demands	from	previous	years,	with	photos	as	documentary	evidence	and	frequently	the	Mayor	himself	providing	the	accountability	report.		On	paper,	participants	may	submit	demands	and	have	the	opportunity	to	speak	for	up	to	three	minutes	defending	their	proposal,	although	I	did	not	personally	see	this	take	place	in	any	of	the	three	assemblies	I	attended.	Each	person	in	attendance	then	votes	for	a	delegate	and	rank	orders	three	demands,	with	the	first	demand	counting	as	three	points,	the	second	as	two	points	and	the	third	as	one	point.	Delegates	are	assigned	proportionally	according	to	the	total	number	in	attendance,	and	any	community	organization	(neighborhood,	PTA,	social	club,	etc.)	with	at	least	ten	members	in	attendance	has	the	right	to	select	a	delegate	to	represent	that	group	in	addition	to	the	delegates	elected	by	the	assembly.	Just	like	Livramento,	the	demand	which	receives	the	most	votes	is	meant	to	be	obligatory	for	the	city	to	execute	the	following	year,	with	the	second	and	third	ranked	demands	remaining	contingent	on	available	funding.	The	round	of	assemblies	typically	takes	place	in	March	and	April,	and	the	delegates	are	only	called	to	meet	if	City	Hall	needs	further	clarification	about	the	details	of	a	demand	or	if	substantial	changes	must	be	made	in	order	for	a	demand	to	feasibly	be	executed.			 The	similarities	between	Livramento	and	Vacaria	end	when	looking	at	budgetary	planning	and	execution.	Although	the	demands	are	never	assembled	in	one	document	to	be	appended	to	the	annual	budget,	the	Mayor	gives	them	priority	and	grants	are	actively	sought	out	so	that	PB	demands	can	be	met.	I	was	able	to	largely	substantiate	the	
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administration’s	claim	to	have	completed	at	least	one	of	the	top	three	demands	every	year	for	almost	every	region.	Although	exact	total	amounts	were	missing	from	many	of	Vacaria’s	records,	when	considering	the	types	of	projects	that	were	executed	it	is	likely	that	the	total	amount	matched	if	not	surpassed	Erechim,	once	all	grants	are	taken	into	consideration.		Given	that	the	city	government	only	has	to	pay	around	10	to	20	percent	of	the	overall	cost	of	the	project	under	federal	initiatives	such	as	the	PAC,	this	essentially	acts	as	a	multiplier	on	the	PB	investment	resources	that	are	available	in	the	budget.			 Although	the	way	in	which	many	projects	were	funded	makes	it	difficult	to	parse	out	the	total	amount	spent	as	a	direct	result	of	PB,	annual	reports	shown	at	each	assembly	contain	a	history	of	previous	demands	and	their	status,	with	pictures	typically	accompanying	the	presentation	as	evidence.		At	least	one	of	the	three	demands	is	carried	out	for	each	region	for	most	of	the	years	on	record.	In	interviews	both	the	mayor	and	the	PB	coordinator	estimated	that	the	average	demand	cost	around	R$	500,000,	meaning	that	the	yearly	total	would	be	R$	5.5	million,	almost	the	same	as	Erechim	and	Farroupilha,	the	two	MPB	cases	discussed	thus	far.	What	sets	Vacaria	apart,	however,	is	that	the	only	thing	underpinning	the	demands	is	the	continued	engagement	of	the	mayor,	and	there	is	little	sign	of	any	evolution	towards	independence	or	the	institutionalized	recognition	and	processing	of	demands.	The	next	pair	of	cases	allows	us	to	see	exactly	what	the	implications	are	of	a	change	in	power	on	a	CPB	program	along	the	lines	of	Vacaria.		 From	the	perspective	of	institutional	design,	the	difference	between	Erechim	and	Vacaria	is	as	sharp	as	the	difference	between	Farroupilha	and	Santana	do	Livramento.	The	personnel	in	charge	of	Erechim’s	PB	program	creating	a	program	reflecting	their	understand	of	participation	as	something	which	involves	far	more	than	venues	for	public	
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deliberation.	Given	the	city’s	dearth	of	associational	traditions	and	groups,	they	invested	in	building	a	social	fabric	from	the	bottom	up,	leveraging	existing	organizations	when	possible.	Vacaria’s	PT	could	claim	a	good	portion	of	the	credit	for	putting	together	a	citywide	framework	under	which	neighborhood	associations	could	grow.	However,	as	that	process	was	reaching	completion	by	the	time	the	party	took	control	over	City	Hall,	PB’s	vocation	to	further	democratize	civil	society	(via	establishing	horizontal	relationship	between	groups,	training	new	leadership,	etc.)	instead	had	a	very	close	relationship	with	the	UMAVA,	from	which	both	PB	and	the	UMAVA	gained	their	legitimacy.	PB	ended	up	functioning	in	many	ways	to	consolidate	a	hierarchical	series	of	relationships	between	community	leaders	and	the	administration,	as	they	were	the	source	of	the	demands	that	were	put	up	to	a	vote	in	the	assemblies.	
Transition	Programs	-	São	Leopoldo	and	Cruz	Alta		 Our	final	pair	of	municipalities	includes	an	additional	layer	of	complexity,	with	changes	in	the	mayor	and	ruling	parties	since	PB	was	adopted.	In	both	Cruz	Alta	and	São	Leopoldo,	opposition	candidates	defeated	the	PT	after	eight	years	in	power.	While	I	will	cover	the	history	of	PB	in	the	two	cities,	the	primary	focus	is	the	set	of	decisions	made	by	the	incoming	administrations	that	inherited	PB	programs	in	which	they	chose	to	maintain	to	some	extent.	Although	the	set	of	options	available	to	each	mayor	constrained	by	the	design	by	the	program	that	was	already	in	place,	much	of	the	framework	that	has	been	used	for	newly	adopting	cities	can	also	help	us	understand	the	fate	of	participation	under	a	different	administration.	Because	these	cases	involve	two	separate	phases,	I	will	first	describe	and	discuss	PB	under	the	PT	for	both	and	then	move	towards	addressing	PB	under	the	new	leadership.		
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	 In	the	local	political	context,	both	Juliano	da	Silva	of	the	PMDB	in	Cruz	Alta	and	Aníbal	Moacir	da	Silva	of	the	PSDB	in	São	Leopoldo	(hereafter	referred	to	as	Juliano	and	Dr.	Moacir28)	were	the	standard-bearers	of	opposition	to	the	PT	that	overcame	past	rivalries	and	coalesced	around	a	single	candidate	in	the	2012	election.	Both	mayors	could	be	placed	on	the	center-right	of	the	ideological	spectrum	and	ran	campaigns	that	turned	the	2012	election	into	a	referendum	on	PT	rule.	Both	municipalities	had	substantial	fiscal	issues	that	barred	them	from	receiving	discretionary	transfers	from	the	federal	government	until	measures	were	taken	to	reduce	municipal	debt.	There	were,	therefore,	partisan,	pragmatic	and	ideological	justifications	for	simply	terminating	PB	when	they	took	office.	PB	was	highly	visible	under	both	PT	administrations	and	was,	and	one	would	expect	that	two	right-of-center	mayors	would	first	focus	on	cutting	expenditures	instead	of	taking	on	new	commitments.	In	the	end,	Dr.	Moacir	and	Juliano	were	able	to	convert	PB	into	something	that	worked	in	their	own	interest.	Juliano	da	Silva	put	neighborhood	association	leaders	in	charge	of	PB	who	aimed	to	restore	pre-PB	relationships	between	City	Hall	and	the	groups	that	they	represented.	Moacir	da	Silva	in	São	Leopoldo	saw	PB	as	a	possible	way	to	expand	his	party’s	small	voter	base	while	burnishing	his	credentials	as	a	pragmatic	moderate.		 Neither	of	these	two	mayors	had	expressed	a	strong	position	with	regards	to	PB	during	the	2012	campaign,	and	the	decisions	that	were	ultimately	made	came	gradually.	The	path	chosen	in	each	city	was	almost	entirely	determined	by	discussions	amongst	members	of	the	new	administration,	as	participants	from	previous	years	exerted	little	to	no	pressure	on	the	new	mayors	to	maintain	PB.	Both	took	control	of	cities	in	receivership	to																																																									
28 Here I am using the name by which each mayor refers to himself in campaigns or general 
public outreach in their role as politicians, the fact that an honorific exists for one is purely 
incidental. 
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the	federal	government,	unable	to	receive	discretionary	grants	and	transfers	until	progress	was	made	towards	paying	down	municipal	debt.	Each	led	a	center-right	coalition	that	campaigned	on	platforms	of	austerity	to	resolve	the	debt	situation,	meaning	that	funding	was	very	tight.	Expectations	surrounding	PB	had	been	sufficiently	deflated	by	the	financial	issues	of	the	preceding	years	and	there	seemed	to	have	been	no	meaningful	pressure	placed	on	either	mayor	to	maintain	PB	following	the	election.	The	substantial	differences	that	took	place	between	the	two	cities	came	from	two	main	sources:	the	institutional	legacy	of	the	PB	program	adopted	by	the	previous	administration	and	the	new	government’s	nature	of	political	support.				 Cruz	Alta	is	in	the	north	central	region	of	Rio	Grande	do	Sul,	roughly	in	the	middle	between	Santana	do	Livramento	and	the	Serra	where	Farroupilha,	Erechim	and	Vacaria	are	located.29	Four	years	prior	to	the	PT’s	victories	in	Erechim	and	Vacaria,	Vilson	Roberto	Bastos	dos	Santos	was	the	party’s	first	mayor	of	a	mid-sized	city	in	the	state	outside	of	the	Porto	Alegre	metropolitan	area.	The	local	political	climate	was	similar	to	the	previous	two	cities,	with	one	dominant	party	(in	this	case	the	PMDB)	in	power	for	most	of	the	previous	two	decades.		Civil	society,	particularly	neighborhood	groups,	had	been	active	since	the	1980s,	and	a	Neighborhood	Association	Union	(UAMCA)	had	been	in	place	dating	back	to	1988.	After	comfortably	winning	reelection	in	2008,	the	PT’s	coalition	fell	apart	and	the	dissenting	group	backed	the	PSB	in	2012.	While	the	left-wing	vote	was	split,	the	PMDB	and	PP	put	aside	past	grudges	and	formed	a	successful	campaign	with	Juliano	da	Silva	of	the	PMDB	for	mayor	and	a	PP	candidate	for	vice-mayor.																																																										
29 Background in this section on Cruz Alta based on interviews with PB Coordinator Jesmar 
Peixoto (March 26, 2014), former PB Coordinator Célio Piovesan (May 28, 2014), Mayor 
Juliano da Silva (May 28, 2014) and President of the PB Council Gilberto Miranda (May 29, 
2014). 
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	 The	original	format	of	PB	in	Cruz	Alta	revolved	around	a	yearly	cycle	that	included	regional	assemblies	open	to	the	public,	forums	of	delegates	at	the	regional	level	and	meetings	of	the	PB	Council	bringing	together	two	representatives	from	all	13	regions	in	the	city.	The	public	assemblies	voted	for	delegates	and	selected	the	policy	area	within	which	the	region’s	demands	would	fall,	but	it	was	up	to	the	delegates	to	sort	out	the	details	at	a	later	date.	Demands	were	submitted	at	the	meeting	and	then	analyzed	by	relevant	sectors	of	the	administration	to	check	for	each	project’s	viability.	The	delegates	would	then	meet	and	select	two	members	for	the	PB	Council	and	two	demands	that	fell	under	the	priority	area	were	voted	upon	at	the	assembly.	The	Council	then	held	meetings	with	members	of	the	administration	to	arrive	upon	a	final	investment	plan.	While	this	process	was	taking	place,	the	PB	Coordination	Office	would	put	together	seminars	for	the	councilors	and	delegates	with	different	topics	related	to	the	municipal	budgeting	process.		 While	participatory	budgeting	as	practiced	in	Cruz	Alta	may	have	been	engaging,	it	fell	short	in	terms	of	providing	for	empowerment	through	involvement	in	the	actual	decision-making	process	surrounding	the	budget.	Out	of	all	six	cities,	Cruz	Alta	under	Mayor	Santos	was	the	only	instance	where	the	participatory	cycle	made	claims	on	the	budget	during	the	following	year,	meaning	there	is	at	least	a	two	year	gap	between	the	proposal	of	demands	in	the	assemblies	and	their	execution.	Every	other	program	was	designed	to	influence	the	budget	passed	the	same	year,	covering	the	following	year’s	spending.	The	justification	for	this	arrangement	was	that	it	gave	city	officials	a	full	year	to	procure	additional	funding	sources	such	as	grants	that	could	be	applied	towards	the	demands.	In	practice,	this	meant	that	participation	remained	external	to	the	preparation	of	the	budget	rather	than	embedded.	The	gap	between	public	debate	and	action	made	
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accountability	more	difficult,	further	exacerbated	by	a	lack	of	objective	criteria	through	which	resources	were	distributed	across	the	regions.	Heavy	reliance	on	external	funding	added	an	additional	layer	of	uncertainty,	given	that	City	Hall	only	pursued	grants	after	first	committing	to	the	demands	that	needed	funding.		 By	the	last	half	of	Santos’	second	term,	PB	was	no	longer	accepting	new	demands,	and	efforts	instead	were	focused	on	creating	a	fair	waiting	list	system	that	prioritized	which	past	demands	would	be	addressed	first	when	funding	became	available.	PB	was	suspended	during	2011,	and	the	loss	of	public	confidence	in	the	administration	manifested	itself	in	nearly	empty	meeting	halls	when	2012’s	cycle	of	meetings	took	place.30	For	the	year	of	2012,	the	Cruz	Alta	municipal	government	reported	no	investment	spending	whatsoever,	following	the	suspension	of	the	city’s	eligibility	for	discretionary	transfers	or	grants	after	falling	in	arrears	with	the	federal	government.		 PB	was	introduced	in	São	Leopoldo	soon	after	the	PT	took	office	in	2005,	carrying	out	the	most	faithful	replica	of	Porto	Alegre	out	of	the	six	that	are	covered	in	this	chapter.	Coming	to	office	in	the	same	year	that	the	PT	lost	control	of	Porto	Alegre	for	the	first	time	since	1988,	the	PT	government	in	São	Leopoldo	benefitted	from	the	involvement	of	participatory	policy	experts	and	practitioners	that	had	prior	experience	with	the	program.	The	yearly	cycle	of	popular	debates	in	the	assemblies,	delegate	forums	and	the	PB	Council	aimed	to	submit	all	local	investment	expenditures	for	public	approval,	not	strictly	the	proposals	that	originated	in	the	public	assemblies.	A	separate	government	department	was	created	exclusively	to	house	PB,	and	a	team	of	facilitators	and	community	organizers	was																																																									
30 An alternative, primarily argued by individuals linked to the PT, is that low attendance was due 
to the weak electoral prospects for Santos’s successor, the only candidate who could credibly 
claim that PB was continue into the following term. 
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hired	to	stimulate	in	all	eight	regions	of	the	city.	Increased	citizen	control	over	government	resources	was	combined	with	a	substantial	and	rapid	increase	in	the	total	amount	spent	on	basic	infrastructure,	fueled	primarily	by	transfers	from	the	federal	government.	Receipts	from	capital	transfers	earmarked	for	specific	projects	were	budgeted	at	R$	156	million	for	2010	alone,	compared	to	R$	2.2	million	in	Cruz	Alta,	R$	3.6	million	in	Erechim	and	R$	8.5	million	in	Vacaria	that	same	year.31	However,	while	those	three	other	cities	collected	at	least	90%	of	the	total	projected	in	their	budget,	that	year	São	Leopoldo	received	R$	36	million,	or	one-fourth	what	they	had	estimated	in	that	year’s	budget.	Because	those	funds	were	all	earmarked,	this	shortfall	affected	projects	that	had	passed	the	planning	stage	and	been	approved	by	the	federal	government.			 The	inability	to	finance	ongoing	projects	paralyzed	São	Leopoldo’s	PB,	and	participants	in	the	last	three	years	of	Vanazzi’s	administration	were	told	to	focus	on	prioritizing	demands	that	were	left	over	from	previous	years	instead	of	proposing	new	projects.32	The	end	result	was	general	disillusionment	and	disengagement,	much	like	Cruz	Alta.	However,	while	Cruz	Alta’s	PB	had	unraveled	into	a	series	of	negotiations	between	the	PB	Council	and	City	Hall,	São	Leopoldo	never	broke	with	the	procedures	established	in	earlier	years.	When	leaving	office	at	the	end	of	2012,	the	outgoing	administration	even	prepared	a	professional	report	for	their	successors	that	explained	in	detail	how	the	process	was	conducted	and	listed	all	demands	from	previous	years	that	had	not	yet	been	completed,	including	summaries	of	any	progress	that	had	been	made.	
																																																								
31 Public spending figures from the Tribunal de Contas do Estado de Rio Grande do Sul. 
32 Background from interviews with Guilherme Maciel (May 9, 2014), Gilberto de Camargo 
(May 18, 2014), Antonio Carlos do Amaral (November 25, 2014). 
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	 As	it	pertains	to	our	study	of	the	trajectory	of	PB	under	new	leadership,	suffice	to	say	that	by	the	2012	election	the	local	PB	had	few	supporters	in	either	city	and	was	discredited	in	the	eyes	of	many,	if	not	most,	residents.	This	created	a	context	similar	to	that	faced	by	the	other	four	PB	implementing	administrations	–	public	demand	for	PB	did	not	play	a	significant	role	in	shaping	the	decisions	ultimately	made	by	the	administration.	Given	that	either	mayor	could	have	eliminated	the	program	without	suffering	any	consequences	from	voters	or	political	allies,	they	also	had	few	constraints	on	how	they	could	modify	the	program	to	better	fit	their	interests.			 After	the	defeat	of	each	mayor’s	designated	successor	in	the	2012	election,	the	incoming	administrations	each	saw	an	opportunity	in	maintaining	PB	in	some	form.	In	Cruz	Alta,	the	PT’s	loss	returned	City	Hall	to	the	familiar	hands	of	the	PMDB,	and	the	party’s	allies	in	the	neighborhood	association	movement	pushed	largely	for	a	restoration	of	the	role	of	association	leadership	as	intermediaries	between	the	government	and	community	residents.	Dr.	Moa	and	the	PSDB	in	São	Leopoldo,	on	the	other	hand,	believed	that	putting	a	more	technocratic	touch	on	the	city’s	once-popular	but	discredited	program	would	build	up	an	image	of	the	administration	as	competent	and	ideologically	pragmatic.		 Existing	civic	associations	were	comparatively	strong	in	Cruz	Alta,	and	only	Farroupilha	had	a	stronger	centralized	organization	that	pooled	together	the	efforts	of	neighborhood	groups.	The	Cruz	Alta	Union	of	Neighborhood	Associations,	or	UAMCA	(União	de	Associações	de	Moradores	de	Cruz	Alta)	was	established	in	1988.	One	of	the	main	goals	from	the	very	beginning	was	to	pressure	on	City	Hall	so	invest	in	small-scale	neighborhood	improvement	projects.	Participating	organizations	would	put	together	a	list	of	requests	from	association	presidents	with	one	or	two	projects	from	each	neighborhood	
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and	meet	with	the	mayor	annually	to	convince	him	to	incorporate	as	many	items	as	possible	in	the	budget	for	the	following	year.	When	PB	was	first	introduced,	the	administration	encouraged	community	leaders	to	participate,	but	their	status	in	existing	associations	granted	them	no	additional	authority	within	PB	itself.	The	standing	of	leaders	within	their	own	communities	was	diminished,	as	they	no	longer	served	as	the	primary	link	between	city	residents	and	local	government	officials.	PB	also	fostered	the	rise	of	leaders	whose	civic	engagement	first	began	as	a	representative	for	their	region	in	the	Forum	of	Delegates	or	on	the	PB	Council.			 Although	the	political	allegiances	of	association	presidents	in	Cruz	Alta	were	spread	across	multiple	parties,	the	PMDB	had	a	solid	base	of	support	within	the	community	movement.	Among	the	party’s	supporters	was	Jesmar	Peixoto,	one	of	the	founding	members	of	the	UAMCA	who	had	been	president	of	the	organization	for	the	PT’s	first	term	in	office.	While	a	vocal	critic	of	certain	aspects	of	the	way	PB	was	managed,	he	nonetheless	was	an	active	participant,	serving	on	the	PB	Council.	He	proposed	two	major	reforms	that	aligned	with	the	administration’s	broader	political	strategy	–	restrict	demands	to	projects	that	could	be	completed	the	following	year	using	exclusively	own-source	revenue,	and	grant	association	leaders	and	UAMCA	a	formal	and	central	role	at	all	stages	of	the	annual	cycle.	UAMCA	held	elections	for	its	Executive	Council	at	the	beginning	of	2013,	and	a	list	of	candidates	affiliated	with	the	PMDB	defeated	incumbents	who	were	sympathetic	to	the	PT.	The	new	UAMCA	President,	Volmar	Camargo,	was	promptly	hired	to	work	for	the	PB	Office,	and	he	was	given	the	necessary	infrastructure	to	run	UMACA	directly	from	City	Hall.		 PB	took	place	in	2013	with	the	same	basic	structure	as	in	previous	years,	albeit	with	heavy	restrictions	on	what	could	be	presented	as	a	demand.	Participants	still	voted	on	
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delegates	and	the	policy	area	for	the	demands,	although	it	was	made	clear	that	only	road	pavement	was	feasible	given	the	city’s	fiscal	situation.	Each	association	president	was	designated	a	“born	delegate”	(delegado	nato),	and	in	many	regions	they	outnumbered	the	delegates	elected	at	the	assembly	itself.	Each	Forum	of	Delegates	could	select	a	small	number	of	blocks	to	be	paved	by	the	end	of	the	following	year.	The	PB	Council’s	role	was	limited	to	planning	for	the	following	year,	and	the	composition	of	the	Council	was	almost	exclusively	association	presidents.			 The	repeated	promises	of	a	100%	completion	rate	by	the	end	of	the	following	year	loomed	heavily	over	PB	in	2014,	and	it	became	increasingly	clear	that	this	goal	would	not	be	met	when	the	delegates	and	the	PB	Council	met	in	the	second	half	of	the	year.	The	assemblies	had	higher	participation	than	the	previous	year,	but	as	those	were	taking	place	Peixoto	and	Camargo	were	shut	out	of	important	government	meetings	and	were	unable	to	get	a	meeting	with	the	Mayor	to	find	out	the	reason	behind	the	delays.			 Further,	in	a	reform	of	the	city’s	administrative	structure	carried	out	in	2013,	PB	was	moved	from	the	Mayor’s	Cabinet	to	a	department	responsible	for	political	coordination	within	the	administration,	a	move	similar	to	what	Romão	(2014)	found	to	be	indicative	of	a	new	government	strategy	under	which	PB	plays	a	less	important	role	than	before.	Unfortunately,	in	this	case	the	PB	office	was	moved	from	near	the	main	plaza	to	a	partially	abandoned	railway	station	on	the	edge	of	downtown	that	had	neither	telephone	nor	Internet	access.			 After	the	delegates	met,	decided	upon	a	list	of	blocks	to	be	paved	and	elected	the	PB	Council,	Mayor	Juliano	finally	agreed	to	meet	with	past	and	present	council	members	to	clarify	the	status	of	the	previous	year’s	demands	and	what	would	be	in	store	for	the	
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following	year.	The	day	the	meeting	was	scheduled,	the	Mayor	announced	he	would	be	unable	to	make	it,	and	the	vice-mayor	would	attend	in	his	place.	Despite	attempts	to	stick	to	a	meeting	agenda	that	was	focused	on	plans	for	the	following	year,	the	meeting	degenerated	into	a	shouting	match	between	members	of	the	council	and	the	vice-mayor,	who	was	personally	unaware	of	any	details	that	could	clarify	why	last	year’s	demands	were	delayed	nor	whether	or	not	they	would	ever	be	concluded.	Although	PB	was	not	formally	cancelled,	it	became	clear	that	the	administration	was	dropping	the	pretense	that	it	would	carry	out	the	projects	indicated	by	participants.		 São	Leopoldo’s	new	mayor,	Dr.	Moacir,	won	as	an	outsider	against	the	PT	“establishment”,	whose	Brazilian	Social	Democrat	Party	(PSDB)	has	been	the	PT’s	primary	rival	on	the	national	stage	since	Fernando	Henrique	Cardoso	defeated	Lula	in	the	first	round	of	the	1994	presidential	election.	Within	Rio	Grande	do	Sul,	the	PT	were	outspoken	opponents	of	the	PSDB’s	Yeda	Crusius,	state	governor	from	2007-2010,	who	focused	on	reducing	the	state	deficit	and	was	defeat	in	2010	by	the	PT’s	Tarso	Genro.	Despite	its	prominent	role	on	the	state	and	national	level,	the	party	had	minimal	presence	in	the	Porto	Alegre	metropolitan	area,	electing	only	one	mayor	between	1988	and	2012	out	of	over	a	dozen	municipalities.	While	Cruz	Alta’s	2012	election	brought	about	the	return	of	a	historically	dominant	party	with	roots	in	local	civil	society,	the	PSDB’s	was	more	of	a	vote	for	change	and	a	rejection	of	the	status	quo.	After	winning	only	22%	of	the	vote	as	the	only	opposition	candidate	in	2008,	Dr.	Moacir	won	with	an	absolute	majority	in	a	three-person	race	in	2012.	Aware	that	at	least	part	of	his	support	was	a	rejection	of	the	PT	rather	than	an	approval	of	him	or	his	platform,	Moacir	da	Silva	wanted	to	expand	his	voting	base	before	the	2018	in	which	a	viable	centrist	candidate	could	easily	become	a	contender.	Just	two	
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years	earlier,	the	PT’s	candidate	for	President	and	Governor	won	the	city	in	the	first	round	with	52%	and	63%,	respectively,	while	the	PSDB’s	candidates	for	the	two	positions	received	only	32%	for	president	and	13%	for	governor.	A	government	based	on	austerity	alone	without	any	appeal	to	social	issues	would	likely	alienate	the	set	of	voters	that	may	have	voted	for	the	PT	at	other	levels	or	for	the	PT	in	previous	local	elections	but	supported	him	in	2012.			 An	important	piece	in	determining	PB’s	ultimate	fate	in	São	Leopoldo	was	that	the	program	existed	as	an	independent	government	department,	already	funded	in	the	2013	budget	passed	when	the	PT	was	still	in	office.	To	run	the	department,	Dr.	Moacir	selected	Gilberto	de	Camargo,	a	PSDB	candidate	for	City	Council	who	also	had	participated	in	PB	for	most	of	the	time	it	was	active.	The	2013	PB	round	was	cancelled	under	the	pretense	that	his	administration	first	wanted	to	address	the	existing	backlog	of	demands	from	previous	years,	some	of	which	dated	back	to	2007.	During	this	time,	the	mayor	tasked	the	department	with	combing	through	archives	of	left	over	demands	and	identifying	ones	that	would	require	the	least	amount	of	effort	and	resources	to	carry	out,	a	task	which	was	helped	by	the	previous	administration’s	reports	handed	over	as	a	part	of	the	transition.	Throughout	the	year	the	Mayor	presided	over	various	inaugurations	while	repeating	a	general	commitment	to	resuming	the	program	the	following	year.	Camargo	and	his	main	assistant,	Executive	Director	Guilherme	Maciel,	reviewed	different	PB	programs	around	the	country	that	had	a	modernizing	touch	that	would	both	mark	an	improvement	from	existing	practices	while	also	fitting	more	coherently	within	the	current	administration’s	program	of	government.	As	the	year	came	to	an	end	and	the	future	of	the	department	faced	potential	
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extinction	under	the	follow	year’s	budget,	Camargo	and	Maciel	pitched	a	new	format	to	the	mayor	that	ultimately	won	his	approval.		 The	new	institutional	structure	had	elements	of	technocratic	flair	but	preserved	much	of	the	original	framework	put	into	place	by	the	previous	mayor,	including	the	layers	of	representation	and	the	timing	and	sequencing	of	meetings	across	the	different	phases	of	the	annual	cycle.	Significant	changes	included	setting	a	fixed	budget	amount	at	the	beginning	of	the	cycle,	using	the	popular	vote	at	the	assemblies	to	distribute	funding	between	spending	categories	and	the	use	of	online	voting	to	make	the	final	decision	on	the	list	of	demands	approved	for	each	region.	The	distribution	of	funds	according	to	the	assemblies	would	help	in	planning	for	the	budget,	because	at	that	point	each	government	department	would	know	exactly	how	much	they	would	need	to	spend	on	PB	even	before	the	demands	themselves	were	chosen.	The	online	vote	would	allow	citizens	to	vote	on	as	many	projects	as	they	wanted	until	they	reached	the	region’s	limit	for	each	policy	area,	serving	a	didactic	purpose	to	teach	residents	about	the	true	cost	of	public	works	projects.	Setting	an	overall	total	at	the	start	of	the	year	would	help	avoid	the	situation	of	the	PB	council	approved	an	investment	plan	that	would	greater	than	the	city’s	investment	capacity.		 In	sharp	contrast	to	Cruz	Alta,	São	Leopoldo’s	PB	department	was	given	substantial	institutional	support	for	the	2014	PB	re-launch.	They	had	a	full-time	staff	of	at	least	one	coordinator	per	region	plus	interns	and	free	use	of	city	vehicles	whenever	necessary.	The	mayor	himself	frequently	opened	the	regional	assemblies	and	spoke	candidly	about	slowly	coming	around	to	see	PB	as	worth	his	administration’s	time	and	effort.	The	department	was	moved	from	an	annex	of	the	Public	Works	depot	to	the	main	administrative	building	and	residents	were	encouraged	to	visit	and	use	the	department	as	a	point	of	contact	for	
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neighborhood	issues,	even	if	they	fell	outside	the	scope	of	PB	itself.	Having	had	time	to	prepare	while	the	program	was	suspended,	the	PB	team	was	reasonably	well	equipped	to	carry	out	the	assemblies,	despite	the	fact	that	few	of	them	had	prior	experience	in	community	mobilization.	To	remove	any	doubts	that	online	voting	would	bias	participation	towards	wealthier	residents	with	Internet	access	at	home	or	work,	mobile	voting	stations	were	set	up	around	the	city	across	two	weeks.			 By	placing	the	final	decision	on	the	demands	shifting	from	the	PB	Council	to	the	greater	public,	there	was	a	possibility	that	this	body	would	lose	relevance	and	no	longer	function	as	a	meaningful	space	of	dialogue	between	City	Hall	and	neighborhood	leaders.	However,	since	a	substantial	part	of	the	new	administration’s	political	interest	was	in	fostering	the	growth	of	new	community	leadership,	every	effort	was	made	to	make	the	Councilors	feel	valued	and	give	them	de	facto	control	over	the	projects	that	would	be	approved	for	their	regions.	After	the	Council	was	elected,	weekly	meetings	took	place	for	the	two	months	period	leading	up	to	the	citywide	vote	in	which	each	department	head,	one	by	one,	would	come	and	talk	to	the	Council	about	their	decisions	about	the	viability	of	proposed	demands	and	answer	more	general	questions	about	their	plans	while	in	office.	Quite	frequently,	the	time	would	be	used	by	the	councilors	to	raise	issues	not	necessarily	related	to	the	PB	demands	up	for	review,	and	the	government	official	would	set	meetings	and	make	promises	to	look	into	broader	community	needs	that	did	not	fit	within	PB’s	scope.	The	Council	was	also	given	full	control	over	the	configuration	of	how	the	demands	would	be	offered	on	the	ballot.	This	was	strategically	important	because	any	set	of	projects	within	a	policy	area	could	be	bundled	together	to	equal	the	exact	amount	available	for	the	region.	
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Vaguely	written	demands	could	be	interpreted	a	number	of	ways,	and	the	PB	department	deferred	to	the	regional	councilors	whenever	clarifications	were	necessary.		 Only	one	councilor	in	2014	had	served	before	on	the	PB	Council,	and	active	participants	in	past	years	appeared	to	have	withdrawn	entirely	rather	than	attempt	to	work	with	the	new	mayor,	unlike	what	took	place	in	Cruz	Alta.	There	was	also	no	alternative	channel	through	which	residents	could	dialogue	with	the	local	government,	and	the	PSDB	had	no	regular	point	of	contact	with	the	relatively	poorer	communities	that	traditionally	participate	in	PB.	While	communities	were	in	need	of	interlocutors	willing	to	dialogue	with	the	new	administration,	council	members	were	given	exceptional	access	to	the	Mayor’s	Cabinet.	These	potential	neighborhood	leaders	would	owe	their	legitimacy	to	Dr.	Moacir’s	administration	rather	than	the	earlier	community	building	efforts	of	the	PT.		 Regardless	of	the	agenda	behind	the	decision	to	maintain	PB,	many	of	the	non-material	benefits	of	participation	seemed	apparent	as	the	new	format	was	implemented	in	2014.	A	channel	of	dialogue	was	maintained	between	City	Hall	and	communities	that	otherwise	would	not	have	existed.	New	community	leadership	was	encouraged	to	grow	within	an	environment	where	they	could	debate	amongst	themselves	and	with	members	of	the	government	about	matters	relevant	to	their	community.	The	meetings	of	the	PB	Council	were	marked	both	by	moments	of	tension	between	groups	and	moments	of	cooperation	following	discursive	appeals	between	citizens.	Government	officials	in	charge	of	the	departments	that	are	most	relevant	to	the	average	resident	had	to	process	citizen	demands	and	then	justify	their	decisions	to	members	of	the	community	whose	legitimacy	as	representatives	was	recognized	both	by	the	local	government	and	by	the	region	of	their	origin.	
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	 Broadly	speaking,	both	São	Leopoldo	and	Cruz	Alta	maintained	the	same	overall	structure	for	PB,	as	either	CPB	(Cruz	Alta)	or	MPB	(São	Leopoldo),	despite	the	change	in	government.	While	no	political	pressure	existed	that	obliged	them	to	do	so,	the	institutional	framework	left	behind	presented	both	new	mayors	with	possible	benefits	that	required	minimal	effort	to	maintain.	In	each	city,	the	fact	that	members	of	the	opposition	had	chosen	to	participate	in	PB	while	the	PT	was	in	power	was	important	in	setting	the	groundwork	for	this	transition	to	take	place,	as	both	Dr.	Moacir	and	Juliano	could	personally	confide	in	PB	Coordinators	who	also	had	legitimacy	amongst	participants.			 However,	the	decision	to	maintain	PB	was	also	a	reflection	of	how	the	opportunities	provided	by	the	previous	administration’s	program	fit	within	the	new	government’s	agenda.	The	PMDB’s	desire	to	reward	old	allies	in	the	community	movement	in	Cruz	Alta	would	have	had	little	use	for	a	program	that	involved	a	more	extensive	commitment	to	a	pro-participatory,	reform	agenda	and	a	more	superficial	structure	that	relied	upon	relationships	with	community	leaders	would	have	held	little	appeal	to	the	more	technocratic	PSDB	in	São	Leopoldo.	Without	a	match	between	the	new	ruling	party's	priorities	and	the	possibilities	represented	by	the	PB	program	that	had	been	in	place,	it	is	unlikely	in	either	city	that	participatory	budgeting	would	have	continued	under	new	leadership.	
Discussion		 At	first	glance,	there	would	appear	to	be	little	in	common	between	Farroupilha,	Erechim	and	São	Leopoldo.	Led	by	mayors	from	three	distinct	political	parties,	local	civic	practices	ranged	from	clientelism	in	Farroupilha	to	church-based,	apolitical	communities	in	Erechim.	However,	in	all	three	cities	the	adoption	of	a	more	complex	and	institutionalized	
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PB	format	was	the	only	way	the	administration	would	be	able	to	meet	its	own	goals	with	regards	to	public	participation.	Without	the	blessing	and	support	of	a	PT	mayor,	PB	in	Farroupilha	and	São	Leopoldo	needed	to	convince	both	participants	and	other	government	officials	of	the	legitimacy	of	PB	as	a	worthwhile	change	to	existing	decision-making	practices.	Without	a	reliable,	existing	civil	society	partner,	the	program’s	structure	needs	to	encourage	to	form	new	groups	whose	access	to	public	goods	is	not	contingent	on	clientelist	ties	to	politicians.		 Comparatively	speaking,	more	commonalities	exist	between	Santana	do	Livramento,	Vacaria	and	Cruz	Alta.	The	mayor	who	first	implemented	PB	was	a	PT	member	in	all	three	cases,	civil	society	groups	were	easily	co-opted	and	internal	support	for	PB	support	was	never	seriously	questioned.	Significant	differences	do	begin	to	appear	when	looking	at	where	PB	fit	amongst	the	policy	goals	of	each	mayor	and	the	strategy	chosen	so	that	PB	could	help	achieve	those	goals.	Santana	do	Livramento	and	Cruz	Alta	under	the	PMDB	both	used	PB	as	a	tool	to	strengthen	ties	to	neighborhood	associations.		The	continued	existence	of	PB	itself	was	less	important	than	signaling	a	commitment	to	listen	to	community	leaders	more	than	had	been	the	case	under	previous	mayors.		Vacaria,	and	Cruz	Alta	under	the	PT	to	a	lesser	extent,	were	most	concerned	with	public	investment	projects,	and	they	used	PB	in	such	a	way	that	it	enhanced	the	legitimacy	of	decisions	made	towards	predetermined	policy	goals	that	were	dependent	on	external	funding	sources.	While	this	led	to	a	reasonably	impressive	list	of	projects	carried	out	in	Vacaria,	the	mayor	would	have	likely	invested	the	same	amount	even	in	the	absence	of	PB,	and,	therefore,	it	would	be	inaccurate	to	say	that	participation	itself	influenced	the	government’s	behavior.	
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	 The	six	cases	presented	in	this	chapter	show	that	decisions	as	to	how	a	participatory	program	should	function	are	the	product	of	a	strategic	logic	that	is	distinct	from	that	which	guides	the	decision	as	to	whether	or	not	a	participatory	program	should	be	adopted.	When	influential	political	actors	who	are	neutral	or	lukewarm	towards	the	idea	of	opening	up	spaces	for	the	public	that	implies	some	surrender	of	their	own	authority,	policymakers	who	themselves	are	invested	in	seeing	PB	succeed	have	an	incentive	to	carefully	consider	the	appeal	of	their	proposed	program	and	make	its	appeal	transcend	partisan	and	ideological	boundaries.	A	recalcitrant	old	guard	of	community	leaders	that	reject	any	efforts	to	reform	clientelist	practices	makes	a	clean	break	of	these	ties	necessary	for	PB	to	be	put	into	action,	but	it	may	be	expedient	to	overlook	the	shortcomings	of	community	leadership	if	their	support	is	easy	to	obtain.	Self-interest	can	overcome	ideological	and	partisan	barriers,	leading	to	the	continuation	of	a	participatory	process	linked	to	the	budget	with	the	potential	to	create	new	community	leadership.		 	
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CHAPTER	6	-	CONCLUSION	For	decades,	advocates	of	participatory	democracy	have	argued	that	a	solution	to	the	increasing	disillusionment	with	representative	democracy	found	among	citizens	of	emerging	and	established	democracies	alike	lies	in	extending	public	engagement	deep	into	the	heart	of	the	government	decision-making	processes.	The	creation	of	these	new	spaces	for	public	participation	is	susceptible	to	elite	capture	and	participation	bias,	meaning	that	the	decisions	reached	within	these	institutions	will	not	be	representative	of	societal	preferences	as	a	whole.	The	Participatory	Budgeting	strategy	offers	a	solution	to	this	dilemma	by	engaging	a	wider	set	of	citizens	through	its	explicit	focus	on	marginalized	segments	of	society	and	the	provision	of	basic	goods	and	services	the	are	particularly	lacking	among	these	same	sectors	of	society.	As	a	timely	policy	innovation	that	offered	a	potential	solution	to	multiple,	overlapping	problems	of	participation,	public	goods	provision,	and	improved	governance,	Participatory	Budgeting	moved	quickly	from	a	strategy	deployed	in	a	small	group	of	Brazilian	cities	to	one	now	found	on	the	global	stage,	winning	recognition	from	the	World	Bank,	the	United	Nations,	and	the	international	academic	community	as	an	innovative	and	effective	program	in	the	fight	against	poverty,	as	well	as	in	efforts	to	strengthen	democracy.	As	PB	gained	more	and	more	devotees	abroad,	it	continued	a	domestic	expansion	that	was	nearly	as	dramatic.	In	the	span	of	a	decade,	it	went	from	a	small	number	of	state	capitals	in	the	south	and	southeast	of	Brazil	to	becoming	common	in	medium-	and	large	cities	across	the	country.		Globally,	it	was	recognized	as	a	‘best	practice’	by	UN-HABITAT	and	became	a	common	component	of	World	Bank	aid	packages	across	the	globe.	However,	a	byproduct	of	the	program’s	wide	diffusion	is	that,	as	a	label,	‘Participatory	Budgeting’	became	diluted,	
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and	in	the	process	less	useful	as	an	analytical	category	of	development	strategy.	The	appeal	of	the	program	was	strong	enough	that	its	name	became	a	costless	signaling	tool	through	which	mediocre	local	government	leadership	could	attempt	to	establish	some	degree	of	legitimacy.	Given	this	variation	in	usage,	the	label	cannot	reliably	serve	as	an	indicator	of	much	significance	with	regards	to	what	takes	places	under	the	inclusive	banner	of	PB.	From	a	methodological	perspective,	one	contribution	of	this	research	concerns	the	need	for	clear	concept	formation	and	theoretically	informed	measurement	strategies	in	the	study	of	policies,	programs	or	initiatives	that	have	certain	theoretical	expectations	attached	to	them.	In	the	case	of	the	proliferation	of	PB-style	programs	over	the	past	twenty	years,	one	stumbling	block	to	a	full	assessment	of	the	theory	behind	the	approach	has	been	that	not	all	PB	programs	are	created	equally.	Creating	a	more	nuanced	measure	of	this	approach	that	allows	for	distinctions	to	be	made	between,	for	example,	a	bare-bones	PB	program	and	one	that	grants	a	viable	place	at	the	policymaking	table	for	citizens	allows	for	the	identification	of	the	specific	institutional	features	that	facilitate	the	translation	of	public	participation	into	meaningful	changes	in	the	political	decision-making	process.	To	explain	PB’s	success	in	shifting	public	policy	towards	increased	spending	on	the	urban	poor,	this	dissertation	has	highlighted	the	importance	of	internal	rules	aimed	at	ensuring	fair	and	effective	participation	as	well	as	administrative	reforms	linking	public	debate	to	existing	budgetary	decision-making	procedures	within	the	executive	branch.	Comparisons	with	participatory	reforms	that	feature	a	narrower	focus	on	the	communicative	dimension	of	participation	demonstrate	that	public	debate	alone	is	insufficient	to	independently	change	government	spending	decisions,	a	finding	with	implications	for	the	broader	family	of	institutions	inspired	by	participatory	democratic	theory.		
		182	
	 My	findings	show	that	participatory	budgeting,	when	implemented	along	with	internal	administrative	reforms	and	using	a	rules	structure	that	supports	the	inclusion	of	new	groups,	can	lead	to	increases	in	resources	dedicated	to	public	investments	by	local	governments,	measured	both	as	shares	of	the	budget	and	as	total	levels	of	spending.	This	increased	spending	is	particularly	focused	on	housing	and	urban	infrastructure,	a	reflection	of	PB’s	use	of	residential	neighborhoods	as	the	basis	upon	which	participation	is	organized.	The	effect	of	a	PB	program	at	first	grows	with	each	additional	year	the	program	is	in	place	until	it	stabilizes	roughly	ten	years	following	adoption.	This	trend	suggests	that	PB	succeeds	in	bringing	spending	closer	in	line	to	the	preferences	of	previously	marginalized	groups	in	politics,	as	a	new	equilibrium	factoring	in	citizen	input	is	reached	after	an	initial	adjustment	period.		Importantly,	these	additional	fiscal	resources	are	translated	into	increases	in	the	provision	of	basic	public	goods	related	to	urban	infrastructure	in	the	municipalities	that	adopt	certain	types	of	participatory	budgeting.	This	shows	that	PB	can	succeed	in	its	stated	aim	to	“invert	priorities”	in	public	investment,	which	traditionally	have	steered	cities	into	providing	well-developed	infrastructure	for	the	wealthy	while	investing	relatively	little	in	the	urban	periphery.	This	shift	in	the	focus	of	local	infrastructure	spending,	extending	access	to	fundamentals	such	as	clean	water	and	sewage	treatment,	can	be	seen	as	part	of	the	extension	of	citizenship	to	communities	that	had	thus	far	failed	to	materially	benefit	from	the	country’s	economic	development.	
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Summary	This	dissertation	began	by	examining	the	increasing	disconnect	between	participatory	budgeting	as	it	was	initially	designed	as	a	complementary	set	of	reforms	and	what	actually	takes	place	on	the	ground.		As	the	policy	has	spread	worldwide,	there	has	been	a	tendency	to	reduce	it	to	a	series	of	public	assemblies	where	citizens	can	voice	their	opinion	about	how	the	local	budget	should	be	spent,	ignoring	equally	important	innovations	that	ensured	that	PB	would	shift	spending	towards	traditionally	marginalized	communities,	a	central	part	of	the	program’s	appeal	to	the	international	academic	and	development	aid	communities.	Thus	far,	quantitative	research	on	participatory	budgeting	has	identified	cases	using	a	set	of	criteria	that	reflect	this	general	tendency	that	treats	open	pubic	assemblies	to	discuss	the	budget	as	PB’s	only	essential	characteristic.	As	a	result,	a	significant	range	of	institutional	practices	are	treated	the	same	in	terms	of	their	ability	to	modify	government	behavior.	I	have	argued,	and	offered	evidence	for,	the	need	to	incorporate	additional	characteristics	present	in	early	PB	experiences	into	our	current-day	assessments	of	the	strategy’s	fiscal	and	development	impact.	These	characteristics	include	the	concurrent	introduction	of	administrative	reforms	and	the	proactive	mobilization	of	previously	unengaged	citizens.		In	order	to	push	research	in	this	direction,	I	introduced	five	additional	criteria	with	which	PB	cases	can	be	objectively	and	more	accurately	categorized.	This	led	to	the	creation	of	two	categories	of	PB:	consultative	participatory	budgeting	(CPB)	that	met	only	the	original	criteria	put	forth	by	Sintomer	et	al.	(2014),	and	multidimensional	participatory	budgeting	(MPB)	that	more	closely	approximates	the	original	design	of	the	PB	approach.	These	criteria	were	then	applied	to	an	existing	data	set,	covering	the	560	Brazilian	
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municipalities	with	a	population	greater	than	50,000,	using	public	records,	academic	research	and	news	media	to	cover	the	entire	period	from	PB’s	debut	in	1989	through	to	2014.	The	results	indicated	that	the	share	of	‘PB’	programs	qualifying	only	as	CPB	has	been	increasing	over	time,	while	the	number	of	multidimensional	PB	programs	is	on	the	decline.	Chapter	3	explored	the	effects	of	PB	on	local	government	expenditure	patterns,	both	on	the	current	versus	capital	dimension	as	well	as	across	different	areas	of	public	policy.	While	similar	studies	exist,	I	was	able	to	introduce	my	own	measure	of	PB	and	establish	whether	or	not	the	additional	criteria	I	employ	have	an	impact	on	PB’s	ability	to	bring	about	change	in	government	behavior.	The	results	confirmed	my	hypothesis	that	PB’s	effect	on	the	budget	was	confined	to	cases	of	MPB.	This	effect	was	present	for	capital	expenditures	and	spending	on	policies	in	the	areas	of	infrastructure	and	housing.	Contrary	to	expectations,	it	was	CPB	and	not	MPB	that	presented	a	positive	effect	on	the	revenue	side	of	the	budget.	Chapter	4	considered	whether	or	not	the	changes	in	spending	patterns	identified	in	Chapter	3	led	to	improvements	in	the	well-being	of	local	residents	by	looking	at	indicators	related	to	the	local	availability	of	basic	urban	infrastructure	and	adequate	housing.	MPB	was	associated	with	an	accelerated	expansion	in	the	proportion	of	residents	with	access	to	sewage	and	adequate	housing.	While	MPB	was	the	primary	phenomenon	of	interest,	one	model	specification	restricted	the	sample	to	only	cities	that	had	once	implemented	either	CPB	or	MPB,	to	address	the	potential	of	endogeneity	in	program	adoption,	and	in	this	direct	comparison	between	the	two	institutional	types	the	magnitude	and	significance	of	MPB’s	effects	was	nearly	the	same.	
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In	Chapter	5,	qualitative	research	methods	were	used	in	a	comparative	case	study	of	six	Brazilian	municipalities	in	order	to	better	understand	the	process	through	which	PB’s	institutional	format	is	determined.	Looking	at	pairs	of	small	cities	matched	at	different	time	points	since	program	adoption,	early	decisions	conditioned	by	local	contextual	factors	set	each	program	down	a	path	towards	becoming	either	CPB	or	MPB,	surviving	as	either	one	or	the	other	even	after	those	who	introduced	the	program	were	defeated	and	replaced	by	a	mayor	from	an	opposition	party.	While	the	decision	to	adopt	PB	is	mainly	a	product	of	the	mayor’s	own	policy	preferences,	the	presence	of	wider	reforms	to	accompany	PB’s	public	assemblies	is	as	much	a	pragmatic	solution	to	overcome	initial	obstacles	faced	when	introducing	the	program	than	a	reflection	of	a	overall	agenda	favorable	to	participation.	
Implications	and	Future	Research		 The	future	of	research	on	participatory	budgeting	critically	depends	on	overcoming	the	weakness	of	the	label	itself	in	identifying	the	actual	underlying	phenomena	of	interest.	The	strategy	used	in	this	dissertation	–	creating	a	more	conceptually	complete	and	nuanced	measurement	strategy	that	also	allowed	for	analysis	of	hundreds	of	observations	using	a	combination	of	data	sources	–	may	be	difficult	beyond	the	subnational	setting	but	the	more	general	approach	that	leads	us	away	from	a	dichotomous	understanding	of	the	world’s	many	Participatory	Budgeting	programs	can	still	be	applied.	In	doing	so,	we	will	further	enhance	our	understanding	of	the	value	each	of	the	specific	mechanisms	embedded	in	the	theory	that	underlies	the	PB	strategy	may	have	on	local	government	spending	and	development	patterns.	The	fact	that	PB’s	communicative	dimension	was	insufficient	on	its	own	to	change	government	behavior	indicates	the	need	to	examine	the	extent	to	which	the	
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broader	participatory	reforms	seen	in	Porto	Alegre	have	been	translated	to	other	subnational	and	national	contexts.	My	expectation	is	that	only	a	small	fraction	of	the	up	to	2,778	programs	worldwide	identified	as	PB	by	Sintomer	et	al.	(2013;	2014)	bear	more	than	a	slight	resemblance	to	the	transformative	local	project	envisioned	by	PB’s	creators.	Is	it	reasonable	to	expect	that	civil	society	and	local	politicians	will	act	similarly	if,	instead	of	being	responsible	for	the	choice	to	adopt	PB,	they	instead	found	themselves	forced	to	hold	public	budgetary	debates	as	part	of	the	requirements	in	an	IMF	bailout	as	happened	in	Peru	in	the	past	decade	(Jaramillo	&	Daniel	2015)?	Would	the	state’s	ability	to	control	the	agenda	be	stronger	or	weaker	if	debate	over	the	budget	were	taking	place	within	a	newly	created	administrative	level	of	government	as	was	the	case	in	Russia	(Beuermann	&	Amelia	2014)?	Can	citizens	become	empowered	through	PB	administered	by	an	authoritarian,	one-party	state	such	as	China	(He	2011)?	Based	on	my	findings,	the	answer	to	all	of	these	questions	would	seem	to	be	a	resounding	“No”.		 Instead	of	attempting	to	treat	diverse	national	experiments	as	functionally	equivalent	to	facilitate	cross-national	comparison,	the	study	of	participatory	budgeting	may	be	better	served	by	examining	differences	in	the	practices	that	have	developed	across	the	world.	The	Porto	Alegre	experience	is	likely	not	the	most	relevant	reference	case	for	the	majority	of	programs	outside	Brazil,	and	it	would	be	useful	to	identify	other	reference	points	that	drive	expansion	in	national	contexts	that	differ	substantially	from	that	of	Brazil.	PB	emerged	during	a	unique	historical	juncture	in	Brazil’s	history,	and	was	intended	to	resolve	immediate	and	pressing	needs.	The	relevance	of	PB	in	other	countries	could	be	contingent	either	on	the	presence	of	factors	similar	to	those	of	Brazil	in	the	1990s	or,	
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alternatively,	on	the	ability	of	local	politicians	to	repurpose	the	basic	framework	of	PB	to	meet	a	different	set	of	locally	relevant	imperatives.		For	example,	even	if	what	passes	as	PB	in	China	is	heavily	circumscribed,	it	could	very	well	be	the	first	opportunity	for	citizens	to	directly	participate	in	municipal	decision-making,	a	step	towards	the	diffusion	of	democratic	norms	amongst	ordinary	citizens	with	potential	implications	for	the	country’s	future	political	development	(Wu	&	Wang	2012).	Given	the	declining	use	of	participatory	budgeting	in	Brazil,	the	development	of	an	accurate	framework	to	understand	global	PB	practice	is	likely	to	become	increasingly	important	in	understanding	what	future	possibilities	may	exist	for	public	involvement	in	local	budgetary	planning.	The	focus	needs	to	expand	beyond	the	program’s	communicative	features	and	evaluate	the	extent	to	which	additional	dimensions	of	the	original	project	have	travelled	beyond	Brazil’s	borders.		 	
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Appendix	
	The	following	tables	contain	the	robustness	tests	for	the	analysis	in	Chapter	3.	For	each	table,	the	rows	represent	each	of	the	ten	dependent	variables	used	within	the	chapter.	For	tables	A.1	through	A.3,	each	column	contains	one	of	the	different	estimation	techniques	discussed	in	the	chapter	body.	Each	cell	reports	the	coefficient	on	the	number	of	years	a	PB	program	has	been	in	place	when	using	a	particular	alternative	estimation	technique	with	the	dependent	variable.	Table	A.1	uses	the	Sintomer	et	al,	broad	definition	of	PB	whereas	table	A.2	uses	MPB	and	table	A.3	uses	CPB.	To	check	whether	or	not	the	CPB/MPB	distinction	is	merely	serving	as	a	proxy	for	the	effect	of	PT-led	PB,	table	A.4	follows	the	same	general	model	for	the	rows	but,	instead	of	estimates	from	different	tests,	the	columns	contains	the	coefficient	of	the	PB	indicator,	a	dummy	for	having	a	PT	mayor	and	the	interaction	term	between	the	two.	Tables	A.4	through	A.7	report	the	results	of	an	endogeneity	test	in	which	PB	is	measure	by	three	dummy	variables	–	one	for	the	four-year	term	prior	to	adoption,	one	to	the	first	mayoral	term	during	which	PB	was	adopted	and	a	third	for	all	subsequent	years	that	PB	is	in	place.	The	coefficients	of	these	three	variables	are	displayed	across	the	three	columns,	splitting	up	the	different	PB	categories	across	separate	tables	using	the	same	pattern	as	in	tables	A.1	to	A.3.		 	
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	Table	A.1	–	PB	(MPB	plus	CPB)	and	Local	Government	Spending,	Alternative	Estimation	Techniques		
	
Main	
Results	
Pooled	
OLS	
Prais-
Winsten	
AR	
Random	
Effects	
Year	
dummies	
Investment	(log	pc)	 .010**	 .003	 .009*	 .005*	 .007*	
	
(.004)	 (.003)	 (.005)	 (.003)	 (.004)	
%	Investment	 .085**	 .027	 .051	 .030	 .042	
	
(.038)	 (.023)	 (.044)	 (.027)	 (.037)	
Infrastructure	(log	pc)	 .011***	 .003	 .010*	 .003	 .008***	
	
(.004)	 (.002)	 (.006)	 (.002)	 (.003)	
%	Infrastructure	 .093***	 .023*	 .089*	 .024	 .065**	
	
(.033)	 (.013)	 (.046)	 (.027)	 (.030)	
Healthcare	(log	pc)	 .001	 -.001	 -.001	 -.001	 .001	
	
(.002)	 (.001)	 (.003)	 (.001)	 (.001)	
%	Healthcare	 -.210	 -.009	 .003	 -.010	 -.013	
	
(.038)	 (.017)	 (.058)	 (.029)	 (.035)	
Education	(log	pc)	 -.001	 -.001	 -.003*	 -.001	 -.001	
	
(.001)	 (.001)	 (.002)	 (.001)	 (.001)	
%	Education	 -.050	 -.010	 -.074	 -.010	 -.034	
	
(.032)	 (.017)	 (.047)	 (.018)	 (.028)	
Own-Source	(log	pc)	 .003*	 .001	 .004	 .001**	 .003*	
	
(.002)	 (.001)	 (.003)	 (.001)	 (.001)	
%	Own-Source	 .027	 .014	 .059**	 .016*	 .023	
	
(.020)	 (.012)	 (.029)	 (.009)	 (.018)			 	
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	Table	A.2	–	PB	(MPB)	and	Local	Government	Spending,	Alternative	Estimation	Techniques		
	
Main	
Results	
Pooled	
OLS	
Prais-
Winsten	
AR	
Random	
Effects	
Year	
dummies	
Investment	(log	pc)	 .012**	 .004*	 .013**	 .004	 .010*	
	
(.006)	 (.002)	 (.006)	 (.003)	 (.005)	
%	Investment	 .113**	 .044**	 .100**	 .049	 .075	
	
(.053)	 (.017)	 (.051)	 (.031)	 (.050)	
Infrastructure	(log	pc)	 .011***	 .002	 .011	 .002	 .008***	
	
(.004)	 (.002)	 (.007)	 (.003)	 (.004)	
%	Infrastructure	 .092***	 .015	 .100*	 .018	 .073**	
	
(.036)	 (.017)	 (.054)	 (.032)	 (.032)	
Healthcare	(log	pc)	 .002	 -.001	 -.001	 -.001	 .001	
	
(.002)	 (.001)	 (.003)	 (.002)	 (.002)	
%	Healthcare	 .004	 -.011	 .018	 -.011	 .006	
	
(.040)	 (.016)	 (.069)	 (.035)	 (.037)	
Education	(log	pc)	 -.001	 -.001	 -.002	 -.001	 -.001	
	
(.001)	 (.001)	 (.002)	 (.001)	 (.001)	
%	Education	 -.030	 -.004	 -.040	 -.006	 -.019	
	
(.040)	 (.018)	 (.057)	 (.022)	 (.035)	
Own-Source	(log	pc)	 .003	 .001	 .003	 .001	 .001	
	
(.002)	 (.001)	 (.003)	 (.001)	 (.001)	
%	Own-Source	 .002	 .006	 .038	 .008	 .004	
	
(.024)	 (.011)	 (.036)	 (.009)	 (.020)			 	
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	Table	A.3	–	PB	(CPB)	and	Local	Government	Spending,	Alternative	Estimation	Techniques		
	
Main	
Results	 Pooled	OLS	
Prais-
Winsten	
AR	
Random	
Effects	
Year	
dummies	
Investment	(log	pc)	 .001	 -.002	 -.003	 -.002	 -.001	
	
(.006)	 (.006)	 (.011)	 (.005)	 (.005)	
%	Investment	 -.033	 -.055	 -.128	 -.059	 -.061	
	
(.054)	 (.059)	 (.099)	 (.041)	 (.054)	
Infrastructure	(log	pc)	 .007	 .006	 .003	 .005	 .004	
	
(.006)	 (.004)	 (.012)	 (.003)	 (.005)	
%	Infrastructure	 .055	 .057	 .041	 .054	 .011	
	
(.053)	 (.047)	 (.098)	 (.038)	 (.049)	
Healthcare	(log	pc)	 -.002	 .001	 .001	 .001	 .001	
	
(.005)	 (.002)	 (.006)	 (.002)	 (.003)	
%	Healthcare	 -.037	 .001	 .018	 .015	 -.011	
	
(.101)	 (.002)	 (.070)	 (.052)	 (.088)	
Education	(log	pc)	 -.004*	 -.001	 -.008**	 -.002	 -.001	
	
(.002)	 (.001)	 (.003)	 (.001)	 (.002)	
%	Education	 -.088	 -.027	 -.128	 -.028	 -.058	
	
(.058)	 (.034)	 (.094)	 (.048)	 (.052)	
Own-Source	(log	pc)	 .004	 .002	 .003	 .002	 .002	
	
(.003)	 (.002)	 (.005)	 (.002)	 (.002)	
%	Own-Source	 .077**	 .030	 .037	 .029	 .064*	
	
(.039)	 (.018)	 (.056)	 (.023)	 (.038)			 	
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Table	A.4	–	PB	with	PT	Rule	and	Local	Government	Spending		
	
Years	PB	 PT	Mayor	
Years	
PB*PT	
Investment	(log	pc)	 .012**	 -.052	 -.001	
	
(.006)	 (.032)	 (.007)	
%	Investment	 .114**	 -.759**	 -.008	
	
(.049)	 (.301)	 (.058)	
Infrastructure	(log	pc)	 .009	 -.025	 -.001	
	
(.006)	 (.026)	 (.006)	
%	Infrastructure	 .105**	 -.290	 -.021	
	
(.047)	 (.242)	 (.056)	
Healthcare	(log	pc)	 -.001	 .021	 -.001	
	
(.002)	 (.012)	 (.002)	
%	Healthcare	 -.027	 .700**	 -.050	
	
(.052)	 (.269)	 (.053)	
Education	(log	pc)	 -.002	 -.005	 .001	
	
(.002)	 (.007)	 (.002)	
%	Education	 -.043	 -.086	 .033	
	
(.051)	 (.229)	 (.054)	
Own	Source	(log	pc)	 .001	 -.023***	 .002	
	
(.003)	 (.009)	 (.003)	
%	Own-Source	 .015	 -.231**	 .019	
	
(.034)	 (.102)	 (.035)			 	
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Table	A.5	–	Pre-Treatment	Effect/Endogeneity	Test	(MPB	plus	CPB)		
	
M	=	-1	 M	=	1	 M	>1	
Investment	(log	pc)	 -.063*	 -.029	 .030	
	
(.032)	 (.025)	 (.034)	
%	Investment	 -.728	 -.633	 .056	
	
(.306)	 (.257)	 (.355)	
Infrastructure	(log	pc)	 .017	 .003	 .101***	
	
(.033)	 (.034)	 (.032)	
%	Infrastructure	 -.116	 -.177	 .709**	
	
(.284)	 (.247)	 (.295)	
Healthcare	(log	pc)	 .007	 .026**	 .014	
	
(.015)	 (.013)	 (.015)	
%	Healthcare	 -.127	 .284	 .002	
	
(.273)	 (.269)	 (.331)	
Education	(log	pc)	 .016*	 .004	 -.008	
	
(.009)	 (.009)	 (.010)	
%	Education	 .252	 -.208	 -.457*	
	
(.244)	 (.226)	 (.240)	
Own	Source	(log	pc)	 .025**	 .035***	 .034***	
	
(.010)	 (.012)	 (.011)	
%	Own-Source	 .085	 .264	 .301**	
	
(.127)	 (.175)	 (.155)			 	
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Table	A.6	-	Pre-Treatment	Effect/Endogeneity	Test	(MPB)		
	
M	=	-1	 M	=	1	 M	>1	
Investment	(log	pc)	 -.084**	 -.003	 .040	
	
(.042)	 (.034)	 (.047)	
%	Investment	 -1.02***	 -.345	 .144	
	
(.374)	 (.367)	 (.493)	
Infrastructure	(log	pc)	 -.012	 .022	 .086**	
	
(.042)	 (.041)	 (.037)	
%	Infrastructure	 -.478	 .127	 .543*	
	
(.386)	 (.359)	 (.335)	
Healthcare	(log	pc)	 .007	 .016	 .021	
	
(.016)	 (.017)_	 (.018)	
%	Healthcare	 -.134	 .027	 .211	
	
(.341)	 (.357)	 (.360)	
Education	(log	pc)	 .001	 -.003	 -.006	
	
(.010)	 (.010)	 (.013)	
%	Education	 -.279	 -.433	 -.425	
	
(.296)	 (.287)	 (.338)	
Own	Source	(log	pc)	 .017*	 .012	 .029**	
	
(.010)	 (.011)	 (.014)	
%	Own-Source	 -.003	 -.035	 .226	
	
(.143)	 (.154)	 (.210)			 	
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Table	A.7	–	Pre-Treatment	Effect/Endogeneity	Test	(CPB)		
	
M	=	-1	 M	=	1	 M	>1	
Investment	(log	pc)	 -.004	 -.031	 -.010	
	
(.037)	 (.028)	 (.049)	
%	Investment	 -.167	 -.555**	 -.506	
	
(.370)	 (.278)	 (.443)	
Infrastructure	(log	pc)	 .055	 .011	 .060	
	
(.038)	 (.041)	 (.046)	
%	Infrastructure	 .391	 -.184	 .411	
	
(.341)	 (.299)	 (.367)	
Healthcare	(log	pc)	 .003	 .025	 -.010	
	
(.022)	 (.016)	 (.027)	
%	Healthcare	 -.105	 .362	 -.365	
	
(.363)	 (.365)	 (.674)	
Education	(log	pc)	 .007	 .002	 -.021*	
	
(.012)	 (.011)	 (.013)	
%	Education	 .218	 -.144	 -.507	
	
(.320)	 (.259)	 (.347)	
Own	Source	(log	pc)	 .017	 .044***	 .026*	
	
(.014)	 (.016)	 (.016)	
%	Own-Source	 -.063	 .378	 .421**	
	
(.174)	 (.239)	 (.205)			 	
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